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PORTSIDE  August 2012, Week 1

PORTSIDE August 2012, Week 1

Subject:

Understanding the Standoff in Mali

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Date:

Tue, 7 Aug 2012 20:23:00 -0400

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Understanding the Standoff in Mali
By Giorgio Cafiero
Foreign Policy in Focus
August 3, 2012
http://www.fpif.org/articles/understanding_the_standoff_in_mali

The standoff between Mali's government and the armed
Islamists who control two-thirds of the country is
unlikely to resolve peacefully, and the prospects for a
new war in the Sahel appear increasingly probable.

In January, a disciplined Tuareg separatist group, the
Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA),
initiated a rebellion that eventually forced Mali's
corrupt and weak military to withdraw from the northern
part of the country in April.  Militant Islamist groups
- Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith) and Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - subsequently took over the
territory and demonstrated a fierce determination to
impose a Taliban-style government on the entire country.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which includes Mali and 14 other Western African states,
and France have expressed a commitment to preserving
Mali's territorial integrity and disarming the militant
Islamists by any means possible, including military
intervention if peaceful measures fail.

Unfortunately, if the humanitarian issues that fueled
this conflict remain unaddressed, a military solution is
unlikely to resolve the tensions that led to the Malian
state's collapse. However, Ansar Dine and AQIM's
extremist nature suggests that a military solution may
be inevitable if the government in Bamako seeks to
reestablish the country's territorial integrity and
restore its prized reputation as a rare African
democratic success story.

The Rise of Azawad

Tuaregs are a nomadic Berber tribe, numbering 1.5 to 3
million, who inhabit territories within Mali, Niger,
Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Libya. They
practice a moderate form of Islam and have managed trade
routes - primarily in gold, slaves, salt, and ivory -
throughout the Sahara for over a millennium. Despite
centuries of old divisions and inner power struggles,
the Tuaregs share the same grievances and goals.

When French colonial rule in Africa ended, the Tuaregs
were scattered across numerous countries. Similar to the
Middle East's Kurdish population, the Tuaregs felt
marginalized in the newly independent states. Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, severe droughts created new
humanitarian and environmental catastrophes for the
Tuaregs. Such experiences fueled nationalist ambitions
and dreams of an independent Tuareg state, which to date
has never existed. Each uprising was suppressed. Peace
settlements, typically brokered by Algeria, promised
development projects for the Tuaregs. However, these
promises never materialized.

Throughout 2011, dry spells and low river levels created
a severe drought across the Sahel. Consequently, 3
million Malians (including 600,000 children younger than
five) fell victim to food insecurity. Worldwide, Mali's
maternal and infant mortality rates rank tenth and
third, respectively. This extremely impoverished African
country's GDP per capita ($1,100 USD), life expectancy
at birth (53 years), and electricity consumption (455.7
million kWh) rank 206, 209, and 165, respectively. Rural
development in the Sahel would require an annual
investment of 1.5 billion Euros for the next decade,
according to a World Bank consultant. These figures
define the context in which the Tuaregs initiated an
armed uprising in January 2012.

The NATO intervention in Libya directly influenced the
Tuaregs' capacity to overpower the Malian military. Once
violence erupted in Libya during 2011, Gaddafi hired
tens of thousands of foreign mercenaries - primarily
from Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Chad - to battle Libya's
opposition. As longtime allies of Gaddafi, many Tuareg
rebels entered Libya to fight alongside his regime. As
Gaddafi's regime collapsed and chaos ensued, the Tuareg
fighters returned to northern Mali with large stockpiles
of Gaddafi's weapons and initiated their rebellion
against Bamako on January 17, 2012. Mali's weak and ill-
equipped military lacked the strength to quell the
uprising.

In response to the civilian government's inability to
suppress the uprising, Captain Amadou Sanogo led a
military coup d'état on March 22, overthrowing President
Amadou Toumani Touré and ending Mali's two decades of
democratic rule. Sanogo's junta, named the "National
Committee for the Revival of Democracy and the
Restoration of the State," called on northern Malians to
resist the Tuareg separatists. Despite the military
leader's intentions, Sanogo's coup only strengthened the
Tuaregs' determination to achieve independence. Less
than two weeks later, the MNLA seized control of
northern Mali, forcing Sanogo's forces to flee. On April
6, a rebel spokesman told the France 24 TV channel, "We
solemnly proclaim the independence of Azawad as of
today." The separatist group's first press statement
outlined its objective of "free[ing] the people of
Azawad from the illegal occupation of its territory by
Mali."

