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PORTSIDE  March 2011, Week 1

PORTSIDE March 2011, Week 1

Subject:

Palestine and the Revolution: Lessons From Egypt

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Palestine and the Revolution: Lessons From Egypt

by Mustafa Barghouthi
CounterPunch 
March 4, 2011
http://www.counterpunch.org/barghouthi03042011.html

The rush and tumult of events makes it hard, sometimes,
to draw the most important general conclusions from
their significance. This said, the revolutionary tidal
wave, which began in Tunisia and Algeria, reached its
crest in Egypt and is currently sweeping other
countries such as Libya and Bahrain, offers a unique
opportunity to watch how people can reshape history as
they reconstruct their fates and futures. It also
offers a rare scientific window to observe the birth of
the new from the old and to study a moment of
qualitative transformation that culminated from a long
process of quantitative accumulation and that manifests
the dialectical laws of social dynamics with utmost
clarity.

What happened in Tunisia and then in Egypt, and what
will certainly follow in other places, cannot be
produced or fabricated by a political party, movement
or force, domestic or otherwise. The uprisings are the
product of a long cumulative evolution, lasting years,
decades or perhaps even centuries in some areas, that
eventually erupted into millions-strong grassroots
protest movements of a magnitude unprecedented in the
modern history of the Arab world, and perhaps in its
entire history. Perhaps the only moment of similar
size, scope and breadth is the first popular
Palestinian Intifada, in its first year (1987-88).
Sadly, the Oslo Accords undermined the magnificent
initial results of this uprising and destroyed a
historic opportunity to end the Israeli occupation. We
should add that this Palestinian revolutionary moment
was never sufficiently documented, first due to the
differences in size and strategic importance compared
to the Egyptian case, and second due to the lack of
media coverage and unprecedented sophistication in
communications technology that was available to Egypt
today.

The events in Egypt today -- as was the case in Tunisia
and in all great revolutions, such as the French and
Russian revolutions -- epitomise what sociologists call
a "revolutionary moment". Such a moment occurs when the
governed refuse to be ruled as they had been and when
the rulers can no longer govern in the same manner. It
is a momentous event. It is one that political parties,
movements and forces, and intellectuals and spontaneous
popular action can prepare for. But it is far bigger
than anyone could have expected, planned for or
attempted to produce. Great revolutions cannot be made.
They erupt, like volcanoes, atop of the mounting force
of huge and long-suppressed social and political
contradictions.

It is precisely because these contradictions have been
pent- up for so long, prevented from expressing
themselves and unable to vent their anger, that the
moment of explosion is too powerful to cap or control.
Therefore, political parties and forces should be
careful not overrate their own size, role and or
abilities with respect to this condition. They might be
akin to a midwife who is there to help with a safe
delivery, but they did not produce the embryo or induce
the birth, and they are not the mother (the people), or
even the surrogate mother.

Rather than blaming themselves for their actions in the
past, political forces should focus on their role at
present, which is to ensure the safety of the birth and
the health of the infant, and to safeguard it against
any attempts on the part of the old order to abort,
kill or stunt it. The revolution, or the eruption, may
produce a newborn, but it cannot guarantee its survival
and wellbeing. This is one of the tasks of an organised
and aware intellectual vanguard.

The phenomenon that is unfolding before our eyes today
is not restricted to Egypt; it has its roots in the
state of the Arab world as a whole. That Tunisia was
the first country to react is due to the fact that it
was the weakest link in the chain of an interconnected
order, whose profound internal contradictions, some of
which are old and others of which are relatively new,
have long needed to be resolved.

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE

The system of governance and the relationship between
the ruler and the ruled in the Arab world remains so at
odds with the democratic transformations that have
taken place elsewhere in the world as to appear not
only far behind but outside the course of human
history. People around the world can no longer tolerate
systems of authoritarian despotism that are essentially
totalitarian in substance, that rely on unrestrained
security apparatuses as their chief instruments of
control, that survive by means of repression,
suppression and the denigration of human dignity, and
whose form of government centres around the exclusive
group or single state party.

