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PORTSIDE  November 2010, Week 4

PORTSIDE November 2010, Week 4

Subject:

Evidence of Iran Nuclear Weapons Program May Be Fraudulent

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Date:

Mon, 22 Nov 2010 00:24:32 -0500

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Exclusive Report: Evidence of Iran Nuclear Weapons 
Program May Be Fraudulent
by: Gareth Porter
t r u t h o u t | Report
18 November 2010
http://www.truth-out.org/the-iaea-and-fraudulent-iranian-nuclear-documents65241

Since 2007, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) - with the support of the United States, Israel
and European allies UK, France and Germany - has been
demanding that Iran explain a set of purported internal
documents portraying a covert Iranian military program
of research and development of nuclear weapons. The
"laptop documents," supposedly obtained from a stolen
Iranian computer by an unknown source and given to US
intelligence in 2004, include a series of drawings of a
missile re-entry vehicle that appears to be an effort to
accommodate a nuclear weapon, as well as reports on high
explosives testing for what appeared to be a detonator
for a nuclear weapon.

In one report after another, the IAEA has suggested that
Iran has failed to cooperate with its inquiry into that
alleged research, and that the agency, therefore, cannot
verify that it has not diverted nuclear material to
military purposes.

That issue remains central to US policy toward Iran. The
Obama administration says there can be no diplomatic
negotiations with Iran unless Iran satisfies the IAEA
fully in regard to the allegations derived from the
documents that it had covert nuclear weapons program.

That position is based on the premise that the
intelligence documents that Iran has been asked to
explain are genuine. The evidence now available,
however, indicates that they are fabrications.

The drawings of the Iranian missile warhead that were
said by the IAEA to show an intent to accommodate a
nuclear weapon actually depict a missile design that
Iran is now known to have already abandoned in favor of
an improved model by the time the technical drawings
were allegedly made. And one of the major components of
the purported Iranian military research program
allegedly included a project labeled with a number that
turns out to have been assigned by Iran's civilian
nuclear authority years before the covert program is
said to have been initiated.

The former head of the agency's safeguards department,
Olli Heinonen, who shaped its approach to the issue of
the intelligence documents from 2005 and 2010, has
offered no real explanation for these anomalies in
recent interviews with Truthout.

These telltale indicators of fraud bring into question
the central pillar of the case against Iran and raise
more fundamental questions about the handling of the
Iranian nuclear issue by the IAEA, the United States and
its key European allies.

Drawings of the Wrong Missile Warhead

In mid-July 2005, in an effort to get the IAEA fully
behind the Bush administration's effort to refer the
Iranian nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security
Council, Robert Joseph, US undersecretary of state for
arms control and international security, made a formal
presentation on the purported Iranian nuclear weapons
program documents to the agency's leading officials in
Vienna. Joseph flashed excerpts from the documents on
the screen, giving special attention to the series of
technical drawings or "schematics" showing 18 different
ways of fitting an unidentified payload into the re-
entry vehicle or "warhead" of Iran's medium-range
ballistic missile, the Shahab-3.

When IAEA analysts were allowed to study the documents,
however, they discovered that those schematics were
based on a re-entry vehicle that the analysts knew had
already been abandoned by the Iranian military in favor
of a new, improved design. The warhead shown in the
schematics had the familiar "dunce cap" shape of the
original North Korean No Dong missile, which Iran had
acquired in the mid-1990s, as former IAEA Safeguards
Department Chief Olli Heinonen confirmed to this writer
in an interview on November 5. But when Iran had flight
tested a new missile in mid-2004, it did not have that
dunce cap warhead, but a new "triconic" or "baby bottle"
shape, which was more aerodynamic than the one on the
original Iranian missile.

The laptop documents had depicted the wrong re-entry
vehicle being redesigned.

When I asked Heinonen, now a senior fellow at Harvard
University's Belfer Center, why Iran's purported secret
nuclear weapons research program would redesign the
warhead of a missile that the Iranian military had
already decided to replace with an improved model, he
suggested that the group that had done the schematics
had no relationship with the Iranian missile program.
"It looks from that information that this group was
working with this individual," said Heinonen, referring
to Dr. Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the man named in the documents
as heading the research program. "It was not working
with the missile program."

Heinonen's claim that the covert nuclear weapon program
had no link to the regular missile program is not
supported by the intelligence documents themselves. The
IAEA describes what is purported to be a one-page letter
from Fakrizadeh to the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group
dated March 3, 2003, "seeking assistance with the prompt
transfer of data" for the work on redesigning the re-
entry vehicle.

