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PORTSIDE  April 2012, Week 3

PORTSIDE April 2012, Week 3

Subject:

The Federal Reserve Turns Left

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The Federal Reserve Turns Left
William Greider
April 11, 2012
This article appeared in the April 30, 2012
edition of The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com/article/167355/federal-reserve-turns-left
 
Washington is lost in a snarl of confusion, cowardice
and wrongheaded ideological assumptions that threaten to
keep the economy in a ditch for a long time. That
prospect is not much discussed in the halls of Congress
or the White House. It's as though the crisis has been
put on hold until after the presidential election.

As almost everyone understands, nothing substantial will
be accomplished this year. President Obama is
campaigning on warmed-over optimism and paper-thin
policy proposals. Republicans propose to make things
worse by drastically shrinking government spending, when
the opposite is needed to foster a real recovery. The
president, like the GOP, embraces large-scale deficit
reduction. In these circumstances, it's just as well
that the two parties cannot reach agreement. After the
election they may make a deal that splits the difference
between bad and worse. In the worst case, they might
inadvertently tip the economy back into recession.

A year and a half after Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act, the Federal Reserve still refuses to block the
Capitol One mergers.

Sniping by Perry and Gingrich is opportunistic. But with
capitalism in crisis, it reflects a deeper insecurity
among conservatives.

In this sorry situation, there is really only one
governing institution with the courage to dissent from
the conventional wisdom-the Federal Reserve. The central
bank declines to participate in the happy talk about
recovery or in the righteous sermons attacking the
deficit. In its muted manner, the Fed keeps explaining
why the house is still on fire, why more aggressive
action is needed, and is gently nudging the politicians
who decide fiscal policy to step up. But its message is
ignored by Congress and the president and viciously
attacked by right-wing Republicans who say, Butt out.

The stakes in this elite dialogue are enormous. The
outcome will be more meaningful for ordinary citizens
than any other issue at play in this year's campaign. If
the Fed is right and politicians refuse to act,
Americans may be condemned to a bitter slog through many
years of stagnation.

Japan in the 1990s is the appropriate comparison. After
its financial bubble burst, Japan saw its "lost decade"
stretch into fifteen years of stunted growth. Its
central bank responded hesitantly, and its monetary
policy proved ineffective-rendered impotent by a
"liquidity trap," a condition identified by John Maynard
Keynes. The United States experienced a similar fate in
the Great Depression of the 1930s. As an economics
professor, Fed chair Ben Bernanke is a scholar of that
period. He is determined not to let it happen again. A
decade ago, he scolded Japanese authorities for failing
to be more imaginative and aggressive. They needed "the
courage to abandon failed paradigms and to do what
needed to be done," Bernanke advised. His model was
Franklin Roosevelt, whose "specific policy actions were,
I think, less important than his willingness to be
aggressive and to experiment-in short, to do whatever
was necessary to get the country moving again."

Maybe the Fed chair should give the same lecture to
American politicians. But Bernanke is at risk of
embarrassment himself: despite the Fed's firepower, it
has been unable to restart the economy. And monetary
policy is running out of gas. Five years ago, in the
heat of crisis, Bernanke's response was awesome. The Fed
created trillions of dollars and flooded the system with
easy money-enough to stabilize financial markets and
rescue wounded banks. It brought short-term interest
rates down to near zero and long-term mortgage rates to
bargain-basement levels. It provided a huge backstop for
the dysfunctional housing sector, buying $1.25 trillion
in mortgage- backed securities, nearly one-fourth of the
market.

Flooding Wall Street with money saved the banks, but it
didn't work for the real economy, where most Americans
live and toil. The housing sector kept falling. The Fed
knows (even if politicians do not) the danger of sliding
into a liquidity trap, which would utterly disarm its
monetary tools (Charles Evans, president of the Chicago
Federal Reserve Bank, thinks the trap has already
closed). So the Fed wants Congress and the White House
to borrow and spend more, which, when the private sector
is stalled, only the government can do. To advance this
cause, the central bank is promoting its recent white
paper on housing, proposing, ever so gingerly, the
heretical remedy of debt forgiveness for the millions of
homeowners facing foreclosure.

