[Who was really responsible for the Mexican debt crisis? Did
Mexico start it?] [https://portside.org/] 

 THE MEXICAN DEBT CRISIS AND THE WORLD BANK  
[https://portside.org/2019-08-11/mexican-debt-crisis-and-world-bank] 

 

 Eric Toussaint 
 July 22, 2019
Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank] 

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 _ Who was really responsible for the Mexican debt crisis? Did Mexico
start it? _ 

 , 

 

IN 2019, THE WORLD BANK (WB) AND THE IMF WILL BE 75 YEARS OLD. THESE
TWO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFI), FOUNDED IN 1944, ARE
DOMINATED BY THE USA AND A FEW ALLIED MAJOR POWERS WHO WORK TO
GENERALIZE POLICIES THAT RUN COUNTER THE INTERESTS OF THE WORLD’S
POPULATIONS.

THE WB AND THE IMF HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY MADE LOANS TO STATES AS A MEANS
OF INFLUENCING THEIR POLICIES. FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS HAS BEEN AND
CONTINUES TO BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SUBORDINATING THE BORROWERS.
SINCE THEIR CREATION, THE IMF AND THE WB HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL
PACTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT SUPPORTING
DICTATORSHIPS.

A NEW FORM OF DECOLONIZATION IS URGENTLY REQUIRED TO GET OUT OF THE
PREDICAMENT IN WHICH THE IFI AND THEIR MAIN SHAREHOLDERS HAVE
ENTRAPPED THE WORLD IN GENERAL. NEW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MUST BE
ESTABLISHED. THIS NEW SERIES OF ARTICLES BY ÉRIC TOUSSAINT RETRACES
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF SINCE THEY WERE FOUNDED
IN 1944. THE ARTICLES ARE TAKEN FROM THE BOOK _THE WORLD BANK: A
NEVER-ENDING COUP D’ÉTAT. THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-a-never-ending-coup-d-etat-The-hidden-agenda-of-the-Washington]_,
MUMBAI: VIKAS ADHYAYAN KENDRA, 2007, OR _THE WORLD BANK : A CRITICAL
PRIMER
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-A-critical-Primer]_ PLUTO, 2007.

Robert McNamara and president Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) were thick
as thieves. The Mexican president had cracked down on the radical
left. From 1973 on, Mexico’s foreign currency revenue soared thanks
to the tripling of oil prices. This increase in currency revenue
should have prevented Mexico from borrowing. However the volume of WB
[http://www.cadtm.org/World-Bank-WB] loans to Mexico rose sharply: it
quadrupled from 1973 to 1981 (from USD 118 million in 1973 to 460
million in 1981). Mexico also borrowed from private banks with the
World Bank’s backing. The volume of loans from private banks to
Mexico multiplied by 6 between 1973 and 1981. US banks led the field,
followed in decreasing order by banks from the UK, Japan, Germany,
France, Canada, and Switzerland. The amounts loaned by private banks
were ten times those borrowed from the World Bank. When the crisis
broke in 1982, there were no less than 550 banks to which the Mexican
government owed money! Lending money to Mexico was the World Bank’s
way of keeping its hold on Mexican authorities. From 1974 to 1976, the
predicament of Mexican public finances seriously worsened. Yet the
World Bank insisted that Mexico should contract more debts while the
alarm signals were flashing.

On 3 February 1978 the World Bank boldly projected a rosy
future: _“The Mexican government almost certainly will experience a
large increase in the resources at its disposal by the early 1980s.
Our most recent projections show that … the balance of payments
[http://www.cadtm.org/Balance-of-payments] will show a surplus on
current account by 1982… large increases in export revenues, mainly
from petroleum and products, should make both the foreign debt problem
and the management of public finance much easier to manage by the
1980s. The debt service [http://www.cadtm.org/Debt-service] ratio of
32.6% (of export revenue) in 76, will increase progressively to 53.1%
en 78, and thereafter will decline to 49.4% in 1980 and about 30% in
1982.”_ [1
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb1]] The
exact opposite was to occur. Every word of this prediction was
contradicted by facts!

