Algeria's Regime: Out on a Limb That Looks Set to Fall

     By giving the Gaddafi family refuge, Algeria's
     gerontocracy is putting itself on the wrong side of
     history

Brian Whitaker
guardian.co.uk

August 30, 2011
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/30/arab-uprising-algeria-next


With three out of five countries now under new
management along the north African coast, the spotlight
is turning towards the remaining two: Algeria and
Morocco.

In Morocco, where a new constitution was approved in
July, the king's promises of reform may succeed in
staving off a mass revolt - at least for the time being.
Morocco also recognised the national transitional
council (NTC) in Libya with deft timing a week ago,
declaring its support for "the legitimate aspirations of
the brotherly Libyan people".

That leaves Algeria out on a limb, increasingly
identified with the forces of counter-revolution. Not
only has it so far failed to recognise the Libyan NTC,
but it is now openly providing refuge for members of the
Gaddafi family.

Welcoming the Gaddafis, according to Algeria's
ambassador at the UN, was nothing more than a
humanitarian gesture, in line with the traditions of
desert hospitality - but we don't have to look very far
to see the politics behind it.

What happened to the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan
regimes could easily have been the fate of the Algerian
regime, too. In January, as the Tunisian uprising
gathered pace, Algeria also experienced widespread
disturbances - and for very similar reasons. Regular
protests were still continuing on a smaller scale at the
end of March.

The fact that the Algerian regime survived almost
unscathed while others fell is due partly to the
country's history - many Algerians still have bitter
memories of the internal conflict in the 1990s that cost
100,000 or more lives - as well as some smart handling
of the situation by the authorities. Unlike Mubarak in
Egypt, they lifted the 19-year-old state of emergency
and, cushioned by oil and gas revenues, were able to
offer economic concessions.

Writing in Foreign Policy, Lahcen Achy highlighted a
couple of additional factors. The opposition, while
heavily constrained by the authorities, was divided by
internal disagreements, and without a common set of
grievances disparate groups of protesters - students,
the unemployed, civil servants, doctors, etc - pursued
their own sectional interests.

Achy also noted that the Algerian security forces are
more integrated into the political system than in
Tunisia and Egypt. The police force is very substantial,
having increased from 50,000 in the mid-1990s to 170,000
today, and is comparatively well paid and professional.
Perhaps more significantly, the security forces were
careful not to fan the flames by killing large numbers
of protesters.

So far, the Algerian regime has been lucky, but it has
probably won only a temporary respite. By continuing to
back a loser (in the shape of Gaddafi), or at least
failing to acknowledge that its neighbourhood is
changing rapidly, it has placed itself on the wrong side
of history - a point that has not gone unnoticed in the
Algerian media. As a result, pressure for change in
Algeria is likely to increase now, rather than diminish.

Last week, a report from Chatham House thinktank warned:

     Algeria's 74-year-old president [Abdelaziz
     Bouteflika] is increasingly isolated in a fast-
     changing north Africa. Bouteflika, so far, has not
     faced a mass uprising, but the ingredients - high
     unemployment, anger over corruption,
     disillusionment with an unrepresentative political
     system - are all there. Rather than carrying out
     serious reforms, the Algerian government has
     responded to the Arab unrest with a mixture of
     money and repression.

Unlike the toppled regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya,
the Algerian regime is not really a one-man (or one-
family) show. It is more of a collective gerontocracy,
whose members are gradually fading away without being
replaced by new blood.

Assessing the state of the regime last year, "Kal", who
blogs as the Moor Next Door, wrote:

     Over the last 10 years, many of the key figures in
     the military hardline - Mohamed Lamari, Smain
     Lamari, Khaled Nezzar, Larbi Belkheir, et al - have
     died, retired or grown too ill to manipulate
     politics. What is left are the stalwarts of the
     praetorian order, especially the ones most well-
     entrenched in the 'privatised' industries.

This suggests it's only a matter of time before the
regime follows its neighbours into oblivion. Possibly
Algerian leaders are hoping to keep revolutionary
fervour at bay by creating difficulties for the
transitional government in Libya next door but, if so,
they could be making a big mistake.

As smarter approach is to accept the inevitable in
Libya, as Morocco has cheerfully done, and not draw
attention to their hankering for the past.

___________________________________________

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