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PORTSIDELABOR  August 2012, Week 5

PORTSIDELABOR August 2012, Week 5

Subject:

China in Revolt

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Portside Labor <[log in to unmask]>

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Date:

Fri, 31 Aug 2012 20:12:54 -0400

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China in Revolt

by Eli Friedman

Jacobin Magazine

http://jacobinmag.com/2012/08/china-in-revolt/

The Chinese working class plays a Janus-like role in
the political imaginary of neoliberalism. On the one
hand, it's imagined as the competitive victor of
capitalist globalization, the conquering juggernaut
whose rise spells defeat for the working classes of the
rich world. What hope is there for the struggles of
workers in Detroit or Rennes when the Sichuanese
migrant is happy to work for a fraction of the price?

At the same time, Chinese workers are depicted as the
pitiable victims of globalization, the guilty
conscience of First World consumers. Passive and
exploited toilers, they suffer stoically for our
iPhones and bathtowels. And only we can save them, by
absorbing their torrent of exports, or campaigning
benevolently for their humane treatment at the hands of
"our" multinationals.

For parts of the rich-world left, the moral of these
opposing narratives is that here, in our own societies,
labor resistance is consigned to history's dustbin.
Such resistance is, first of all, perverse and
decadent. What entitles pampered Northern workers, with
their "First World problems," to make material demands
on a system that already offers them such abundance
furnished by the wretched of the earth? And in any
case, resistance against so formidable a competitive
threat must surely be futile.

By depicting Chinese workers as Others-as abject
subalterns or competitive antagonists-this tableau
wildly miscasts the reality of labor in today's China.
Far from triumphant victors, Chinese workers are facing
the same brutal competitive pressures as workers in the
West, often at the hands of the same capitalists. More
importantly, it is hardly their stoicism that
distinguishes them from us.

Today, the Chinese working class is fighting. More than
thirty years into the Communist Party's project of
market reform, China is undeniably the epicenter of
global labor unrest. While there are no official
statistics, it is certain that thousands, if not tens
of thousands, of strikes take place each year. All of
them are wildcat strikes-there is no such thing as a
legal strike in China. So on a typical day anywhere
from half a dozen to several dozen strikes are likely
taking place.

More importantly, workers are winning, with many
strikers capturing large wage increases above and
beyond any legal requirements. Worker resistance has
been a serious problem for the Chinese state and
capital and, as in the United States in the 1930s, the
central government has found itself forced to pass a
raft of labor legislation. Minimum wages are going up
by double digits in cities around the country and many
workers are receiving social insurance payments for the
first time.

Labor unrest has been growing for two decades, and the
past two years a-lone have brought a qualitative
advance in the character of worker struggles.

But if there are lessons for the Northern left in the
experience of Chinese workers, finding them requires an
examination of the unique conditions those workers
face-conditions which, today, are cause for both
great optimism and great pessimism.

Over the past two decades of insurgency, a relatively
coherent catalog of worker-resistance tactics has
emerged. When a grievance arises, workers' first step
is often to talk directly to managers. These requests
are almost always ignored, especially if they relate to
wages.

Strikes, on the other hand, do work. But they are never
organized by the official Chinese unions, which are
formally subordinate to the Communist Party and
generally controlled by management at the enterprise
level. Every strike in China is organized autonomously,
and frequently in direct opposition to the official
union, which encourages workers to pursue their
grievances through legal channels instead.

The legal system, comprising workplace mediation,
arbitration, and court cases, attempts to individualize
conflict. This, combined with collusion between state
and capital, means that this system generally cannot
resolve worker grievances. It is designed in large part
to prevent strikes.

Until 2010, the most common reason for workers to
strike was nonpayment of wages. The demand in these
strikes is straightforward: pay us the wages to which
we are entitled. Demands for improvements above and
beyond existing law were rare. Given that legal
violations were and are endemic, there has been fertile
ground for such defensive struggles.

Strikes generally begin with workers putting down their
tools and staying inside the factory, or at least on
factory grounds. Surprisingly, there is little use of
scab labor in China, and so pickets are rarely used.*

When faced with recalcitrant management, workers
sometimes escalate by heading to the streets. This
tactic is directed at the government: by affecting
public order, they immediately attract state attention.
Workers sometimes march to local government offices or
simply block a road. Such tactics are risky, as the
government may support strikers, but just as frequently
will resort to force. Even if a compromise is struck,
public demonstrations will often result in organizers
being detained, beaten, and imprisoned.