Many bigger and more powerful regimes than the ones we
have in our region ultimately proved unable to
withstand the winds of change. The most salient example
is the Soviet Union, whose successes in protecting
itself and the world against the spread of Nazism and
in defeating Nazi Germany, and whose economic feat of
transforming Russia from a feudal to a modern economy,
could not prevent it from rapid and resounding collapse
when the soviet peoples decided that they could no
longer tolerate totalitarian rule. After decades in
which the soviet ruling elite controlled everything --
national wealth and resources, the military and
security agencies, the economy and all aspects of
political life, and all organisations and associations
connected with healthcare, education and culture -- and
sustained a suffocating stranglehold on public space
and civil society, there came a point when the people
said "Enough!"

Another prominent example is to be found in the Latin
American dictatorships, which the US had long fostered,
backed and financed while fighting the popular
revolutions, such as that in Nicaragua, in order to
maintain its strategic dominance. But then came the
critical moment when the Cold War ended and the primary
propaganda stay of that entire constellation collapsed.
Suddenly, one dictatorship after the other toppled as
Latin American countries finally entered the expanses
of pluralism and democracy and began to forge their way
to real development and to win major victories over
poverty and unemployment. Brazil is a prime example of
a nation whose successive elected leaders represented
socio-political movements that advocated a blend of
political and social democracy, and whose policies
enabled their country to progress by leaps and bounds,
socially and economically.

In this regard, it should be born in mind that
political democracy is not an ideal form of government.
It still has plenty of room for improvement, to which
testify some major inconsistencies in leading
democratic nations. In the US, for example, the
difficulties in challenging the alliance between money
and the media pose an enormous challenge, which will
probably entail breaking the near total monopoly of the
two mammoth parties over the political realm.

Democracy has evolved at the hands of different peoples
and cultures across history since its first beginnings
in ancient Greece. The evolutionary process is still
ongoing, the most salient indication of which is the
general acceptance of the notion that democracy is
deficient if it is restricted to purely political
domain and fails to include a socioeconomic dimension.
The evolution of democracy has not been solely the
province of the Western world, as some might claim or
imagine. In fact, some of the healthiest signs of
progress were manifested in developing nations. Sri
Lanka (formerly Ceylon) was the first country to elect
a woman head of state, preceding long-established
democracies such as Britain by decades in this regard.

Yet, with all its imperfections, democracy is
immeasurably superior to the horrors of
totalitarianism. Its components are universally
applicable and appropriate, and consist of free and
fair periodic elections, the separation between the
executive, legislative and judicial authorities with an
equitable system of checks and balances between them,
and the subordination of the army to elected executive
and legislative authorities. It also rests on a broad
range of essential principles and civic liberties,
notably freedom of opinion and the press, political
plurality and the right to associate and form political
parties, an open civic space, and the rule of law and
equality before the law.

From this perspective, the chief task that lies before
the Egyptian people at this juncture is to remove all
obstacles to the establishment of a true democratic
order and to proper democratic practices. The emergency
law must be lifted, the fraudulent parliament dissolved
and all the constitutional and legal impediments to the
people's right to freely elect their officials, from
the president down to the members of the smallest
municipal council, must be eliminated. All officials
must also be subject to a clear system of
responsibility and accountability while there should be
no restrictions to the right to contest incumbents
through free and fair elections held at their appointed
times. In short, the Egyptian people need to put in
place the institutional and legal edifice to guarantee
the peaceful rotation of authority in accordance with
the will of the people.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADITIONALISM AND MODERNISM

The mounting conflict between traditional forms of
totalitarian rule and the influences of modernism was
another factor that fed the Egyptian revolution. It is
impossible, here, to discuss the question of
globalisation and its positive and negative impacts, or
the attempts of capitalism to monopolise it as a means
to secure global dominance. Suffice it to say that
globalisation, like the industrial revolution and the
invention of the steam engine, is a fact of life and
stage in technological development. Its consequences
are contingent upon how it is used, for it can be used
for good or for bad.