Azawad refers to the northern portion of Mali -
including Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao - that the MNLA
seized control of after the coup in Bamako. Although
previous Tuareg separatist demands have included the
incorporation of southern Algeria, western Niger, and
western Libya as well, the MNLA declared that their
self-proclaimed independent state, Azawad, would respect
the borders of all neighboring states. The MNLA's self-
proclaimed independence from Bamako was condemned by the
African Union and several Western governments, which
asserted that they would never question Mali's
territorial integrity. No state within the international
community recognized the legitimacy of Azawad's
independence.

However, international condemnation of Sanogo's coup led
to an ECOWAS-brokered deal, meant to return Mali to
civilian rule. On April 12, 2012, Mali's parliamentary
speaker, Dioncounda Traoré, was sworn in as interim
president. A 70-year old mathematician educated in
France, the Soviet Union, and Algeria, Traoré lacked
legitimacy. Thousands of Sanogo's supporters stormed
Traoré's office on May 21, chanting "down with ECOWAS,
Down with Diouncounda" and carrying an empty coffin with
the interim president's name written on it. After being
beaten by the crowd, Traoré was forced to seek medical
treatment in France. Two months later, Traoré returned
to form a unity government, although much confusion
remains as to who leads Mali's government.

Islamist Hijacking

As chaos ensued, Ansar Dine and AQIM entered northern
Mali, with more guns and money than the MNLA, and seized
control of the territory that the MNLA previously
claimed for their Tuareg state. Ansar Dine immediately
stated its opposition to independence. "Our war is a
holy war. It's a legal war in the name of Islam. We are
against rebellions." The organization's military chief
Omar Hamaha continued, "We are against independence. We
are against revolutions not in the name of Islam."

Currently, according to the BBC, "Timbuktu is under
Sharia law. Gunmen patrol the streets, arresting men for
smoking, forcing women to veil their faces." David Blair
of the Telegraph reported, "Al Qaeda's allies have
imposed the rigours of Sharia, banning alcohol and
music, blocking the local television signal and
preventing radio stations from broadcasting anything but
official announcements and Koranic verse." Amnesty
International labeled the human rights crisis as the
worst situation in Mali since independence in 1960. The
violence in northern Mali has displaced 365,000 people,
15,000 of whom fled to neighboring Mauritania in the
final two weeks of June, according to the United Nations
High commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR). Smaller numbers
of refugees have fled to Algeria, Burkina Faso, and
Niger.

A dearth of funding threatens to exacerbate the ongoing
humanitarian crises within the refugee camps. A UN
report has stated:

Operations to support Malian refugees are threatened by
a critical low level of funding. For UNHCR, only US$34.9
million has been received against an appeal for US$153
million, that is just 22.7% of the funding needed. Our
partners World Food Program (WFP) and United Nations
Children Fund (UNICEF) also report poor funding levels
for refugee operations in the region. UNHCR and partners
are struggling to maintain minimum humanitarian
standards for the refugees. In some camps in Niger and
Burkina Faso refugees have to contend with daily water
supplies below the emergency standard of 15 litres per
person per day.

The sacking of hotels, in addition to the widespread
violence, has essentially destroyed Mali's tourism
industry. "The entire local economy is gone. Everything
has been torn down," stated Halle Ousmane Cisse,
Timbuktu's mayor. "There's no more trade, no more banks.
Administrative services are non-existent: Islamists have
looted everything. Timbuktu is now a ghost town."

After the armed Islamist factions hijacked the MNLA's
struggle, the MNLA's political objective changed. On
July 15, Ibrahim Ag Assaleh, a MNLA senior member,
declared an end to his organization's separatist
demands. "We are seeking cultural, political and
economic independence but not secession," stated
Assaleh, who instead advocated a system like Canada's
Quebec province, which enjoys special autonomy rights.
Another MNLA official stated that "independence has been
our line since the start of the conflict but we are
taking on board the view of the international community
to resolve the crisis."