Even more risky, and yet still common, is for workers
to engage in sabotage and property destruction, riot,
murder their bosses, and physically confront the
police. Such tactics appear to be more prevalent in
response to mass layoffs or bankruptcies. A number of
particularly intense confrontations took place in late
2008 and early 2009 in response to mass layoffs in
export processing due to the economic crisis in the
West. As will be explained, workers may now be
developing an antagonistic consciousness vis-a-vis the
police.

But the least spectacular item in this catalog of
resistance forms the essential backdrop to all the
others: migrants, increasingly, have simply been
refusing to take the bad jobs they used to flock to in
the export processing zones of the southeast.

A labor shortage first arose in 2004, and in a nation
that still has more than 700million rural residents,
most assumed it to be a short-term fluke. Eight years
later, there is clearly a structural shift taking
place. Economists have engaged in intense debate about
the causes of the labor shortage, a debate I will not
recap here. Suffice it to say that a large swath of
manufacturers in coastal provinces such as Guangdong,
Zhejiang, and Jiangsu has not been able to attract and
retain workers.

Regardless of the specific reasons, the salient point
is that the shortage has driven up wages and
strengthened workers' power in the market-an
advantage that they have been exploiting.

A turning point came in the summer of 2010, marked by a
momentous strike wave that began at a Honda
transmission plant in Nanhai.

Since then, there has been a change in the character of
worker resistance, a development noted by many
analysts. Most importantly, worker demands have become
offensive. Workers have been asking for wage increases
above and beyond those to which they are legally
entitled, and in many strikes they have begun to demand
that they elect their own union representatives. They
have not called for independent unions outside of the
official All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),
as this would surely incite violent state repression.
But the insistence on elections represents the
germination of political demands, even if the demand is
only organized at the company level.

The strike wave was detonated at Nanhai, where for
weeks workers had been grumbling about low wages and
discussing the idea of a stoppage. On 17May2010,
hardly any of them knew that a single employee-whom
many reports have since identified by the pseudonym Tan
Zhiqing-would call the strike on his own initiative
by simply hitting the emergency stop button, shutting
down both of the plant's production lines.

Workers walked out of the factory. By that afternoon,
management was pleading with them to return to work and
open negotiations. Production was in fact resumed that
day. But the workers had formulated their initial
demand: a wage increase of 800rmb per month, amounting
to a 50percent hike for regular workers.

More demands followed: for the "reorganization" of the
company's official union, which was offering the
workers virtually no support in their struggle, as well
as the reinstatement of two fired workers. During the
talks workers again walked out, and one week into the
strike all of Honda's assembly plants in China had been
shut down due to lack of parts.

Meanwhile, news of the Nanhai strike began to spark
widespread unrest among industrial workers around the
country. Chinese newspaper headlines told the story:
"One Wave Is Higher Than the Next, Strike Also Erupts
At Honda Lock Factory"; "70Thousand Participate in
Dalian Strike Wave Affecting 73Enterprises, Ends With
34.5%Wage Increases"; "Honda Wage Strikes Are a Shock
to the Low-Cost Manufacturing Model." In each strike,
the main demand was for major wage increases, although
in many of them demands for union reorganization were
also heard-a political development of great
importance.

One of these copycat strikes was especially notable for
its militancy and organization. Over the weekend of
June 19-20, a group of up to two hundred workers at
Denso, a Japanese-owned auto parts maker supplying
Toyota, met secretly to discuss plans. At the meeting,
they decided on a strategy of "three nos:" for three
days there would be no work, no demands, and no
representatives.

They knew that by disrupting the supply chain, the
neighboring Toyota assembly plant would be forced to
shut down in a matter of days. By committing to strike
for three days without demands, they anticipated
mounting losses both for Denso and for Toyota's larger
production chain.

Their plan worked. On Monday morning, they kicked off
the strike by walking out and blocking trucks from
leaving the plant. By that afternoon, six other
factories in the same industrial zone had closed, and
the next day the lack of parts forced a shutdown in the
Toyota assembly plant.

On the third day, as they had planned, workers elected
twenty-seven representatives and went into negotiations
with the central demand of an 800RMB wage increase.
After three days of talks involving the CEO of Denso,
who had flown in from Japan, it was announced that they
had won the full 800 RMB increase.

If the summer of 2010 was characterized by radical but
relatively orderly resistance to capital, the summer of
2011 produced two mass insurrections against the state.