What matters in this context, however, is that
globalisation brought three concurrent revolutions: the
unstoppable and irrepressible revolution in information
technology, as exemplified by electronic communications
and social networking media such as the Internet,
Facebook, blogging sites and Twitter; the
communications revolution as powered by mobile phones
and similar devices, of which billions are bought every
year; and the media revolution in which satellite
television channels are spearheading forward bound mass
media, just as radio broadcasting had in the mid-20th
century and the press had in the late 19th century.

Conventional means of authoritarian control could not,
nor cannot, halt the impact of these revolutions. They
have given people access to information that their
governments tried to conceal from them. They have
furnished unprecedented means to establish contact, to
remain in communication, and to organise and mobilise.
They have broken the monopoly of dictatorial
governments on communications and the media, creating
what we might term a media democracy in advance of the
emergence of political democracy, serving as a means
for opposition forces to spread calls to rally and
demand change.

The impact of this quantum leap forward in media,
communications and information technology not only
shook the foundations of the conventional structures of
totalitarian societies. It had a similar impact on the
countries of the modern industrialised West, where
government monopolies over confidential information and
diplomatic cables have been severely dented. What
better illustrations have we than the famous WikiLeaks
revelations, which probably mark only the beginning of
what is yet to come? It is no longer possible in our
age to conceal information from the public for any
length of time, as had once been the case with such
dealings as the Sykes-Picot agreement.

At the same time, the growing pressure of the IT and
communications revolutions are forcefully propelling us
towards modernisation and modernism. This dynamic is
affecting many traditional systems and structures in
our region. Even such heated divides as that which
plagues the Palestinian arena are being exposed as
conflicts between two facets of the same traditional
structure, which resists modernisation and modernity,
and espouses exclusionist dominance and one party rule,
as opposed to political plurality and equal
opportunity.

Arab youth was naturally poised to assume the vanguard
of the drive to change. They are the most adept at
using and taking advantage of the modern technologies,
and they have the least to lose from an overthrow of
the old traditional order and are simultaneously the
most open to modernist development. Contrary to what
some might think, this does not imply that our young
are willing to sacrifice their heritage and history.
Indeed, they are probably keener on protecting this
heritage and reinforcing this history in contemporary
terms, much in the manner of the Muslims and Arabs of
the Middle Ages, who pioneered the fields of science
and knowledge, and built the finest universities and
research centres while Europe was still shrouded in
medieval darkness.

Arab youth and the Palestinian youth among them have
long been the victims of marginalisation, neglect, lack
of opportunity, unemployment and the ills of nepotism,
discrimination and petty corruption. Yet, people under
30 constitute the overwhelming majority of the Arab
population. The UNDP Arab Human Development Reports
(AHDR) diagnosed these problems and cautioned against
their repercussions. Sadly, the series was stopped and
its lessons and recommendations remained unheeded.
Incidentally, the AHDR series shed considerable light
on the structural deficiencies derived from the
marginalisation of the role and status of women.

Given all the foregoing factors, young Arab men and
women house an enormous revolutionary energy aimed at
development and modernisation. They should not only
assume participatory roles, but also effective
leadership roles in all domains.

ECONOMIC MONOPOLISATION, CORRUPTION AND POVERTY

The Arab national liberation movements achieved
national liberation and founded revolutionary systems
of a predominantly militaristic character, the army
being the best organised controlling power. Initially,
at least, these regimes scored major inroads towards
development. The Nasserist regime, for example, put an
end to feudalism and set Egypt on the road to
industrialisation and agricultural modernisation. Some
of these regimes espoused a socialist outlook. However,
by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, three major
factors asserted themselves.

One was the oil boom and the enormous influx of money
that poured into the hands of traditional conservative
regimes, which started to expand their influence in the
region. The second was Israel's repeated attacks
against neighbouring countries, such as Syria and
Egypt, with the aim of curbing their influence and
their role as beacons of national liberation, which had
been a source of considerable anxiety to governments in
Africa and the developing world in general. The third
factor was the lack of political democracy, which
deprived the leaderships of these regimes of one of
their mainstays of support: the people in whose name
they were ruling.