In October 1979, when Paul Volcker, then chairman of the US Federal
Reserve [http://www.cadtm.org/FED-Federal-Reserve], decided on a steep
rise in interest rates [http://www.cadtm.org/Interest-rates] that
would inevitably lead to the debt crisis (which was to start in
Mexico), the World Bank had reassuring words. On 19 November 1979 we
read: _"Both the increase in Mexico’s external public debt and
especially the increase in the debt service ratio, which in 1979 may
become as high as 2/3 of its exports (…), suggest a very critical
situation. In fact, the truth is exactly the
opposite.”_ (author’s underlining). [2
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb2]] This
is quite simply astounding.

The World Bank’s message consists of repeating that even when
everything suggests there is cause for alarm, actually all is well,
the situation is excellent, and you should just contract further
debts. What would we think of a crossing-keeper who would tell
pedestrians they should cross the railway lines when a red light
clearly indicates that a train is arriving? What would a court say if
such behaviour had resulted in loss of life?

Private banks of the North loaned exponentially higher amounts to
developing countries, starting with Mexico.

One of the Bank’s economists in charge of monitoring the situation
sent a most alarming report on 14 August 1981. [3
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb3]] He
explained that he disagreed with the optimistic view held by the
Mexican government and its representative Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
minister of Planning and Budget. [4
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb4]] He
later had serious problems with his hierarchy, and even decided to
lodge a lawsuit against the WB (which he won). [5
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb5]] In
1981 the World Bank granted Mexico a 1.1 billion dollar loan
(scheduled over several years): it was by far the largest loan granted
by the WB since 1946. In the early months of 1982 the World Bank still
claimed that the increase in the Mexican GDP
[http://www.cadtm.org/Gross-Domestic-Product-GDP] would average 8.1%
a year between 1983 and 1985. On 19 March 1982, i.e. six months before
the crisis, the president of the World Bank, Alden W. Clausen, sent
the following letter to the Mexican president José Lopez
Portillo: [6
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb6]] _"Our
meeting in Mexico City with your top aides reinforced my confidence in
the economic leaders of your country. You, Mr. President, can be
rightfully proud of the achievements of the last five years. Few
countries can claim to have achieved such high growth rates, or have
created so many jobs… I wish to congratulate you on the many
successes already achieved. As I stated during our meeting, the
recent setback for the Mexican economy is bound to be transient, and
we will be happy to be of assistance during the consolidation
process”_ (author’s underlining). [7
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb7]] Less
than a year earlier, Alden W. Clausen still chaired the Bank of
America, which was busy providing loan on loan to Mexico.

On 20 August 1982 Mexico, which had paid back considerable amounts
over the first seven months of the year, stated that it could not pay
any more. It decreed a six month moratorium (August 1982 to January
1983). It had only 180 million dollars in reserve and was expected to
pay 300 million on 23 August. Already in early August Mexico had told
the IMF
[http://www.cadtm.org/IMF-International-Monetary-Fund,1114] that its
currency reserve was down to 180 million dollars. At the end of August
the IMF convened with the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury, the Bank
for International Settlements
[http://www.cadtm.org/Bank-for-International-Settlements,1144] (BIS)
and the Bank of England. The director of the IMF, Jacques de
Larosière, told the Mexican authorities that the IMF and the BIS were
willing to grant currency loans in December 1982 on the twofold
condition that the money be used to refund private banks and that
Mexico implement drastic structural adjustment
[http://www.cadtm.org/Structural-Adjustment,1133] measures. Mexico
accepted. It steeply devalued its national currency, considerably
increased domestic interest [http://www.cadtm.org/Interest] rates,
saved Mexican private banks from bankruptcy by nationalizing them and
taking over their debts. In exchange, it seized the 6 billion dollars
cash they had on hand. President José Lopez Portillo presented this
measure to the Mexican people as though it were a nationalist move. He
of course refrained from divulging that the 6 billion dollars would be
used to pay back foreign bankers.

Who was really responsible for the Mexican debt crisis? Did Mexico
start it?

Generally speaking, the reasons are obvious: a rise in interest rates
decided in Washington, plummeting oil revenues and a huge debt are the
structural causes. The first two are external factors and Mexico was
helpless against them. The third one results from choices made by the
Mexican leaders, whom the WB and private bankers encouraged to take on
enormous loans.