The august central bank is engaged in a startling role
reversal. It has turned left, so to speak, abandoned old
positions on fundamental matters and endorsed Keynesian
principles it once spurned. Bernanke would doubtless
protest that this is not about left or right, that the
Fed is simply doing what it's supposed to do in a
crisis-using the stimulative power of money creation to
act as "lender of last resort." Nevertheless, for nearly
three decades, first under Paul Volcker and then Alan
Greenspan, the Fed did pretty much the opposite. It was
the conservative authority that dominated policy-making,
scolding politicians for their spending excesses and
threatening to punish over-exuberant growth by raising
interest rates.

A tidal shift in governing influence is under way,
because monetary policy is now eclipsed. As the central
bank loses control, the stronger hand shifts to the
fiscal side of government. That seminal insight
originates with economist Paul McCulley, retired after
many years as Fed watcher for PIMCO, the world's largest
bond fund. McCulley is a Keynesian who never bought into
the ideological fantasy of self-correcting markets. His
views won respect at the Fed because he was right. Only
politicians still don't get it. After thirty years of
deferring to conservative orthodoxy, both parties are
afraid to break from the past. While the Fed pushes for
fiscal expansion, Congress and the president remain
obsessed with deficit reduction.

"This was not supposed to happen," McCulley observes.
"The fiscal authority was always supposed to be afraid
of the Fed. The Fed would say, Don't do this, don't do
that. And the fiscal side would back off. Now you have a
situation where monetary policy is effectively impotent
and the Fed is openly inviting the fiscal side to do
what for decades the Fed told it they couldn't do." The
"missing partner," McCulley says, is the fainthearted
politician who clings to old dogma about fiscal
rectitude, even though the crisis has made those
convictions "irresponsible."

As a longstanding critic of the Federal Reserve, I am
experiencing a role reversal of my own. In the new
circumstances, I find myself feeling sympathy and a
measure of admiration for Bernanke's willingness to
stand up for unorthodox ideas and to switch sides on the
sensitive matter of debt reduction for failing
homeowners. For many years, I have assailed the
institution's unaccountable power and anti-democratic
qualities, its incestuous relations with powerful banks
and investment houses. Those flaws and contradictions
remain unreformed, yet I now think the country needs a
stronger Fed-a central bank not afraid to use its
awesome powers to help the real economy more directly.

People ask, How come the Federal Reserve can dispense
trillions to save Wall Street banks but won't do the
same to rescue the real economy? Good question. They
deserve a better answer than the legalisms provided by
the Fed. At this troubled hour, the Federal Reserve
should find the nerve to abandon "failed paradigms" and
to use its broad powers to serve a broader conception of
the public interest.

* * *

The Fed belatedly turned its attention to the
foreclosure crisis when it realized that the housing
sector, clogged with millions of failed mortgages and
vacant houses, was a big part of why Bernanke's monetary
policy failed. Housing, of course, is an issue that
belongs to the fiscal side of government, but the Fed
can help out because its "dual mandate" in law requires
monetary policy to support both maximum employment and
stable money. If the housing market does not get well,
Fed experts reasoned, there will be no recovery.

Though it seemed out of character for the austere
central bank, the Fed has staged its version of a media
blitz on behalf of troubled homeowners. In the span of
seven days in January, two governors from the Federal
Reserve Board in Washington and three presidents from
the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks delivered
strong speeches on how to stop the bleeding and revive
housing. They asked the elected politicians to consider
a broad campaign to reduce the principal owed by the 11
million homeowners who are underwater, owing more on
their mortgages than their homes are worth. Most of them
can't sell and can't keep up with their payments, and
are thus doomed to foreclosure.

All this was explained in the white paper Bernanke sent
to Capitol Hill, which explained why cleaning up the
housing mess is necessary for a "quicker and more
vigorous recovery." Housing advocates and community
activists had been telling the central bank the same
thing since the collapse began. Fed governors listened
politely but never responded- until now. If nothing
changes, the white paper warned, market adjustments
"will take longer and incur more deadweight losses,
pushing house prices still lower and thereby prolonging
the downward pressure on the wealth of current
homeowners and the resultant drag on the economy at
large."