In the same week in June 2011, immense worker riots
rocked the suburban manufacturing areas of Chaozhou and
Guangzhou, both leading to widespread and highly
targeted property destruction. In the Chaozhou town of
Guxiang, a Sichuanese worker seeking back wages was
brutally attacked by knife-wielding thugs and his
former boss. In response to this, thousands of other
migrants began demonstrating at the local government
offices, many of them having suffered years of
discrimination and exploitation by employers working in
collusion with officials.

The protest was purportedly organized by a loosely
organized Sichuan "hometown association," one of the
mafia-like organizations that have proliferated in an
environment where open association is not tolerated.
After surrounding the government offices, the migrants
quickly turned their ire on local residents who they
felt had discriminated against them. After they burned
dozens of cars and looted stores, armed police were
required to put down the riot and to disband locals who
had organized into vigilante groups.

Just one week later, an even more spectacular uprising
took place on the outskirts of Guangzhou in Zengcheng.
A pregnant woman from Sichuan hawking goods on the side
of the street was approached by police and violently
shoved to the ground. Rumors immediately began
circulating among factory workers in the area that she
had miscarried as a result of the altercation; whether
or not this was actually the case quickly became
irrelevant.

Enraged by another incident of police aggression,
indignant workers rioted throughout Zengcheng for
several days, burning down a police station, battling
riot cops, and blockading a national highway. Other
Sichuanese migrants reportedly poured into Zengcheng
from around Guangdong to join in. Eventually the
People's Liberation Army was called in to put down the
insurrection and engaged the militants with live
ammunition. Despite denials from the government, it is
likely that a number of people were killed.

In just a few years, worker resistance has gone from
defensive to offensive. Seemingly small incidents have
set off mass uprisings, indicative of generalized
anger. And ongoing labor shortages in coastal areas
point to deeper structural shifts that have also
changed the dynamics of labor politics.

All of this presents a severe challenge to the model of
export-led development and wage repression that has
characterized the political economy of China's
southeastern coastal regions for more than two decades.
By the end of the 2010 strike wave, Chinese media
commentators were declaring that the era of low-wage
labor had come to an end.

But if such material gains are cause for optimism,
entrenched depoliticization means that workers cannot
take much satisfaction from these victories. Any
attempt by workers to articulate an explicit politics
is instantly and effectively smashed by the Right and
its state allies by raising the specter of the Lord of
Misrule: do you really want to go back to the chaos of
the Cultural Revolution?

If in the West "there is no alternative," in China the
two official alternatives are a frictionless and
efficient capitalist technocracy (the Singaporean
fantasy) or unmitigated, feral, and profoundly
irrational political violence. As a result, workers
self-consciously submit to the state-imposed
segregation of economic and political struggles and
present their demands as economic, legal, and in
accordance with the stultifying ideology of "harmony."
To do otherwise would incite harsh state repression.

Perhaps workers can win a wage hike in one factory,
social insurance in another. But this sort of
dispersed, ephemeral, and desubjectivized insurgency
has failed to crystallize any durable forms of
counter-hegemonic organization capable of coercing the
state or capital at the class level.

The result is that when the state does intervene on
behalf of workers-either by supporting immediate
demands during strike negotiations or passing
legislation that improves their material standing-its
image as "benevolent Leviathan" is buttressed: it has
done these things not because workers have demanded
them, but because it cares about "weak and
disadvantaged groups" (as workers are referred to in
the official lexicon).

Yet it is only through an ideological severing of cause
from effect at the symbolic level that the state is
able to maintain the pretense that workers are in fact
"weak." Given the relative success of this project, the
working class is political, but it is alienated from
its own political activity.

It is impossible to understand how this situation is
maintained without grasping the social and political
position of today's working class. The Chinese worker
of today is a far cry from the heroic and
hyper-masculinized proletarians of Cultural Revolution
propaganda posters. In the state-owned sector, workers
were never really "masters of the enterprise" as
claimed by the state. But they were guaranteed lifetime
employment, and their work unit also bore the cost of
social reproduction by providing housing, education,
health care, pensions, and even wedding and funeral
services.

In the 1990s, the central government began a massive
effort to privatize, downsize, or desubsidize many
state-owned enterprises, which led to major social and
economic dislocations in northeastern China's "Rust
Belt." While material conditions for workers in the
remaining state-owned companies are still better in
relative terms, today these firms are increasingly run
in accordance with the logic of profit maximization.