In tandem with these factors there was significant
economic development. The overthrow of the capitalist
and feudal order in these societies left a vacuum.
Rushing to fill this were portions of the new middle
class that monopolised the hold on the state
bureaucracy and used its power to create what we might
term a parasitic bourgeoisie that eventually fused with
the comprador bourgeoisie. Therefore, it would not take
long for a country such as Egypt to take a 180-degree
turn. The process was led by president Anwar El-Sadat
who reoriented his country towards the control of these
parasitic groups, the Camp David Accords, and the
establishment of a repressive system of control against
the people for whom the 1952 Revolution had originally
been waged.

Although there are certainly shades of difference
between one country and next, the rise of the parasitic
bourgeoisie and their hold over the state bureaucracy
enabled them to control all the resources of the
economy in both the public and private sector. Through
a combination of repression, bribery, kickbacks,
expropriation and outright theft they accumulated
unimaginable fortunes without creating a base of
production that would permit for a simultaneous growth
in society at large. The result was a rapidly
broadening gap between the rich and poor and an
increasing concentration of wealth. When the sources of
wealth began to dry up, privatisation and the sale of
state- owned property, businesses and factories became
the next avenue for corrupt enrichment at the expense
of the poor. In the face of that conspicuous ill-gotten
wealth, the oppressed and impoverished peoples could no
longer tolerate their daily privation and they
rebelled.

The story of Mohamed Bouazizi encapsulated that blend
of poverty, hardship and degradation at the hands of
the Tunisian security forces that drove the Tunisian
people to rebel. Other examples are to be found in the
stories of the torture and persecution of thousands of
equally deprived young men and women in Egypt, and in
the stories of other tens of thousands of people who
have reached the autumn of their lives without being
able to afford the costs of marriage.

The triad of corrupt and parasitic economic
monopolisation, widespread and mounting poverty, and
brutal repression was the great engine of the
unprecedented revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world.
When one contemplates this fact one is struck not by
the surprise that these revolutions happened but by the
surprise that it took them so long in coming.

THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY AGAINST PERSONAL AND NATIONAL
DEGRADATION

It was no coincidence that the events in Tunisia and in
Egypt were often described as the "Dignity revolution".
Arab people have suffered degradation on a daily basis.
They were routinely humiliated by their own repressive
regimes or by those in the neighbouring countries they
visited. Perhaps it was the offence to dignity caused
by the deprivation of citizenship rights that sparked
the wrath of the middle class. Its members may not have
suffered poverty, but they would have suffered from the
lack of equal opportunity, from the degradation
inflicted by theft, by means of forged elections, of
their right to chose, and from the larger affront of
being marginalised in their own country by a
totalitarian order and its coterie of opportunists who
closed the doors of opportunity and advancement to
others.

In Egypt, the deprivation of the right to dignified
citizenship reached a new peak with the blatant forgery
of the last People's Assembly elections in November.
That farce was one of the major triggers of the anger
of the middle class and its younger members in
particular who, because of modern telecommunications
and media, were fully aware of what they were being
deprived of.

THE REVOLUTION AND PALESTINE

There remains another factor that we should not
overlook and that has a direct bearing on Palestine in
particular. The defeat of the Arabs in the Palestine
war of 1948 and the defective weapons scandal that
exposed the corruption of the Egyptian monarchy played
a major part in fuelling the 1952 Revolution, which was
also a revolution against the humiliation inflicted
upon the Egyptian army. In the 1980s, 1990s and the
first decade of the 21st century, the national dignity
of every Arab nation suffered a stream of offences
primarily at Israel's hands.

Arab people and especially the people of Egypt which,
from Salaheddin Al-Ayoubi to Gamal Abdel-Nasser, had
become accustomed to being at the forefront of the Arab
national defence, watched in fury at the atrocities it
perpetrated against the Palestinian and Lebanese
peoples, from the invasion of Lebanon and siege against
the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1982, through
the suppression of the Palestinian Intifada and further
attacks against Lebanon, to the brutal incursion into
Palestinian territories and siege against the
Palestinian leadership in 2002 and the massacres in
Lebanon in 2006.