* * *

The white paper was hedged with lots of qualifiers, but
it read like a handbook for recovery. A prime mover
behind the initiative was William Dudley, president of
the New York Fed. A Goldman Sachs alumnus, Dudley is
first among equals, because the New York Fed is always
closest to Wall Street. Dudley suggested $15 billion in
bridge loans to tide over unemployed homeowners. He
urged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) now in conservatorship, to
loosen their tightfisted control over mortgages and
reduce outstanding balances on delinquent loans-which
most likely will never be repaid anyway.

"I am uncomfortable with the notion that `underwater'
borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than their
homes are worth should have to go delinquent before they
have a chance of securing a reduction in their mortgage
debt," Dudley told an audience of New Jersey bankers in
January. The standard objection to debt reduction is
"moral hazard"-the fear that it will encourage bad
behavior by other debtors. Dudley dismissed this as
overblown. Most people in trouble, he said, are victims
of bad luck-they bought their house at the peak of
market prices or they became unemployed through no fault
of their own. "Punishing such misfortune accomplishes
little," he said.

Dudley's remark suggests a different tone at the Fed,
one more sensitive to the human dimensions of economic
crisis. Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin, who was appointed
to the Federal Reserve Board by Obama, delivered an
unusually caustic message to bankers last year. She is
pushing substantive penalties for banking-sector abuses-
the regulatory diligence neglected by the Greenspan Fed.
"In the housing sector, we traveled a very low road that
had nothing to do with looking out for the greater
good," Raskin declared. "On the contrary, there were too
many people in all of the functional component parts-
mortgage brokers, loan originators, loan securitizers,
subprime lenders, Wall Street investment bankers and
rating agencies-who were interested only in making their
own fast profits.. Now it is time to pay back the
American citizenry in full."

A sense of moral resonance runs through the white paper.
Fairness, it turns out, is an economic variable. So are
the social consequences of doing nothing. The
foreclosure mess, the Fed noted, hurts innocent
bystanders when their neighborhoods are ruined by other
people's failure. Towns burdened by lots of empty houses
lose property-tax revenue needed to sustain public
services. The foreclosure process piles up "deadweight
losses" in which nobody wins, not even bankers.

Mortgage relief, on the other hand, in effect
redistributes income and wealth from creditors to
debtors. "Modifying an existing mortgage-by extending
the term, reducing the interest rate, or reducing
principal-can be a mechanism for distributing some of a
homeowner's loss (for example, from falling house prices
or reduced income) to lenders, guarantors, investors,
and, in some cases, taxpayers," the Fed document
explained. Both the lender and the borrower can gain
from reducing the size of an underwater mortgage, the
Fed asserted. "Because foreclosures are so costly, some
loan modifications can benefit all parties concerned,
even if the borrower is making reduced payments."

Refinancing at a lower rate and reducing the principal
allows a family to keep its home with the promise of
regaining equity as they pay down the more affordable
mortgage. The modification can also restore the loan as
a profitable investment for lenders, who will gain a
greater return than they would if they had let the
mortgage slide into foreclosure. Writing it down
acknowledges that the original debt was never going to
be repaid anyway. The lender suffers an accounting
"loss" on the forgiven debt, but in real terms earns
back more.

The same logic can apply to the economy as a whole, the
Fed explained. The short-term costs of adjustment are
upfront for lenders, but the long- term benefits will be
much greater for the overall economy if clearing away
bad debt revives the housing market. "Greater losses.in
the near term might be in the interests of taxpayers to
pursue if those actions result in a quicker and more
vigorous recovery," Fed governors concluded. Which would
taxpayers choose? Reducing deficits or achieving "a
quicker and more vigorous recovery"? I feel certain most
people would choose jobs over balanced budgets. But we
don't really know what the people think, because the
choice is never put to them in those terms. Neither
political party has the nerve, and the media have failed
to do so. It has fallen to the cloistered central bank.