Of greater immediate interest is the new working class,
composed of migrants from the countryside who have
flocked to the "Sun Belt" cities of the southeast. With
the transition to capitalism beginning in 1978, farmers
originally fared well, as the market provided higher
prices for agricultural goods than the state had. But
by the mid 1980s, these gains began to be wiped out by
rampant inflation, and the rural population started to
look for new sources of income. As China opened its
doors to export-oriented manufacturing in the southeast
coastal regions, these farmers were transformed into
migrant workers.

At the same time, the state discovered that a number of
institutions inherited from the command economy were
useful for enhancing private accumulation. Chief among
these was the hukou or household registration system,
which tied an individual's social benefits to a
particular place. The hukou is a complex and
increasingly decentralized instrument of
administration, but the key thing to note is that it
institutionalizes a spatial and social severing between
migrant workers' productive and reproductive
activities-between their work life and their home and
family life.

This separation has shaped every aspect of migrant
workers' labor struggles. Young migrants come to cities
to work in factories, restaurants, and construction
sites, to engage in petty crime, sell street food, or
earn a living as sex workers. But the state never made
any pretense that migrants are formally equal to urban
residents or that they are welcome for the long term.

Migrants do not enjoy access to any of the public
services that urban residents have, including health
care, housing, and education. They require official
permission to be in the city, and during the 1990s and
early 2000s there were many instances of migrants being
detained, beaten, and "deported" for not having papers.
For at least a generation, migrant workers' primary aim
has been to earn as much money as they could before
returning to the village in their mid twenties to get
married and have a family.

Other formal arrangements ensure that migrants are not
able to make a life in the city. The system of social
insurance (including health insurance, pensions,
unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, and
workplace injury insurance) is organized at the
municipal level. This means the migrants who are lucky
enough to have employer-supported social insurance-a
small minority-are paying into a system that they
will never benefit from. If pensions are not portable,
why would a migrant demand a better one? Worker demands
therefore focus quite rationally on the most immediate
of wage issues.

Thus, subjectively, migrants do not refer to themselves
as "workers," nor do they think of themselves as part
of the "working class." Rather, they are mingong, or
peasant-workers, and they engage in "selling labor"
(dagong) rather than having a profession or a career.
The temporality of this relationship to work is perhaps
the norm under neoliberal capitalism, but rates of
turnover in many Chinese factories are astonishing,
sometimes exceeding 100percent a year.

The implications for the dynamics of worker resistance
have been immense. For example, there are very few
recorded struggles over the length of the working day.
Why would workers want to spend more time in a city
that rejects them? The "work-life balance" of hr
discourse means nothing to an eighteeen-year-old
migrant worker toiling in a suburban Shanghai factory.
In the city, migrants live to work-not in the
self-actualizing sense but in the very literal sense.
If a worker assumes that they are just earning money to
eventually bring back home, there is little reason (or
opportunity) to ask for more time "for what one will"
in the city.

Another example: every year just before the Chinese New
Year, the number of strikes in the construction sector
surges. Why? This holiday is the only time of the year
that most migrants will return to their hometowns, and
is often the only time that they can see family
members, often including spouses and children.
Construction workers are generally paid only when a
project is completed, but nonpayment of wages has been
endemic since the deregulation of the industry in the
1980s. The idea of going back to the village
empty-handed is unacceptable for workers, since the
reason they left for the city in the first place was
because of the promise of marginally higher wages.
Hence the strikes.

In other words, migrant workers have not attempted to
link struggles in production to struggles over other
aspects of life or broader social issues. They are
severed from the local community and do not have any
right to speak as citizens. Demands for wages have not
expanded into demands for more time, for better social
services, or for political rights.

Capital, meanwhile, has relied on several
tried-and-true methods to prop up profitability.

Within the factory, the biggest development of the past
few years is one that will be drearily familiar to
workers in the US, Europe, or Japan: the explosive
growth of various kinds of precarious labor, including
temps, student interns, and, most importantly,
"dispatch workers."

Dispatch workers are directly employed by a labor
contracting firm-many of which are owned by local
labor bureaus-which then "dispatches" its workers to
sites where they will be put to work. This has the
obvious effect of obscuring the employment
relationship, and enhancing flexibility for capital.
Dispatch labor now constitutes a huge percentage of the
workforce (often more than 50percent in a given
workplace) in an incredibly diverse array of
industries, including manufacturing, energy,
transportation, banking, healthcare, sanitation, and
the service industry. The trend has emerged in domestic
private, foreign private, joint-venture, and
state-owned enterprises.