Shahid Hemat, which is part of the Iranian military's
Defense Industries Organization, was involved in testing
the engine for the Shahab-3 and, in particular, in
working on aerodynamic properties and control systems
for Iranian missiles, all of which were reported in the
US news media. "Project 11" was the code name given to
the purported re-entry vehicle project.

Heinonen also suggested that the program's engineers
could have been ordered to redesign the older Shahab-3
model before the decision was made by the missile
program to switch to a newer model and that it couldn't
change its work plan once it was decided.

However, according to Mike Elleman, lead author of the
most authoritative study of the Iranian missile program
thus far, published by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last May, Iran
introduced the major innovations in the design of the
medium-range missile, including a longer, lighter
airframe and the new warhead shape, over a period of two
to five years. Elleman, told me in an interview that the
redesign of the re-entry vehicle must have begun in 2002
at the latest.

The schematics on the laptop documents' redesigned
warhead were dated March-April 2003, according to the
IAEA report of May 2008.

Heinonen's explanation assumes that the Iranian military
ordered an engineer to organize a project to redesign
the warhead on its intermediate-range ballistic missile
to accommodate a nuclear payload, but kept the project
in the dark about its plans to replace the Shahab-3 with
a completely new and improved model.

That assumption appears wholly implausible, because the
reason for the shift to the new missile, according to
the IISS study, was that the Shahab-3, purchased from
North Korea in the early to mid-1990s, had a range of
only 800 to 1,000 km, depending on the weight of the
payload. Thus, it was incapable of reaching Israel. The
new missile, later named the Ghadr-1, could carry a
payload of conventional high-explosives 1,500 to 1,600
kilometers, bringing Israel within the reach of an
Iranian missile for the first time.

The missile warhead anomaly is a particularly telling
sign of fraud, because someone intending to fabricate
such technical drawings of a re-entry vehicle could not
have known that Iran had abandoned the Shahab-3 in favor
of the more advanced Ghadr-1 until after mid-August
2004. As the IISS study points out, the August 11, 2004,
test launch was the first indication to the outside
world that a new missile with a triconic warhead had
been developed. Before that test, Elleman told me, "No
information was available that they were modifying the
warhead."

After that test, however, it would have been too late to
redo the re-entry vehicle studies, which would have the
biggest impact on news media coverage and political
opinion.

Iranian statements about the Shahab-3 missile would have
been misleading for anyone attempting to fabricate these
schematics. The IISS study recalls that Iran had said in
early 2001 that the Shahab-3 had entered "serial
production" and declared in July 2003 that it was
"operational." The IISS study observes, however, that
the announcement came only after the US invasion of
Iraq, when Iran felt an urgent need to claim an
operational missile capability. The study says it is
"very dubious" that the missile was ever produced in
significant numbers.

Skepticism and Resistance at the IAEA

A second inconsistency between the laptop documents and
the established facts emerged only in 2008. At a
briefing for IAEA member states in February 2008,
Heinonen displayed an organization chart of the
purported research program, showing a "Project 5" with
two sub-projects: "Project 5/13" for uranium conversion
and "Project 5/15" for uranium ore processing. Kimia
Maadan, a private Iranian firm, is shown to be running
"Project 5."

One of the key documents in the collection, a one-page
flow sheet for a uranium-conversion process, dated May
2003, with Kimia Maadan's name on it, is marked "Project
5/13."

Bush administration hardliners and the IAEA safeguard
department had been convinced in the 2004-2005 period
that Kimia Maadan was a front for the Iranian military.
In a 2005 report, the IAEA questioned how that company,
with such "limited experience in ore processing," could
have established an ore processing plant at Gchine in
such a short time from 2000 to mid-2001 on its own.

But in January 2008, Iran provided documents to the IAEA
showing that Kimia Maadan had actually been created by
the civilian Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
in 2000 solely to carry out a contract to design, build
and put into operation an ore-processing facility. The
documents also established that the firm's core staff
consisted entirely of experts who had previously worked
for AEOI's Ore Processing Center and that the conceptual
design and other technical information had been provided
to Kimia Maadan by AEOI.

The forces against independent journalism are growing.
Help Truthout keep up the fight against ignorance and
regression! Support us here.