For most Republicans the Fed's message is alarming. It
sounds suspiciously liberal. The Wall Street Journal
raked Bernanke over the coals for his "extraordinary
political intrusion," denouncing the white paper as "a
clear attempt to provide intellectual cover for
politicians to spend more taxpayer money to support
housing prices." In a stern letter Senator Orrin Hatch
told the Fed chair to back off. "I worry that.your
staff's housing white paper.treads too far into fiscal
policy, and runs the risk of being perceived as advocacy
for particular policy options," Hatch wrote. Some GOP
presidential hopefuls had uglier things to say about
Bernanke.

The Fed did not push back. It could have replied that it
has a direct stake in solving the foreclosure mess-the
clogged housing market is a principal reason Bernanke's
monetary policy failed to revive the economy. The chair
had assumed that, as the Fed brought mortgage interest
rates below 4 percent, homeowners would rush to
refinance. The savings would give them new disposable
income, thus increasing aggregate demand for the
weakened economy. The lower rates would trigger a wave
of home buying and building, igniting the rebound in
real estate. Housing has always been the classic channel
by which the Fed has stimulated recovery, which it does
by reducing the cost of credit. This time it didn't
happen, because the channel was blocked. One explanation
is that the Obama administration and Congress were
standing in the way, nullifying Bernanke's
accomplishment. Bankers, investors and especially Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, were preventing homeowners from
taking advantage of the reduced rates. They threw up
various obstacles to refinancing and squeezed borrowers,
trying to collect the last drop from homeowners before
foreclosure. This is shortsighted politics, resisting
immediate losses when doing so prevents the larger
rewards of a genuine recovery. To put it another way,
government has done a lot to protect the creditors from
the costs of their misadventures. For the borrowers, not
so much.

From the start, the administration has protected the
bankers and other financial players, who have resisted
the painful reckoning needed to unfreeze the housing
sector. Presumably, the White House and Treasury feared
that relief for debtors would threaten bank revenues,
maybe their solvency. The GSEs, which guarantee 80-90
percent of mortgages, have cost the taxpayers some $150
billion. Congress gave them stern instructions to stop
the losses. Obama has danced on both sides of the issue.
He has launched several programs that promised to rescue
homeowners, but he never used the full power of his
office to force the financial sector into cooperating.
Housing advocates thought Obama's initiatives seemed
designed to fail, and one by one, they have.

* * *

Early in his presidency, Obama made fateful choices that
have come back to haunt the country. He and his
advisers, joined by the Federal Reserve and other
regulators, decided to give the fragile financial sector
"forbearance." That is, they looked the other way. It
was a banker's version of "don't ask, don't tell."
Government has given generous interpretations to the
wounded balance sheets of the largest banks. Examiners
have not challenged toxic assets booked at inflated
valuations. The assumption was that over time the
economy would recover and so would the worth of those
assets, especially in housing. But that hasn't happened.
The result is a blanket of leftover debt, which is still
burdening the economy.

Mitt Romney described this with impressive clarity while
campaigning in Florida. "We're just so overleveraged, so
much debt in our society, and some of the institutions
that hold it aren't willing to write it off," he told a
foreclosure forum. "The banks are scared to death, of
course, because they think they're going out of
business.. They just want to pretend all of this is
going to get paid someday so they don't have to write it
off.. This is cascading throughout our system, and in
some respects government is trying to just hold things
in place, hoping things get better.. My own view is you
recognize the distress, you take the loss and let people
reset. Let people start over again.. This effort to try
and exact the burden of their mistakes on homeowners and
commercial property owners, I think, is a mistake."

Over the past four years, a substantial portion of
overvalued mortgages have migrated onto public balance
sheets and are guaranteed by the GSEs. So taxpayers are
on the hook for losses, one way or the other. The
economy would benefit if these uncollectible loans were
cleared away. But who wants to tell the taxpayers they
are picking up the tab?

The government's vast holdings in fact have created
another obstacle to housing recovery. Thanks to the Fed,
Washington is the 800-pound gorilla now holding about 20
percent of the secondary market in mortgage-backed
securities (MBS). That may inhibit private investors
from restoring normal trading on their own. In past
financial disasters, like the savings and loan crisis of
the 1980s, regulators swiftly disposed of government-
held assets acquired from failed banks. This time,
government has held on too long. Eric Rosengren,
president of the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, explained
the problem. "One of the big mistakes the Japanese
made," he said, "was they kept a huge inventory of
problem real estate loans at commercial banks and
government agencies. Their housing market didn't come
back because everyone was waiting for the next shoe to
drop. When were the government and banks going to
dispose of those loans? You don't want a situation where
there is a huge overhang of real estate loans with
government agencies as a very large seller."