But the big story in recent years has been the
relocation of industrial capital from the coastal
regions into central and western China. There are huge
social and political consequences that derive from this
"spatial fix," and they present the working class with
a new and potentially transformative set of
possibilities. Whether or not these possibilities will
be realized is of course a question that can only be
resolved in practice.

The case of Foxconn, China's largest private employer,
is instructive here. Foxconn moved from its original
home in Taiwan to coastal Shenzhen more than a decade
ago, but in the wake of the 2010 worker suicides and
the ongoing public scrutiny of its highly militarized
and alienating work environment, it is now being forced
to move once again. The company is currently in the
process of drawing down its manufacturing workforce in
Shenzhen, having built massive new facilities in inland
provinces. The two largest of these are in the
provincial capitals of Zhengzhou and Chengdu.

It isn't hard to understand the attraction that the
interior holds for such companies. Although wages in
Shenzhen and other coastal areas are still quite low by
global standards (less than 200 USD a month), wages in
interior provinces such as Henan, Hubei, and Sichuan
can be almost half that. Many employers also assume,
perhaps correctly, that more migrants will be available
closer to the source, and a looser labor market also
has immediate political advantages for capital. This,
too, is a familiar story of capitalism: the labor
historian Jefferson Cowie identified a similar process
at work in his history of electronics manufacturer
rca's "seventy-year quest for cheap labor"-a quest
that took the company from New Jersey to Indiana to
Tennessee, and finally to Mexico.

If coastal China has offered transnational capital
highly favorable social and political conditions for
the past two decades, things will be different in the
interior. The antagonism between labor and capital may
be universal, but class conflict proceeds on the
terrain of particularity.

So what is particular about the Chinese interior, and
why might it be grounds for cautious optimism? Whereas
migrants in coastal regions are necessarily
transitory-and their struggles therefore
ephemeral-in the interior they have the possibility
of establishing durable community. Theoretically, this
means that there is a greater possibility to fuse
struggles in the spheres of production and
reproduction, something that was not possible when
these two arenas were spatially severed.

Consider the issue of hukou, the household
registration. The huge eastern megalopolises to which
migrants have flocked in the past have very tight
restrictions on gaining local residency. Even
white-collar workers with graduate degrees can have a
difficult time getting a Beijing hukou.

But smaller cities in the interior have set a much
lower bar for gaining local residency. While it is
admittedly speculative, it is worth thinking about how
this will change the dynamics of worker resistance. If,
before, migrants' presumed life trajectory was to go
work in the city for a few years to earn money before
returning home and starting a family, workers in the
interior may have a very different perspective.
Suddenly they are not just "working," but also
"living," in a particular place.

This implies that migrants will be much more likely to
settle permanently in their places of work. They will
want to find spouses, have their own places of
residence, have kids, send those kids to school-in
short, engage in social reproduction.

Previously, employers did not have to pay migrant
workers a livable wage, and there was no pretense that
this was to be expected, since it was clear that
workers would go back to the village to settle down.
But in the interior, migrants will likely demand all
the things one needs for a decent life-housing,
health care, education, and some protection against the
risks of unemployment and old age. They may also want
time for themselves and for their community, a demand
that has been conspicuously absent up to the present.

This raises the possibility of the politicization of
worker unrest. Decent public services were never an
expectation of migrants on the coast. But if they can
establish residence rights in the interior, demands for
social services could easily be generalized, providing
the opportunity to escape the isolation of
workplace-based struggles. Demands for social
protection are more likely to be aimed at the state
than at individual employers, establishing the symbolic
foundation for a generalizable confrontation.

Although it is easy to romanticize the brave and
sometimes spectacular resistance of migrant workers,
the reality is that the most frequent response to bad
working conditions has simply been to quit and find
another job or return home. This, too, may change if
they work where they live. The conditions may now be in
place for migrants to stand their ground and fight for
their community and in their community rather than
simply fleeing.

The biographies of workers in the interior may also
present opportunities for enhanced militancy. Many of
these migrants have previous experience working and
fighting in coastal regions. Older workers may lack the
militant passion of youth, but their experience in
dealing with exploitative bosses and their state allies
could be an invaluable resource.