The latest chapter in Israeli belligerency and
brutality was its invasion of Gaza, which was weak,
defenceless and under economic blockade. The Egyptian
people watched this crime unfold in its full horror
right next to their country's borders amidst
accusations against their government for complicity in
the blockade. Such outrages must offend the national
dignity of every Arab citizen, all the more so when, as
is the case with Egypt, that citizen's country is bound
by an inequitable treaty with Israel that restricts its
ability to act in solidarity with the oppressed.

The US-led invasion, occupation and destruction of Iraq
aggravated the Arabs' sense of fury and compounded
their thirst to avenge their national humiliation. This
factor cannot be excluded in any attempt to understand
the force and scope of the eruption that took place in
Egypt. Many wonder how the current revolutionary wave
will affect the Palestinian struggle. I do not believe
it is premature or wishful thinking to claim that there
has already been a positive effect.

First, the Arab world will no longer remain a passive
agent as regional and international forces fight it out
on Arab territory. Henceforth, the Arabs will be
proactive agents in these conflicts, which in itself is
a positive development.

Second, the victory of the Egyptian revolution will
strengthen the status and the role of Egypt, if it
establishes a solid democratic government. This can
only help to readjust the balance of power in favour of
the Palestinian cause, for a democratic Egypt can only
be a supporter of the Palestinian people, rather than a
mere mediator.

Third, the victory of democracy in Egypt, Tunisia and
hopefully elsewhere will fling open the doors to
popular solidarity with the Palestinian people. People
who have been longing to demonstrate their support for
Palestine will now be able to do so in powerful and
effective ways. The Arabs will once again be able to
take the lead in the campaign to boycott and impose
sanctions on Israel, which is a major feature of the
Palestinian national strategy for altering the balance
of power.

Fourth, we can already see the effect of the Egyptian
and Tunisian victories on the Palestinian morale.
Thousands of Palestinian youth are re-emerging from the
doldrums of frustration, despair and marginalisation,
and displaying a renewed desire to take part and act.
The immediate effect of this can be seen in the
Palestinian demonstrations in support of the people of
Egypt, as well as in support of the campaign to end the
internal rift among Palestinians and demand democracy
and civil rights. In the mid to long range, we can
expect the resurgence of a broad-based youth and
people's resistance movement against the occupation,
the Separation Wall and apartheid.

If the first Palestinian Intifada was the prelude to
the Arab popular uprisings of today, the revolutions of
Egypt and Tunisia serve to remind the Palestinian
people of their latent force and of the power of large-
scale peaceful grassroots resistance.

Fifth, certainly the Palestinians harbour the hope that
one of the first actions of the new Egypt will be to
lift the boycott against Gaza and thereby neutralise
the criminal Israeli stranglehold on a million and a
half people living in what can only be called the
largest prison in modern history.

Whatever happens next, Israel remains a major source of
concern. Its arrogance, racism and aggressiveness have
remained unchecked by neighbouring regimes, whose
weakness it had long exploited in order to give full
sail to its dreams of political, military and economic
hegemony over the region. Finally, however, the voice
of the Egyptian people reminded Israel of the words of
immortal Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish: "A serpent's
eggs do not hatch eagles." There are limits to power
and they are defined by the forces of history,
civilisation and human grit. The rule of tyranny in the
age of despair must recede before the revival of human
will.

A NEW AGE: We have entered a new era in every sense of
the word. Some of us may have had the fortune to have
experienced the global youth revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s and then to witness this new youth
revolution. What a relief we feel after that long
interval of stagnation and decay, when humanitarian
values collapsed, despair and frustration prevailed,
and many of the old revolutionaries and pioneers were
turned into worthless statues, while intellectuals
became sycophants in royal courts and consciences were
reduced to commodities to be bought and sold. Today, a
new and promising age has arisen in the Arab world. For
the moment, it is taking its first tentative steps and
it might totter like an infant. However, it will grow
and it will become stronger.

Therefore, our most crucial task today is to tend to
this infant, to take its hand and help guide it to a
full and robust democratic system that derives its
authority from the will of the people. Nothing is more
important than protecting this newborn from Israeli or
imperialist attempts to stunt it solely in order to
perpetuate Israeli hegemony and the interests vested in
this hegemony. Nothing is more important than to keep
the doors open to the winds of change so that they can
gather speed and spread, and break down more barriers.