Beyond these structural causes, which are fundamental, an analysis of
how one thing led to another shows that private banks of the North
started the crisis in that they significantly reduced the loans
granted to Mexico in 1982. Aware that almost all available currency in
the Mexican Treasury had been used to pay back the debt, they
considered it was time to reduce their loans. In this way they brought
one of the world’s largest indebted countries to its knees. Seeing
that Mexico was facing the combined effects of a rise in interest
rates – from which they profited - and a fall in its oil revenues,
they chose to act first and move out. An aggravating circumstance was
that foreign bankers had aided and abetted Mexican ruling circles
(CEOs and leaders of the party-State called the Institutional
Revolutionary Party) who were frantically transferring their capital
abroad in order to invest it safely. It is estimated that in
1981-1982, no less than 29 billion dollars left Mexico as capital
flight. [8
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb8]] After
precipitating the crisis private bankers then further benefited from
it – and left it for others to mend matters. The evidence can be
seen in the following tables.

TABLE 1. FOREIGN BANKS’ LOANS WITHOUT ANY STATE GUARANTEE AND
REPAYMENTS TO THE BANKS (IN MILLION DOLLARS)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

The table traces the evolution of loans granted by private foreign
banks without any guarantee by the state. We note that after a huge
increase from 1978 to 1981, loans fell drastically in 1982. On the
other hand repayments did not decrease. On the contrary they increased
by close to 40% in 1982. In 1983 bank loans had completely stopped.
Yet repayments were still well underway. The evolution of debt net
transfer, which had been positive until 1981, became seriously
negative from 1982 on. All in all, between 1978 and 1987, negative net
transfer accounted for more than 10 billion dollars in profits for the
bankers.

TABLE 2. FOREIGN BANKS’ LOANS WITH STATE GUARANTEE AND REPAYMENTS TO
THE BANKS (in million dollars)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

Table 2 shows the evolution of loans from foreign private banks that
were guaranteed by the Mexican state. We note the increase in loans
from 1978 to 1981. In 1982 loans decreased by 20% while repayments
increased. Bank loans decreased sharply until 1986. By contrast
repayments by the Mexican state continued at a very high level. Net
transfer on the public debt to foreign banks contracted with a state
guarantee, which had been positive from 1978 to 1982, became very
seriously negative from 1983. All in all, the net negative transfer
between 1978 and 1987 accounts for over 10 billions dollars in profits
for the banks.

If we add up negative transfers in the two tables we reach a sum of
over 20 billion dollars. Private banks in the North extracted juicy
benefits from the Mexican people.

TABLE 3. WB LOANS TO MEXICO AND REPAYMENTS (in million dollars)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

Table 3 shows the evolution of World Bank loans to Mexico. We note a
sharp increase from 1978 to 1981. The WB was then frantically
competing with private banks. In 1982 and 1983 we note a moderate
decrease. Loans increased again from 1984 on. The Bank behaved as a
last resort lender. Loans were conditioned on the Mexican state
repaying private banks, a majority of which were North American. Net
transfer remained positive because Mexico did use WB loans to repay
private banks.

TABLE 4. IMF LOANS TO MEXICO AND REPAYMENTS (in million dollars)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

Table 4 shows the evolution of IMF loans to Mexico. There were none
between 1978 and 1981. Yet in those years Mexico repaid old loans.
From 1982 on the IMF loaned massive amounts on two conditions: 1) the
money had to be used to repay private banks; 2) Mexico had to
implement a structural adjustment policy (reduction of social
expenditure and of expenditure for infrastructures, privatization,
rise in interest rates, increase in indirect taxation, etc.). Net
transfer remained positive because Mexico did use IMF loans to repay
private banks.

TABLE 5. LOANS FROM COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH TO MEXICO AND
REPAYMENTS (in million dollars)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

Table 5 shows the evolution of loans granted by the most
industrialized countries. Like private banks and the World Bank,
countries of the North sharply increased their loans to Mexico from
1978 to 1981. Then they did more or less what the WB and the IMF were
doing. While private banks reduced their loans, they followed the IMF
and the WB in loaning to Mexico in order to make sure that it could
repay private banks and that it would implement the structural
adjustment programme.

TABLE 6. EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN EXTERNAL DEBT FROM 1978 TO 1987 (in
million dollars)

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2005

Table 6 shows the evolution of Mexico’s total external debt. It
multiplied by 3 from 1978 to 1987. During this period the amounts that
were paid back were 3.5 times the amount owed in 1978. Total negative
net transfer accounts for over 26 billion dollars.