Finally, workers will have greater social resources at
their command. In large coastal cities, they would be
unlikely to garner much sympathy from local residents,
a fact made painfully clear in the Guxiang riots. But
in the interior, workers may have friends and family
nearby, people who are not just inclined to side with
labor but who may in a very direct way depend on
increased wages and social services. This presents the
possibility of expanding struggles beyond the workplace
to incorporate broader social issues.

There may be some on the Left who are sanguine about
perpetual resistance in and of itself. And the form of
class conflict that has prevailed in China has caused
major disruptions for capital accumulation.

But workers are alienated from their own political
activity. A profound asymmetry exists: workers resist
haphazardly and without any strategy, while the state
and capital respond to this crisis self-consciously and
in a coordinated manner.

So far, this fragmented and ephemeral form of struggle
has been unable to make any major dent in the basic
structures of the party-state and its ruling ideology.
And capital, as a universal tendency, has proven its
ability to subdue militant particularities over and
over again. If militant worker resistance simply forces
capital to destroy one working class and produce a new
(antagonistic) working class somewhere else, can we
really consider this a victory?

The new frontier of capital accumulation presents the
Chinese working class with opportunities to establish
more enduring forms of organization capable of
expanding the domain of social struggle and formulating
broad-based political demands.

But until that happens, it will remain a half-step
behind its historical antagonist-and ours.



*It is not immediately apparent why employers have only
infrequently attempted to use scab labor. One
explanation is that the government would not support
such a move, as it could heighten tensions and lead to
violence or greater social disruptions. Another factor
is simply that strikes rarely last for more than a day
or two, as strikers do not have the institutional
support of a union and often come under intense
pressure from the state. The result is that there is
perhaps less need for scabs on the part of employers.