The Obama administration was warned of this risk early
by Sheila Bair, chair of the FDIC, and Elizabeth Warren,
chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel, as well as
numerous housing advocates. They urged Obama to clean up
the foreclosure crisis upfront to generate a quicker
recovery. The warnings were not heeded. The pattern is
not entirely clear, but it suggests a government
decision made somewhere to transform private liabilities
into public obligations. Banks repackaged MBS and sold
them to Fannie and Freddie. The GSEs applied the
government guarantee and sold the MBS to the Fed, which
now has $850 billion worth of them on its balance sheet.
The Fed is thus directly implicated in the government's
tolerance for wishful thinking.

The extent of likely losses is evidently not known. The
New York Fed, I learned, did not examine the MBS it
purchased to find out how many have inflated prices or
are burdened by too many underwater borrowers who can
never repay them. I was told the Fed didn't bother to
look further because the securities are guaranteed by
Fannie and Freddie. That seems like ludicrous
reassurance-one federal agency guaranteeing the holdings
of another agency. The taxpayers are thus on both ends
of the transaction and certain to lose if the securities
turn out to be duds.

Instead, the problem is passed around like a hot potato.
The Fed creates the money and buys a trillion dollars'
worth of MBS from Fannie and Freddie. Thanks to the
Fed's vast holdings, the securities are trading above
par. Thanks to its interest income from the MBS, the Fed
makes a profit, about $70 billion a year. At the end of
the year, it remits the money to the Treasury, which
uses it to offset budget deficits. All three agencies
are handling the public's money but from narrow-minded,
self-protective perspectives. A more rational response,
Paul McCulley suggests, would be to take the Fed
surpluses and use them to finance a massive write-down
of mortgage debt by the GSEs. Alas, in the bizarre
mechanics of federal accounting, no one knows how to get
the money from here to there.

The Federal Reserve should act because nobody else will.
That sounds unfair, since the Fed has already taken
heavy flak for poaching beyond its traditional domain.
Further experiment will enrage right-wing critics, but
the central bank is running out of options. Monetary
policy-makers say they face formidable legal limits that
people like me don't appreciate. But the Fed still has
enormous leverage. I believe what Wall Street financiers
tell me: the Fed can usually find a way to accomplish
what it really wants to do. In this case, it can break
the political impasse and goad other parties into taking
action. That does not require it to violate the Federal
Reserve Act. It does require reinterpretation of the
vaguely defined "dual mandate," which has always been
heavily biased in favor of Wall Street finance over the
real economy. If stagnation drags on for years, tearing
up society and destabilizing politics, demands for more
radical action will swell and eventually overwhelm the
old restraints.

Here is a modest example of what the Fed could do to
shake up the system and help housing revive. It could
announce its intention to buy only new mortgage-backed
securities that have been subjected to the process of
refinancing and modification to establish positive
equity and more realistic valuations. The mere
announcement would cast a cloud over the existing stock
of GSE mortgages and probably trigger a wave of market-
driven mortgage adjustments. The Fed, in effect, would
not only provide a model for debt write- downs generally
but help create the market for them. The Fed's presence
would assure people the process does not threaten the
banking system. For distressed homeowners, it would
amount to redistribution of income and wealth-sharing
the costs of the financial catastrophe among other
players instead of dumping all the pain on borrowers.
Unilateral action would send a cleansing shock wave
through the political system.

If this country ever gets back to a time when real
questions are asked about democracy and our unrealized
aspirations, people and politicians will have to talk
about the Federal Reserve and its "money power." I have
a hunch current events are educating citizens and their
elected representatives toward that day. It no longer
makes sense to keep fiscal and monetary policy separate,
pulling the economy in opposite directions. The present
crisis suggests that monetary tools should be
coordinated with the fiscal side. How this could be done
in a democratic way is a tough question, but it cannot
be answered until people and politicians are educated
far beyond their primitive level of understanding.