But the most explosive new evidence provided by Iran
showed that the code number of "Project 5/15" on ore
processing, supposedly assigned by the Iranian
military's secret nuclear weapon research program, had
actually been assigned by the AEOI more than two years
before the purported nuclear weapons program had been
started. In the context of the documents on Kimia
Maadan's relationship with AEOI, the IAEA report of
February 2008 acknowledged, "A decision to construct a
UOC [uranium ore concentration] plant at Gchine, known
as 'project 5/15,' was made August 25, 1999."

An unpublished paper by the IAEA safeguards department,
leaked to the media and the Washington, DC-based
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
in 2009, identified early 2002 as the formal beginning
of what it called the Iranian military's "warhead
development program."

Asked about this contradiction, Heinonen told me he
couldn't answer the question, because he did not recall
the specific dates involved.

After the IAEA had acquired that new evidence of fraud
in January 2008, an IAEA official familiar with the
internal debate inside the agency told me that some IAEA
officials had demanded that the agency distance itself
publicly from the intelligence documents. But IAEA
reports made no concession to those demands. Instead,
beginning with the May 2008 report, the agency began to
use language implying that the documents were considered
reliable.

Behind the scenes, a conflict was about to boil over
between Heinonen and then IAEA Director General Mohammed
ElBaradei, who was skeptical about the authenticity of
the laptop documents and refused to give them any
official IAEA endorsement. In late 2008, Heinonen began
pushing ElBaradei to approve publication of his
department's favorable assessment of the intelligence
documents, which concluded that Iran had done research
and development on nuclear weapons components and
speculated that it was continuing to do so.

But ElBaradei refused to do so and in August 2009,
diplomats from the UK, France and Germany, who were
supporting Heinonen's view of the documents, leaked to
Reuters and The Associated Press that, for nearly a
year, ElBaradei had been suppressing "credible" evidence
of Iran's covert work on nuclear weapons.

ElBaradei responded to those political pressures to
publish the safeguards department speculative study in
an interview with The Hindu on October 1, 2009, in which
he declared, "The IAEA is not making any judgment at all
whether Iran even had weaponisation studies before
because there is a major question of authenticity of the
documents."

Evidence of Israel's Role

The origin of the laptop documents may never be proven
conclusively, but the accumulated evidence points to
Israel as the source. As early as 1995, the head of the
Israel Defense Forces' military intelligence research
and assessment division, Yaakov Amidror, tried
unsuccessfully to persuade his American counterparts
that Iran was planning to "go nuclear." By 2003-2004,
Mossad's reporting on the Iranian nuclear program was
viewed by high-ranking CIA officials as an effort to
pressure the Bush administration into considering
military action against Iran's nuclear sites, according
to Israeli sources cited by a pro-Israeli news service.

In the summer of 2003, Israel's international
intelligence agency, Mossad, had established an
aggressive program aimed at exerting influence on the
Iran nuclear issue by leaking alleged intelligence to
governments and the news media, as Israeli officials
acknowledged to journalists Douglas Frantz and Catherine
Collins. According to the book, "The Nuclear Jihadist,"
as part of the program, Mossad sometimes passed on
purported Iranian documents supposedly obtained by
Israeli spies inside Iran.

German sources have suggested that the intelligence
documents were conveyed to the US government, directly
or indirectly, by a group that had been collaborating
closely with Mossad. Soon after Secretary of State Colin
Powell made the existence of the laptop documents public
in November 2004, Karsten Voight, the coordinator of
German-American cooperation in the German Foreign
Ministry, was quoted in The Wall Street Journal as
saying that they had been transferred by an Iranian
"dissident group." A second German source familiar with
the case was even more explicit. "I can assure you," the
source told me in 2007, "that the documents came from
the Iranian resistance organization." That was a
reference to the Mujahideen-E-Khalq (MEK), also known as
the People's Mujahideen of Iran, the armed Iranian exile
group designated as a terrorist organization by the US
State Department.

The National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), the
political arm of the MEK, was generally credited by the
news media with having revealed the existence of the
Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak in an
August 2002 press conference in Washington, DC. Later,
however, IAEA, Israeli and Iranian dissident sources all
said that the NCRI had gotten the intelligence on the
sites from Mossad.

An IAEA official told Seymour Hersh that the Israelis
were behind the revelation of the sites and two
journalists from Der Spiegel reported the same thing. So
did an adviser to an Iranian monarchist group, speaking
to a writer for The New Yorker. That episode was not
isolated, but was part of a broader pattern of Israeli
cooperation with the MEK in providing intelligence
intended to influence the CIA and the IAEA. Israeli
authors Melman and Javadanfar, who claimed to have good
sources in Mossad, wrote in their 2007 book that Israeli
intelligence had "laundered" intelligence to the IAEA by
providing it to Iranian opposition groups, especially
the NCRI.