Since 1982 the Mexican people have been bled dry to assuage their
various creditors. Indeed the IMF and the World Bank have exacted the
last cent back from what they loaned to the country so that it could
pay private banks. Mexico has been forcefully subjected to the logic
of structural adjustment. The shock of 1982 first led to a steep
recession, massive layoffs and a dramatic drop in purchasing power.
Next structural measures resulted in hundreds of publicly owned
companies being privatized. The concentration of wealth and of a large
part of the national assets in the hands of a few Mexican and foreign
industrial and financial corporations is staggering. [9
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nb9]]

In a historical perspective it is evident that the road to
overindebtedness in the 1960s and 1970s, the explosion of the debt
crisis in 1982 and the way it was managed in the following years
marked a radical break with the progressive policies implemented from
the start of the Mexican revolution in 1910 to the 1940s with Lazaro
Cardenas as president. From the revolution to the 1940s, living
standards notably improved, Mexico made great strides in economic
terms and adopted an independent foreign policy. From 1914 to 1946
Mexico did not pay back any debt and eventually won a resounding
victory over its creditors when the latter agreed to give up 90% of
the amount owed in 1914 without claiming any interest either. Since
the 1982 crisis Mexico has lost control of its destiny. Historically,
this has been the US’s objective since the 19th century.

In 1970, Mexico’s public external debt amounted to USD 3.1 billion.
33 years later, in 2003, it had multiplied by 25, reaching 77.4
billion (public and private external debts together amounted to 140
billion). Meanwhile the Mexican government paid back 368 billion (120
times the amount owed in 1970). Net negative transfer from 1970 to
2003 amounts to USD 109 billion. From 1983 to 2003, i.e. over a period
of 21 years, net transfer on the public external debt was positive
only in 1990 and 1995.

We trust the day is approaching when the Mexican people will be able
to win back their freedom to decide their own future.

Part 1 Concerning the founding of the Bretton Woods’ Institutions
[http://www.cadtm.org/Concerning-the-founding-of-the-Bretton-Woods-Institutions]
Part 2 The WB assists those in power in a witch-hunting context
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-WB-assists-those-in-power-in-a-witch-hunting-context]
Part 3 Early conflicts between the UN and the World Bank/IMF tandem
[http://www.cadtm.org/Early-conflicts-between-the-UN-and-the-World-Bank-IMF-tandem]
Part 4 SUNFED versus World Bank
[http://www.cadtm.org/SUNFED-versus-World-Bank]
Part 5 Why the Marshall Plan ?
[http://www.cadtm.org/Why-the-Marshall-Plan]
Part 6 Why the 1953 cancellation of German debt won’t be reproduced
for Greece and Developing Countries
[http://www.cadtm.org/Why-the-1953-cancellation-of-German-debt-cannot-be-reproduced-for-Greece-and]
Part 7 Domination of the United States on the World Bank 
[http://www.cadtm.org/Domination-of-the-United-States-on-the-World-Bank]
Part 8 World Bank and IMF support to dictatorships
[http://www.cadtm.org/World-Bank-and-IMF-support-to-dictatorships]
Part 9 The World Bank and the Philippines
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-and-the-Philippines]
Part 10 The World Bank’s support of the dictatorship in Turkey
(1980-1983) [http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-s-support-of-the]
Part 11 The World Bank and the IMF in Indonesia: an emblematic
interference
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-and-the-IMF-in-Indonesia-an-emblematic-interference]
Part 12 Theoretical lies of the World Bank
[http://www.cadtm.org/Theoretical-lies-of-the-World-Bank,2190]
Part 13 The South Korean miracle is exposed
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-South-Korean-miracle-is-exposed]
Part 14 The debt trap [http://www.cadtm.org/The-debt-trap]
Part 15 The World Bank saw the debt crisis looming 
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-saw-the-debt-crisis-looming]
Part 16
Part 17 The World Bank and the IMF: the creditors’ bailiffs
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-and-the-IMF-the-creditors-bailiffs]
Part 18 Presidents Barber Conable and Lewis Preston (1986-1995)
[http://www.cadtm.org/Presidents-Barber-Conable-and-Lewis-Preston-1986-1995]

Footnotes

[1
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh1]] D.
Kapur, J. Lewis, R. Webb, 1997, vol. 1. p. 499

[2
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh2]] Idem,
p. 499

[3
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh3]] Memorandum
to files, “Mexico: Present Economic Situation – Problems and
Policies”, August 14, 1981.