The other promising challenge is to convince ourselves
that money created by government really belongs to the
people. Could it be used- judiciously-to finance long-
term public projects, like infrastructure and high-speed
rail? The government as employer of last resort? Make
your own list of what the nation needs. Imagine if
highest-priority projects were financed with the new
money mysteriously created by the mighty Federal
Reserve. That would be a future worth arguing over.

___________________________________________

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April 2016, Week 2
April 2016, Week 1
March 2016, Week 5
March 2016, Week 4
March 2016, Week 3
March 2016, Week 2
March 2016, Week 1
February 2016, Week 5
February 2016, Week 4
February 2016, Week 3
February 2016, Week 2
February 2016, Week 1
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December 2015, Week 5
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December 2015, Week 3
December 2015, Week 2
December 2015, Week 1
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September 2015, Week 2
September 2015, Week 1
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August 2015, Week 3
August 2015, Week 2
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July 2015, Week 3
July 2015, Week 2
July 2015, Week 1
June 2015, Week 5
June 2015, Week 4
June 2015, Week 3
June 2015, Week 2
June 2015, Week 1
May 2015, Week 5
May 2015, Week 4
May 2015, Week 3
May 2015, Week 2
May 2015, Week 1
April 2015, Week 5
April 2015, Week 4
April 2015, Week 3
April 2015, Week 2
April 2015, Week 1
March 2015, Week 5
March 2015, Week 4
March 2015, Week 3
March 2015, Week 2
March 2015, Week 1
February 2015, Week 4
February 2015, Week 3
February 2015, Week 2
February 2015, Week 1
January 2015, Week 5
January 2015, Week 4
January 2015, Week 3
January 2015, Week 2
January 2015, Week 1
December 2014, Week 5
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December 2014, Week 3
December 2014, Week 2
December 2014, Week 1
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November 2014, Week 4
November 2014, Week 3
November 2014, Week 2
November 2014, Week 1
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October 2014, Week 3
October 2014, Week 2
October 2014, Week 1
September 2014, Week 5
September 2014, Week 4
September 2014, Week 3
September 2014, Week 2
September 2014, Week 1
August 2014, Week 5
August 2014, Week 4
August 2014, Week 3
August 2014, Week 2
August 2014, Week 1
July 2014, Week 5
July 2014, Week 4
July 2014, Week 3
July 2014, Week 2
July 2014, Week 1
June 2014, Week 5
June 2014, Week 4
June 2014, Week 3
June 2014, Week 2
June 2014, Week 1
May 2014, Week 5
May 2014, Week 4
May 2014, Week 3
May 2014, Week 2
May 2014, Week 1
April 2014, Week 5
April 2014, Week 4
April 2014, Week 3
April 2014, Week 2
April 2014, Week 1
March 2014, Week 5
March 2014, Week 4
March 2014, Week 3
March 2014, Week 2
March 2014, Week 1
February 2014, Week 4
February 2014, Week 3
February 2014, Week 2
February 2014, Week 1
January 2014, Week 5
January 2014, Week 4
January 2014, Week 3
January 2014, Week 2
January 2014, Week 1
December 2013, Week 5
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December 2013, Week 3
December 2013, Week 2
December 2013, Week 1
November 2013, Week 5
November 2013, Week 4
November 2013, Week 3
November 2013, Week 2
November 2013, Week 1
October 2013, Week 5
October 2013, Week 4
October 2013, Week 3
October 2013, Week 2
October 2013, Week 1
September 2013, Week 5
September 2013, Week 4
September 2013, Week 3
September 2013, Week 2
September 2013, Week 1
August 2013, Week 5
August 2013, Week 4
August 2013, Week 3
August 2013, Week 2
August 2013, Week 1
July 2013, Week 5
July 2013, Week 4
July 2013, Week 3