Perhaps what we see today in the Arab world marks the
beginning of a universal transformation whose time must
inevitably come, because the current system of global
hegemony and the globalisation of dominance is rife
with contradictions that can only be resolved by
revolutionary transformations on a global scale. In
this turbulent world, we -- the Palestinians -- stand
on the right side of history: the side that is fighting
for freedom and human dignity. Our allies are the Arab
and international forces of progress and change. As for
those who are waging their bets on the adversary, they
will reap nothing but disappointment.

[Mustafa Barghouthi is a Palestinian democracy activist
and head of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief
Committees.]

___________________________________________

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March 2016, Week 4
March 2016, Week 3
March 2016, Week 2
March 2016, Week 1
February 2016, Week 5
February 2016, Week 4
February 2016, Week 3
February 2016, Week 2
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December 2015, Week 5
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August 2015, Week 4
August 2015, Week 3
August 2015, Week 2
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July 2015, Week 3
July 2015, Week 2
July 2015, Week 1
June 2015, Week 5
June 2015, Week 4
June 2015, Week 3
June 2015, Week 2
June 2015, Week 1
May 2015, Week 5
May 2015, Week 4
May 2015, Week 3
May 2015, Week 2
May 2015, Week 1
April 2015, Week 5
April 2015, Week 4
April 2015, Week 3
April 2015, Week 2
April 2015, Week 1
March 2015, Week 5
March 2015, Week 4
March 2015, Week 3
March 2015, Week 2
March 2015, Week 1
February 2015, Week 4
February 2015, Week 3
February 2015, Week 2
February 2015, Week 1
January 2015, Week 5
January 2015, Week 4
January 2015, Week 3
January 2015, Week 2
January 2015, Week 1
December 2014, Week 5
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November 2014, Week 4
November 2014, Week 3
November 2014, Week 2
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October 2014, Week 4
October 2014, Week 3
October 2014, Week 2
October 2014, Week 1
September 2014, Week 5
September 2014, Week 4
September 2014, Week 3
September 2014, Week 2
September 2014, Week 1
August 2014, Week 5
August 2014, Week 4
August 2014, Week 3
August 2014, Week 2
August 2014, Week 1
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July 2014, Week 4
July 2014, Week 3
July 2014, Week 2
July 2014, Week 1
June 2014, Week 5
June 2014, Week 4
June 2014, Week 3
June 2014, Week 2
June 2014, Week 1
May 2014, Week 5
May 2014, Week 4
May 2014, Week 3
May 2014, Week 2
May 2014, Week 1
April 2014, Week 5
April 2014, Week 4
April 2014, Week 3
April 2014, Week 2
April 2014, Week 1
March 2014, Week 5
March 2014, Week 4
March 2014, Week 3
March 2014, Week 2
March 2014, Week 1
February 2014, Week 4
February 2014, Week 3
February 2014, Week 2
February 2014, Week 1
January 2014, Week 5
January 2014, Week 4
January 2014, Week 3
January 2014, Week 2
January 2014, Week 1
December 2013, Week 5
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December 2013, Week 3
December 2013, Week 2
December 2013, Week 1
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November 2013, Week 4
November 2013, Week 3
November 2013, Week 2
November 2013, Week 1
October 2013, Week 5
October 2013, Week 4
October 2013, Week 3
October 2013, Week 2
October 2013, Week 1
September 2013, Week 5
September 2013, Week 4
September 2013, Week 3
September 2013, Week 2
September 2013, Week 1
August 2013, Week 5
August 2013, Week 4
August 2013, Week 3
August 2013, Week 2
August 2013, Week 1
July 2013, Week 5
July 2013, Week 4