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May 2018, Week 3
May 2018, Week 2
May 2018, Week 1
April 2018, Week 5
April 2018, Week 4
April 2018, Week 3
April 2018, Week 2
April 2018, Week 1
March 2018, Week 5
March 2018, Week 4
March 2018, Week 3
March 2018, Week 2
March 2018, Week 1
February 2018, Week 4
February 2018, Week 3
February 2018, Week 2
February 2018, Week 1
January 2018, Week 5
January 2018, Week 4
January 2018, Week 3
January 2018, Week 2
January 2018, Week 1
December 2017, Week 5
December 2017, Week 4
December 2017, Week 3
December 2017, Week 2
December 2017, Week 1
November 2017, Week 5
November 2017, Week 4
November 2017, Week 3
November 2017, Week 2
November 2017, Week 1
October 2017, Week 5
October 2017, Week 4
October 2017, Week 3
October 2017, Week 2
October 2017, Week 1
September 2017, Week 5
September 2017, Week 4
September 2017, Week 3
September 2017, Week 2
September 2017, Week 1
August 2017, Week 5
August 2017, Week 4
August 2017, Week 3
August 2017, Week 2
August 2017, Week 1
July 2017, Week 5
July 2017, Week 4
July 2017, Week 3
July 2017, Week 2
July 2017, Week 1
June 2017, Week 5
June 2017, Week 4
June 2017, Week 3
June 2017, Week 2
June 2017, Week 1
May 2017, Week 5
May 2017, Week 4
May 2017, Week 3
May 2017, Week 2
May 2017, Week 1
April 2017, Week 5
April 2017, Week 4
April 2017, Week 3
April 2017, Week 2
April 2017, Week 1
March 2017, Week 5
March 2017, Week 4
March 2017, Week 3
March 2017, Week 2
March 2017, Week 1
February 2017, Week 4
February 2017, Week 3
February 2017, Week 2
February 2017, Week 1
January 2017, Week 5
January 2017, Week 4
January 2017, Week 3
January 2017, Week 2
January 2017, Week 1
December 2016, Week 5
December 2016, Week 4
December 2016, Week 3
December 2016, Week 2
December 2016, Week 1
November 2016, Week 5
November 2016, Week 4
November 2016, Week 3
November 2016, Week 2
November 2016, Week 1
October 2016, Week 5
October 2016, Week 4
October 2016, Week 3
October 2016, Week 2
October 2016, Week 1
September 2016, Week 5
September 2016, Week 4
September 2016, Week 3
September 2016, Week 2
September 2016, Week 1
August 2016, Week 5
August 2016, Week 4
August 2016, Week 3
August 2016, Week 2
August 2016, Week 1
July 2016, Week 5
July 2016, Week 4
July 2016, Week 3
July 2016, Week 2
July 2016, Week 1
June 2016, Week 5
June 2016, Week 4
June 2016, Week 3
June 2016, Week 2
June 2016, Week 1
May 2016, Week 5
May 2016, Week 4
May 2016, Week 3
May 2016, Week 2
May 2016, Week 1
April 2016, Week 5
April 2016, Week 4
April 2016, Week 3
April 2016, Week 2
April 2016, Week 1
March 2016, Week 5
March 2016, Week 4
March 2016, Week 3
March 2016, Week 2
March 2016, Week 1
February 2016, Week 5
February 2016, Week 4
February 2016, Week 3
February 2016, Week 2
February 2016, Week 1
January 2016, Week 5
January 2016, Week 4
January 2016, Week 3
January 2016, Week 2
January 2016, Week 1
December 2015, Week 5
December 2015, Week 4
December 2015, Week 3
December 2015, Week 2
December 2015, Week 1
November 2015, Week 5
November 2015, Week 4
November 2015, Week 3
November 2015, Week 2
November 2015, Week 1
October 2015, Week 5
October 2015, Week 4
October 2015, Week 3
October 2015, Week 2
October 2015, Week 1
September 2015, Week 5
September 2015, Week 4
September 2015, Week 3
September 2015, Week 2
September 2015, Week 1
August 2015, Week 5
August 2015, Week 4
August 2015, Week 3
August 2015, Week 2
August 2015, Week 1
July 2015, Week 5
July 2015, Week 4
July 2015, Week 3
July 2015, Week 2
July 2015, Week 1
June 2015, Week 5
June 2015, Week 4
June 2015, Week 3
June 2015, Week 2
June 2015, Week 1
May 2015, Week 5
May 2015, Week 4
May 2015, Week 3
May 2015, Week 2
May 2015, Week 1
April 2015, Week 5
April 2015, Week 4
April 2015, Week 3
April 2015, Week 2
April 2015, Week 1
March 2015, Week 5
March 2015, Week 4
March 2015, Week 3
March 2015, Week 2
March 2015, Week 1
February 2015, Week 4
February 2015, Week 3
February 2015, Week 2
February 2015, Week 1
January 2015, Week 5
January 2015, Week 4
January 2015, Week 3
January 2015, Week 2
January 2015, Week 1
December 2014, Week 5
December 2014, Week 4
December 2014, Week 3
December 2014, Week 2
December 2014, Week 1
November 2014, Week 5
November 2014, Week 4
November 2014, Week 3
November 2014, Week 2
November 2014, Week 1
October 2014, Week 5
October 2014, Week 4
October 2014, Week 3
October 2014, Week 2
October 2014, Week 1
September 2014, Week 5
September 2014, Week 4
September 2014, Week 3
September 2014, Week 2
September 2014, Week 1
August 2014, Week 5
August 2014, Week 4
August 2014, Week 3
August 2014, Week 2
August 2014, Week 1
July 2014, Week 5
July 2014, Week 4
July 2014, Week 3
July 2014, Week 2
July 2014, Week 1
June 2014, Week 5
June 2014, Week 4