[4
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh4]] Carlos
Salinas de Gortari became president of Mexico in 1988 as a result of a
massive fraud to rob the progressive candidate Cuauthémoc Cardenas of
his victory. He left the presidency in 1994, shortly after ratifying
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See next chapter.

[5
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh5]] Here
is what historians of the World Bank write: _“The economist (at
time of writing still with the Bank) had taken a much more alarmed
view of Mexico’s macro prospects in 1981 and wrote up his dissenting
economic analysis in the form of a memo to the files. His subsequent
career at the Bank was jeopardized: after an embattled few years, he
was reinstated after a legal battle. Pieter Bottelier, interview with
the authors, January 19, 1993_ in D. Kapur, J. Lewis, R. Webb, 1997,
vol. 1., p. 603.

[6
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh6]] José
Lopez Portillo was president from 1977 to 1982.

[7
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh7]] Letter,
A. W. Clausen to His Excellency Jose Lopez Portillo, president, United
Mexican States, March 19, 1982, in D. Kapur, J. Lewis, R. Webb, 1997,
vol. 1, p. 603

[8
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh8]] Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, _World Financial Markets_, March
1986, p. 15.

[9
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Mexican-debt-crisis-and-the-World-Bank#nh9]] The
consequences of structural adjustment policies in Mexico are analysed
in the first edition of _Your Money or Your Life, The Tyranny of
Global Finance_, Chapter 15, Case study # 2.

_Eric Toussaint  [http://www.cadtm.org/Eric-Toussaint?lang=en]is a
historian and political scientist who completed his Ph.D. at the
universities of Paris VIII and Liège, is the spokesperson of the
CADTM International, and sits on the Scientific Council of ATTAC
France. He is the author of Bankocracy
[http://www.cadtm.org/Bankocracy] (2015); The Life and Crimes of an
Exemplary Man
[http://www.cadtm.org/The-Life-and-Crimes-of-an] (2014); Glance in
the Rear View Mirror. Neoliberal Ideology From its Origins to the
Present, Haymarket books, Chicago, 2012 (see here
[http://www.cadtm.org/Glance-in-the-Rear-View-Mirror]), etc. See his
bibliography:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89ric_Toussaint
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89ric_Toussaint]
He co-authored World debt figures 2015 with Pierre Gottiniaux,
Daniel Munevar and Antonio Sanabria (2015); and with Damien
Millet Debt, the IMF, and the World Bank: Sixty Questions, Sixty
Answers [http://www.cadtm.org/Debt-the-IMF-and-the-World-Bank],
Monthly Review Books, New York, 2010. Since the 4th April 2015 he is
the scientific coordinator of the Greek Truth Commission on Public
Debt [http://www.cadtm.org/4-April-2015-a-landmark-in-the]._

_The Committee for the Cancellation of the Third World Debt (the CADTM
- Comité pour l’annulation de la dette du Tiers Monde) is an
international network of individuals and local committees from across
Europe and Latin America, Africa and Asia. It was founded in Belgium
on 15th March 1990._

_The network acts in close liaison with other movements and
organisations fighting for the same ideals. Its main preoccupation,
besides the debt issue, is the planning of activities and radical
alternatives for the creation of a world respectful of people’s
fundamental rights, needs and liberties._

_The CADTM has always been a pluralist association composed of both
private individuals and legally constituted organisations [1
[http://www.cadtm.org/About-CADTM#nb1]]. Its activities take place on
the common ground occupied by the battles being waged by grassroots
and cultural movements, trade unions, international solidarity
committees and development NGOs. It is a member of the international
council of the World Social Forum and is fully committed to its role
within the international movement of citizens fighting for the
“other worlds possible”. This movement is gradually defining a
new, alternative form of globalisation, in contrast to that being
pushed by those insisting on a globalised neoliberal capitalist model
as the ultimate in human happiness, the natural state of society, the
“end of history”, the inevitable destiny for all wherever they
come from._

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