July 2013, Week 2
July 2013, Week 1
June 2013, Week 5
June 2013, Week 4
June 2013, Week 3
June 2013, Week 2
June 2013, Week 1
May 2013, Week 5
May 2013, Week 4
May 2013, Week 3
May 2013, Week 2
May 2013, Week 1
April 2013, Week 5
April 2013, Week 4
April 2013, Week 3
April 2013, Week 2
April 2013, Week 1
March 2013, Week 5
March 2013, Week 4
March 2013, Week 3
March 2013, Week 2
March 2013, Week 1
February 2013, Week 4
February 2013, Week 3
February 2013, Week 2
February 2013, Week 1
January 2013, Week 5
January 2013, Week 4
January 2013, Week 3
January 2013, Week 2
January 2013, Week 1
December 2012, Week 5
December 2012, Week 4
December 2012, Week 3
December 2012, Week 2
December 2012, Week 1
November 2012, Week 5
November 2012, Week 4
November 2012, Week 3
November 2012, Week 2
November 2012, Week 1
October 2012, Week 5
October 2012, Week 4
October 2012, Week 3
October 2012, Week 2
October 2012, Week 1
September 2012, Week 5
September 2012, Week 4
September 2012, Week 3
September 2012, Week 2
September 2012, Week 1
August 2012, Week 5
August 2012, Week 4
August 2012, Week 3
August 2012, Week 2
August 2012, Week 1
July 2012, Week 5
July 2012, Week 4
July 2012, Week 3
July 2012, Week 2
July 2012, Week 1
June 2012, Week 5
June 2012, Week 4
June 2012, Week 3
June 2012, Week 2
June 2012, Week 1
May 2012, Week 5
May 2012, Week 4
May 2012, Week 3
May 2012, Week 2
May 2012, Week 1
April 2012, Week 5
April 2012, Week 4
April 2012, Week 3
April 2012, Week 2
April 2012, Week 1
March 2012, Week 5
March 2012, Week 4
March 2012, Week 3
March 2012, Week 2
March 2012, Week 1
February 2012, Week 5
February 2012, Week 4
February 2012, Week 3
February 2012, Week 2
February 2012, Week 1
January 2012, Week 5
January 2012, Week 4
January 2012, Week 3
January 2012, Week 2
January 2012, Week 1
December 2011, Week 5
December 2011, Week 4
December 2011, Week 3
December 2011, Week 2
December 2011, Week 1
November 2011, Week 5
November 2011, Week 4
November 2011, Week 3
November 2011, Week 2
November 2011, Week 1
October 2011, Week 5
October 2011, Week 4
October 2011, Week 3
October 2011, Week 2
October 2011, Week 1
September 2011, Week 5
September 2011, Week 4
September 2011, Week 3
September 2011, Week 2
September 2011, Week 1
August 2011, Week 5
August 2011, Week 4
August 2011, Week 3
August 2011, Week 2
August 2011, Week 1
July 2011, Week 5
July 2011, Week 4
July 2011, Week 3
July 2011, Week 2
July 2011, Week 1
June 2011, Week 5
June 2011, Week 4
June 2011, Week 3
June 2011, Week 2
June 2011, Week 1
May 2011, Week 5
May 2011, Week 4
May 2011, Week 3
May 2011, Week 2
May 2011, Week 1
April 2011, Week 5
April 2011, Week 4
April 2011, Week 3
April 2011, Week 2
April 2011, Week 1
March 2011, Week 5
March 2011, Week 4
March 2011, Week 3
March 2011, Week 2
March 2011, Week 1
February 2011, Week 4
February 2011, Week 3
February 2011, Week 2
February 2011, Week 1
January 2011, Week 5
January 2011, Week 4
January 2011, Week 3
January 2011, Week 2
January 2011, Week 1
December 2010, Week 5
December 2010, Week 4
December 2010, Week 3
December 2010, Week 2
December 2010, Week 1
November 2010, Week 5
November 2010, Week 4
November 2010, Week 3
November 2010, Week 2
November 2010, Week 1
October 2010, Week 5
October 2010, Week 4
October 2010, Week 3
October 2010, Week 2
October 2010, Week 1
September 2010, Week 5
September 2010, Week 4
September 2010, Week 3
September 2010, Week 2
September 2010, Week 1
August 2010, Week 5
August 2010, Week 4
August 2010, Week 3
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August 2010, Week 1
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July 2010, Week 3
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July 2010, Week 1

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