Presently, the African Union is attempting to negotiate
a peace settlement with Ansar Dine if the organization
separates from AQIM. Meanwhile, in the event that a
peaceful resolution fails to develop - a likely outcome
given Ansar Dine's extremism - the African Union,
through ECOWAS, is planning the creation of a UN-backed,
3,300-troop force to expel the Islamist militants from
northern Mali and reunify the state. French Foreign
Minister Laurent Fabius warned that Paris would send
forces into Mali to initiate an assault on AQIM, which
considers France enemy number one. As of this writing,
the coalition is seeking the UN Security Council's
approval for military intervention.

While denouncing the "bribed" governments of ECOWAS,
Ansar Dine threatened reprisals against the Malian
government and other states complicit in any coalition
intent on forcefully expelling the armed Islamists.
Ansar Dine threatened France with a statement promising
"suicide bombings, assassinations or abductions," even
if non-French troops enter northern Mali, based upon the
assumption that West African troops would be acting on
behalf of French interests. Ultimately, if the African
Union fails to negotiate a political solution with Ansar
Dine, northern Mali's malnourished civilian population
may have to endure a bloody war between a French-backed
ECOWAS coalition and Ansar Dine, on top of the daily
struggle to survive in the drought-stricken region.

Lessons for the White House

The Sahel is one of the world's most unstable and
dangerous regions. Portions of the land are controlled
by armed Islamist extremists, drug smugglers, and
kidnappers whose income depends on the ransoms of
Western hostages. The lawlessness and extreme poverty
within this strip of territory below the waterless
Sahara threatens to create a new Afghanistan or Somalia
in West Africa. The collapse of the Malian state has
enabled Al Qaeda to gain a safe haven in more than
300,000 square miles of Malian territory with vast
natural resources, airports and military bases. This
scenario creates grave security concerns for the United
States.

Washington has been slow to learn the painful lessons of
blowback. The Western military intervention against
Gaddafi transformed Libya into the world's largest
source of illicit weaponry following the regime's
demise. Militant groups, including the MNLA, seized the
opportunity to overpower Mali's army, thus empowering
AQIM to become the dominant force alongside their
Islamist Tuareg counterpart, Ansar Dine. Provided the
confusion and power vacuum in Bamako, the Malian state
has no capacity to expel AQIM without foreign
intervention.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States has spent an annual $100 million on the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a
part of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), to
boost the Sahel governments' anti-terrorism efforts and
weaken al-Qaeda's regional influence. Nonetheless, the
AFRICOM mission in Mali backfired. The 87 Land Cruisers
and satellite communications technology that the United
States gave Mali's military fell into AQIM's hands after
it gained control of northern Mali, according to David
Blair. "The Islamists are the masters today," claims
Blair's unidentified source inside the Malian army.
"They have all the equipment that we left in the field."

When Amadou Toumani Touré usurped power in 1991 in a
military coup, he restored civilian rule the following
year, earning the title, "soldier of democracy." Before
insecurity and violence erupted in 2012, Mali
experienced two decades of democracy and was hailed as
an African democratic success story. Today, however,
Mali's future appears dark. No central government wields
the power, or legitimacy, to protect Malians from the
daily atrocities carried out by armed factions. Nor can
it address the environmental, economic, and humanitarian
crises that place millions of the brink of starvation
and fuel the flames of radicalism. Any strategy that the
Obama administration employs will carry high risks, and
no easy solution is apparent.

Nonetheless, Washington should encourage dialogue among
all the relevant regional actors even if the prospects
for peaceful settlement are dim, and focus on addressing
the root causes of instability in the region -
environmental degradation, desertification, food
insecurity, and large weapon flows. Besides al-Qaeda and
its like-minded extremists, no one has an interest in
seeing one of Africa's largest nations becoming another
Afghanistan.

___________________________________________

Portside aims to provide material of interest to people
on the left that will help them to interpret the world
and to change it.

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