July 2013, Week 3
July 2013, Week 2
July 2013, Week 1
June 2013, Week 5
June 2013, Week 4
June 2013, Week 3
June 2013, Week 2
June 2013, Week 1
May 2013, Week 5
May 2013, Week 4
May 2013, Week 3
May 2013, Week 2
May 2013, Week 1
April 2013, Week 5
April 2013, Week 4
April 2013, Week 3
April 2013, Week 2
April 2013, Week 1
March 2013, Week 5
March 2013, Week 4
March 2013, Week 3
March 2013, Week 2
March 2013, Week 1
February 2013, Week 4
February 2013, Week 3
February 2013, Week 2
February 2013, Week 1
January 2013, Week 5
January 2013, Week 4
January 2013, Week 3
January 2013, Week 2
January 2013, Week 1
December 2012, Week 5
December 2012, Week 4
December 2012, Week 3
December 2012, Week 2
December 2012, Week 1
November 2012, Week 5
November 2012, Week 4
November 2012, Week 3
November 2012, Week 2
November 2012, Week 1
October 2012, Week 5
October 2012, Week 4
October 2012, Week 3
October 2012, Week 2
October 2012, Week 1
September 2012, Week 5
September 2012, Week 4
September 2012, Week 3
September 2012, Week 2
September 2012, Week 1
August 2012, Week 5
August 2012, Week 4
August 2012, Week 3
August 2012, Week 2
August 2012, Week 1
July 2012, Week 5
July 2012, Week 4
July 2012, Week 3
July 2012, Week 2
July 2012, Week 1
June 2012, Week 5
June 2012, Week 4
June 2012, Week 3
June 2012, Week 2
June 2012, Week 1
May 2012, Week 5
May 2012, Week 4
May 2012, Week 3
May 2012, Week 2
May 2012, Week 1
April 2012, Week 5
April 2012, Week 4
April 2012, Week 3
April 2012, Week 2
April 2012, Week 1
March 2012, Week 5
March 2012, Week 4
March 2012, Week 3
March 2012, Week 2
March 2012, Week 1
February 2012, Week 5
February 2012, Week 4
February 2012, Week 3
February 2012, Week 2
February 2012, Week 1
January 2012, Week 5
January 2012, Week 4
January 2012, Week 3
January 2012, Week 2
January 2012, Week 1
December 2011, Week 5
December 2011, Week 4
December 2011, Week 3
December 2011, Week 2
December 2011, Week 1
November 2011, Week 5
November 2011, Week 4
November 2011, Week 3
November 2011, Week 2
November 2011, Week 1
October 2011, Week 5
October 2011, Week 4
October 2011, Week 3
October 2011, Week 2
October 2011, Week 1
September 2011, Week 5
September 2011, Week 4
September 2011, Week 3
September 2011, Week 2
September 2011, Week 1
August 2011, Week 5
August 2011, Week 4
August 2011, Week 3
August 2011, Week 2
August 2011, Week 1
July 2011, Week 5
July 2011, Week 4
July 2011, Week 3
July 2011, Week 2
July 2011, Week 1
June 2011, Week 5
June 2011, Week 4
June 2011, Week 3
June 2011, Week 2
June 2011, Week 1
May 2011, Week 5
May 2011, Week 4
May 2011, Week 3
May 2011, Week 2
May 2011, Week 1
April 2011, Week 5
April 2011, Week 4
April 2011, Week 3
April 2011, Week 2
April 2011, Week 1
March 2011, Week 5
March 2011, Week 4
March 2011, Week 3
March 2011, Week 2
March 2011, Week 1
February 2011, Week 4
February 2011, Week 3
February 2011, Week 2
February 2011, Week 1
January 2011, Week 5
January 2011, Week 4
January 2011, Week 3
January 2011, Week 2
January 2011, Week 1
December 2010, Week 5
December 2010, Week 4
December 2010, Week 3
December 2010, Week 2
December 2010, Week 1
November 2010, Week 5
November 2010, Week 4
November 2010, Week 3
November 2010, Week 2
November 2010, Week 1
October 2010, Week 5
October 2010, Week 4
October 2010, Week 3
October 2010, Week 2
October 2010, Week 1
September 2010, Week 5
September 2010, Week 4
September 2010, Week 3
September 2010, Week 2
September 2010, Week 1
August 2010, Week 5
August 2010, Week 4
August 2010, Week 3
August 2010, Week 2
August 2010, Week 1
July 2010, Week 5
July 2010, Week 4
July 2010, Week 3
July 2010, Week 2
July 2010, Week 1

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