June 2014, Week 3
June 2014, Week 2
June 2014, Week 1
May 2014, Week 5
May 2014, Week 4
May 2014, Week 3
May 2014, Week 2
May 2014, Week 1
April 2014, Week 5
April 2014, Week 4
April 2014, Week 3
April 2014, Week 2
April 2014, Week 1
March 2014, Week 5
March 2014, Week 4
March 2014, Week 3
March 2014, Week 2
March 2014, Week 1
February 2014, Week 4
February 2014, Week 3
February 2014, Week 2
February 2014, Week 1
January 2014, Week 5
January 2014, Week 4
January 2014, Week 3
January 2014, Week 2
January 2014, Week 1
December 2013, Week 5
December 2013, Week 4
December 2013, Week 3
December 2013, Week 2
December 2013, Week 1
November 2013, Week 5
November 2013, Week 4
November 2013, Week 3
November 2013, Week 2
November 2013, Week 1
October 2013, Week 5
October 2013, Week 4
October 2013, Week 3
October 2013, Week 2
October 2013, Week 1
September 2013, Week 5
September 2013, Week 4
September 2013, Week 3
September 2013, Week 2
September 2013, Week 1
August 2013, Week 5
August 2013, Week 4
August 2013, Week 3
August 2013, Week 2
August 2013, Week 1
July 2013, Week 5
July 2013, Week 4
July 2013, Week 3
July 2013, Week 2
July 2013, Week 1
June 2013, Week 4
June 2013, Week 3
June 2013, Week 2
June 2013, Week 1
May 2013, Week 5
May 2013, Week 4
May 2013, Week 3
May 2013, Week 2
May 2013, Week 1
April 2013, Week 5
April 2013, Week 4
April 2013, Week 3
April 2013, Week 2
April 2013, Week 1
March 2013, Week 5
March 2013, Week 4
March 2013, Week 3
March 2013, Week 2
March 2013, Week 1
February 2013, Week 4
February 2013, Week 3
February 2013, Week 2
February 2013, Week 1
January 2013, Week 5
January 2013, Week 4
January 2013, Week 3
January 2013, Week 2
January 2013, Week 1
December 2012, Week 5
December 2012, Week 4
December 2012, Week 3
December 2012, Week 2
December 2012, Week 1
November 2012, Week 5
November 2012, Week 4
November 2012, Week 3
November 2012, Week 2
November 2012, Week 1
October 2012, Week 5
October 2012, Week 4
October 2012, Week 3
October 2012, Week 2
October 2012, Week 1
September 2012, Week 4
September 2012, Week 3
September 2012, Week 2
September 2012, Week 1
August 2012, Week 5
August 2012, Week 4
August 2012, Week 3
August 2012, Week 2
August 2012, Week 1
July 2012, Week 5
July 2012, Week 4
July 2012, Week 3
July 2012, Week 2
July 2012, Week 1
June 2012, Week 5
June 2012, Week 4
June 2012, Week 3
June 2012, Week 2
June 2012, Week 1
May 2012, Week 5
May 2012, Week 4
May 2012, Week 3
May 2012, Week 2
May 2012, Week 1
April 2012, Week 5
April 2012, Week 4
April 2012, Week 3
April 2012, Week 2
April 2012, Week 1
March 2012, Week 5
March 2012, Week 4
March 2012, Week 3
March 2012, Week 2
March 2012, Week 1
February 2012, Week 5
February 2012, Week 4
February 2012, Week 3
February 2012, Week 2
February 2012, Week 1
January 2012, Week 5
January 2012, Week 4
January 2012, Week 3
January 2012, Week 2
January 2012, Week 1
December 2011, Week 5
December 2011, Week 4
December 2011, Week 3
December 2011, Week 2
December 2011, Week 1
November 2011, Week 5
November 2011, Week 4
November 2011, Week 3
November 2011, Week 2
November 2011, Week 1
October 2011, Week 5
October 2011, Week 4
October 2011, Week 3
October 2011, Week 2
October 2011, Week 1
September 2011, Week 5
September 2011, Week 4
September 2011, Week 3
September 2011, Week 2
September 2011, Week 1
August 2011, Week 5
August 2011, Week 4
August 2011, Week 3
August 2011, Week 2
August 2011, Week 1
July 2011, Week 5
July 2011, Week 4
July 2011, Week 3
July 2011, Week 2
July 2011, Week 1
June 2011, Week 5
June 2011, Week 4
June 2011, Week 3
June 2011, Week 2
June 2011, Week 1
May 2011, Week 5
May 2011, Week 4
May 2011, Week 3
May 2011, Week 2
May 2011, Week 1
April 2011, Week 5
April 2011, Week 4
April 2011, Week 3
April 2011, Week 2
April 2011, Week 1
March 2011, Week 5
March 2011, Week 4
March 2011, Week 3
March 2011, Week 2
March 2011, Week 1
February 2011, Week 4
February 2011, Week 3
February 2011, Week 2
February 2011, Week 1
January 2011, Week 5
January 2011, Week 4
January 2011, Week 3
January 2011, Week 2
January 2011, Week 1
December 2010, Week 5
December 2010, Week 4
December 2010, Week 3
December 2010, Week 2
December 2010, Week 1
November 2010, Week 5
November 2010, Week 4
November 2010, Week 3
November 2010, Week 2
November 2010, Week 1
October 2010, Week 5
October 2010, Week 4
October 2010, Week 3
October 2010, Week 2
October 2010, Week 1
September 2010, Week 5
September 2010, Week 4
September 2010, Week 3
September 2010, Week 2
September 2010, Week 1
August 2010, Week 5
August 2010, Week 4
August 2010, Week 3
August 2010, Week 2
August 2010, Week 1
July 2010, Week 5
July 2010, Week 4
July 2010, Week 3
July 2010, Week 2
July 2010, Week 1

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