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A Quick Assessment of the Electoral Situation
by Stathis Gourgouris
Greek Left Review June 18, 2012
http://greekleftreview.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/a-quick-assessment-of-the-electoral-situation/
The majority of Greeks voted for governmentability this
time, as opposed to registering a mere protest vote as
in the May 6 elections. This manifestation was
motivated by two contrary sentiments, fear of change
and desire for change, which correspond to votes going
to New Democracy and SYRIZA respectively.
The new government to be formed will involve
collaboration between two nominally vicious opponents
of the past, who have been, however, complicit in the
degradation of the Greek political system in the last
30 years. Their current collaboration confirms their
long term mutual complicity and renders their previous
opposition a mere brawl over spoils. In this respect,
there has never been greater political clarity as to
the primary self-interest of the Greek political elite.
But this new government will represent an electorate
that has registered its trust motivated by fear. Such
politics can never sustain itself in the long run,
especially as the new ND-PASOK government is bound to
distinguish itself by even greater capitulation to the
interests of financial capital and European
bureaucratic elites. The very same people who voted for
this sort of political formation (a minority position
overall) will quickly turn against their rulers in
various manifestations of social unrest. How this
social unrest will translate into a different political
order is one of the key wagers of Greece's future.
On the other hand, SYRIZA collected unprecedented
popular support. It is evident that voters who
supported SYRIZA are no longer motivated by mere
opposition to the old political order. Rather, they
registered their conviction that SYRIZA is a probable
(and indeed desirable) governing force. There is a
stunning statistic that shows SYRIZA an overwhelming
victor among the ages of 55 years and below, while the
population of over 55 years old went to ND. The desire
for change and the commitment to change belongs to
Greece's future, while the fear-driven, literally
conservative, sentiment that brought ND to power is a
force of years past. While not knowing exactly how this
will play out, this generational discrepancy must not
be underestimated.
Now, SYRIZA as the chosen party of primary opposition
cannot return to its habitual mode of parliamentary
opposition from the fringes of 5-6%. Parliamentary
opposition is essential to democratic governance and
must be conducted with impeccable responsibility. As
SYRIZA is likely to be the governing power in the near
future, it must honor the electoral support it received
by conducting an ingenious, vigilant, yet flexible
opposition. While occupying the forefront of critique,
it cannot afford to recede into obstructionism. Given
that the mass media, controlled as they are by major
elite interests, will continue to barrage SYRIZA with
all kinds of vilification, SYRIZA must become even more
vigilant as to its parliamentary conduct. The goal of
SYRIZA is not opposition for opposition's sake - or for
the sake of adherence to some sort of legacy of the
Left. It is to come to government without compromising
the core principles that brought it this trust from
nearly 27% of the electorate.
I have argued that the Left must overcome its taboo on
governing in a democratic society. As SYRIZA was
entrusted with being the primary opposition party, the
allure of this taboo looms more intensely than ever.
The ND-PASOK coalition will hold on to power with
difficulty in the next year. Its majority is slim and
so is the trust of the electorate. Although it is
likely that the upcoming EU Council in June 27-28 will
reward the new government with an extension on its debt
payments and may even grant new loans quickly, the
terms of the Memorandum will not be substantially
renegotiated and the state of Greece's bankruptcy will
continue, as will the general economic decline of the
entire Eurozone. Impoverishment will get worse and
social unrest will increase. Since the ND-PASOK
coalition has shown itself capable of only capitulation
to external forces, its internal political legitimacy,
now bolstered by insecurity and fear, is bound to
collapse. And SYRIZA must remain the primary vehicle
for the alteration of the old political system.
Two other aspects of this electoral result must be
noted:
First, electoral absenteeism increased even further to
38% of the electorate. This means that governmental
representation is extraordinarily partial. It is very
hard to figure out what, if anything, this electorally
dormant population is likely to do in the future.
Electoral absenteeism certainly manifests a socially
defeated population, who in the midst of its dire
impoverishment has lost all trust in the political
process. If SYRIZA aims to develop itself responsibly
as a governing force, it also must address itself to
this self-depoliticized population.
Second, the fact the fascist Golden Dawn (XA) retained
its 6.9% means that it is now a real political
phenomenon that cannot be ignored. The Left must come
to terms with this force, which is not to say that it
must help to authorize its legitimation. XA is still a
criminal organization, self-admittedly anti-democratic,
which merely uses the openness of the democratic
process to bolster its criminal violence. It is
imperative that SYRIZA conduct both a parliamentary and
a public campaign to revise the Constitution as to
judicial immunity granted to members of Parliament. In
general, the most important task of the Greek political
order right now is not to meet the Memorandum's numbers
(because it can't anyway), but to reauthorize an
independent judiciary and to prosecute relentlessly all
criminality - from tax evasion to the racist and
political violence exemplified by the public action of
XA.
Though this election returns to power the old political
elite, the political trajectory of the country has
irreversibly changed. And, as the historical conditions
that provoked this change remain in place and are
likely to become more intense, this new trajectory is
indeed the way by which we shall be judging the future
of Greek political culture.
[Stathis Gourgouris is Professor of Classics and
Comparative Literature and director of the Institute
for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia
University.]
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