Israeli officials also went to extraordinary lengths to
publicize the story of covert Iranian experiments on a
key component of a nuclear weapon, which was one of
messages the intelligence documents conveyed. As a
result of satellite intelligence brought to the
attention of the IAEA in 2004 by Undersecretary of State
John Bolton, the IAEA requested two separate
investigations at the main Iran military research center
at Parchin. The investigations, in January 2005 and
November 2005, were aimed at examining the charge that
Iran was using facilities at Parchin to test high
explosives used in the detonation of a nuclear weapon.
In each investigation, the IAEA investigators were
allowed complete freedom to search and take
environmental samples at any five buildings in the
complex and their surroundings. But they failed to find
any evidence of any Iranian nuclear weapons-related
experiments.

At that point, Israeli intelligence came up with a new
story. Hersh reported  that, earlier in 2006, Mossad had
given the CIA an intelligence report - purportedly from
one of its agents inside Iran - claiming that the
Iranian military had been "testing trigger mechanisms"
for a nuclear weapon. The experiment supposedly involved
simulating a nuclear explosion without using any nuclear
material, so that it could not be detected by the IAEA.
But there were no specifics on which to base an IAEA
investigation - no test site specified and no diagrams -
and CIA officials told Hersh they could not learn
anything more about the identity of the alleged Israeli
agent.

The CIA evidently did not regard the Israeli claim as
credible, because the intelligence community issued a
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in late 2007, which
said that Iran had ended all work on nuclear weapons in
2003 and had not restarted it. Israel expressed dismay
at the US intelligence estimate, but Israeli officials
admitted that the official position that Iran was still
working actively on a nuclear weapon was based on an
assumption rather than any hard evidence.

Israel encountered yet another problem in its effort to
promote the covert Iranian nuclear weapon narrative. The
IAEA analysts doubted that Iran would be able to develop
a nuclear weapon small enough to fit into the missile it
had tested in 2004 without foreign assistance, as David
Albright, former IAEA contract officer and director of
the Institute for Science and International Security,
wrote in a letter to The New York Times in November
2005.

Sometime between February and May, however, yet another
purported Iranian document conveniently materialized
that addressed the problem of the US NIE and the "small
bomb" issue noted by Albright. The document was a long,
Farsi-language report purporting to be about the testing
of a system to detonate high explosives in hemispherical
arrangement. Based on the new document, the IAEA
safeguard department concluded that the "implosion
system" on which it assumed Iran was working "could be
contained within a payload container believed to be
small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of
the Shahab-3 missile."

The document was given to the IAEA by a "Member State,"
which was not identified in the leaked excerpts from an
unpublished IAEA report describing it. But Albright, who
knows Heinonen well, told me in a September 2008
interview, that the state in question was "probably
Israel."

The day before the Reuters and Associated Press stories
attacking ElBaradei over his refusal to publish the
report appeared in August 2009, the Israeli daily
Haaretz reported that Israel "has been striving to
pressure the IAEA through friendly nations and have it
release the censored annex." The operation was being
handled by the director general of the Israel Atomic
Energy Commission and the Foreign Ministry, according to
the report. The Israeli objective, Haaretz reported, was
to "prove that the Iranian effort to develop nuclear
weapons is continuing, contrary to the claims that
Tehran stopped its nuclear program in 2003."

Rethinking the Case Against Iran 

Once the intelligence documents that have been used to
indict Iran as plotting to build nuclear weapons are
discounted as fabrications likely perpetrated by a self-
interested party, there is no solid basis for the US
policy of trying to coerce Iran into ending all uranium
enrichment. And there is no reason for insisting that
Iran must explain the allegations in those documents to
the IAEA as a condition for any future US-Iran
negotiations.

News coverage of the purported intelligence documents
over the past few years has created yet another false
narrative that distorts public discourse on the subject.
Almost entirely ignored is the possibility that the real
aim of Iran's nuclear program is to maintain a
bargaining chip with the United States, and to have a
breakout capability to serve as a deterrent to a US or
Israeli attack on Iran.

The evidence that documents at the center of the case
for a covert Iranian nuclear weapons program are
fraudulent suggests the need for a strategic reset on
Iran policy. It raises both the possibility and the need
for serious exploration of a diplomatic solution for the
full range of issues dividing the two countries, which
is the only sensible strategy for ensuring that Iran
stays a non-nuclear state.

___________________________________________

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