Report From Rabat, Morocco

Morocco: Can Dinosaurs Become Butterflies?

By Stuart Schaar
The Indypendent
April 6, 2011 issue
http://www.indypendent.org/2011/04/05/can-dinosaurs-become-butterflies/

RABAT, Morocco - Faced with a growing pro-democracy
movement, King Mohamed VI of Morocco surprised many on March
9 when he declared in a nationally televised speech that he
was willing to trim his powers and become a constitutional
monarch. Toward this end, he named an 18-member commission
to reform the constitution headed by the respected jurist
and professor of law at Rabat's Mohamed V University
Abdelatif Mennouni. The king asked Mennouni to submit a
report to him by June outlining changes to be voted on in a
popular referendum later this year.

Among the reforms announced by Mohamed VI were future
elections for prime minister and regional governors instead
of palace appointments; elevating Amazigh identity (as the
often-discriminated-against Berbers are known here) as a
core element of the nation's overall identity; and
transforming the judiciary into an independent branch of the
government.

M6, as the king is popularly called in this Northwest
African nation of 35 million people, also spoke of "boosting
moral integrity in public life," referring to widespread
government corruption. He appointed a close advisor to head
another commission to gather suggestions for constitutional
reform from political party leaders, trade unionists, NGOs
and the potent youth movement that has organized mass
demonstrations as part of the ongoing democratic uprising in
North Africa and the Middle East. While the king's actions
are more than the political elite expected, they were not
enough for some reformers and many young activists.

Abdoubakr Jamai, former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct
Journal Hebdomadaire, told Voice of America that for many in
the democratic movement the king's speech was ambiguous
"because he claims that Morocco will usher in an era of
democratization with the institution of a constitutional
monarchy, with a prime minister who will be designated from
the winning party in parliamentary elections, with
separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, etc.
The problem with all these things is that we were supposed
to have them before."

In his speech, Mohammed VI skirted mention of nationwide
demonstrations organized by the February 20 movement on that
day. Organizers claimed they mobilized 300,000 people in 53
cities and towns, while the government put numbers at
37,000. In the capital of Rabat, the turnout was 5,000 at
most, modest by Moroccan standards. In recent decades, more
than one million Moroccans have rallied in support of
Palestinians, around one million turned out for an Islamist
demonstration against family reform, and some 300,000 showed
up when secularists pushed for women's rights. Several
political parties such as the "moderate" Islamist party, the
Party for Justice and Development (PJD), and the Party of
Progress and Socialism, the successor to the banned
Communist Party, did not participate.

The minister of interior denounced the protests before and
after they took place. During the Tunisian Revolution in
January, the minister twice refused to grant permits for
demonstrations in front of the Tunisian embassy in Rabat.
However, after Egyptians forced out President Hosni Mubarak
in February, hundreds of Moroccans demonstrated in Rabat's
city center. The Interior Ministry, a stronghold of anti-
reform elements, told them they could protest, but they
could not call for regime change in Morocco. Demonstrators
on Feb. 20 called for lower food prices, more jobs and
constitutional reform, such as limiting the king's power and
elections for the prime minister. Most protests remained
calm, but violence erupted in several cities as a few
hundred young people in each place broke off from the main
demonstrations, setting fire to banks (with five deaths in
Al Hoceima) and trashing gasoline stations, as well as a
McDonald's and a Spanish department store in Marrakech.

Poor youth vented their anger over the large class divisions
in a country with an annual per capita income of less than
$2,800, high youth unemployment and an adult illiteracy rate
of 44 percent. (The official unemployment rate is around 9
percent, and the real unemployment rate may be double that.)

Oussama El Khlifi, a leader of the February 20 movement, has
explained that about 50 men and women in their late teens
and 20s, inspired by Tunisia's Jasmine revolution, created a
Facebook group on Jan. 11. It soon mushroomed into a
movement of 20,000 youth discussing politics, social
justice, poverty and corruption and advocating
democratization of the regime. Youth unemployment, the lack
of decent housing, poor healthcare and growing inequalities
surfaced as major issues in need of redress.

Many youth look to the 47-year-old king, who is seen as
responsive to younger generations, to initiate the country's
reforms. After initially denouncing the youth movement
before Feb. 20, Mohamed VI changed course, siding with
liberal elements in his entourage who convinced him to
initiate fundamental changes before the monarchy was pushed
aside by a mass revolutionary movement.

Meanwhile, young people have continued to organize on the
internet and have held demonstrations throughout Morocco in
March to pressure the state to initiate reforms rapidly.
Continuing daily peaceful protests and sit-ins by university
professors, high school students, Saharan employees and
unemployed professionals allow them to let off steam and
present their demands.

JOBS AND BREAD 

Last December, in response to rumblings in Tunisia, the
state boosted police pay by up to 60 percent and added
new benefits, hoping to ensure their loyalty. The
Ministry of Finance later declared that 10 percent of
the 2011 budget would be allocated for job creation.

The former minister of finance had in the past told me that
he could not create any state jobs because of opposition
from the United States, the World Bank and IMF. He added
that he had no discretionary funds after paying the salaries
of the top-heavy state bureaucracy.

Once the protest movement grew into a major force, however,
the Moroccan government said it would create more than 4,000
state jobs in an attempt to placate thousands of young
unemployed professionals who have demonstrated daily outside
the parliament for years. Immediately, some 7,000 more
Moroccans showed up from among the vast army of un- and
underemployed.

Morocco has not been successful in creating jobs over the
years due to structural factors such as sparse state funds
for jobs spending, the reluctance of Moroccan capital to
invest in labor-intensive industries and a poor education
system that barely trains potential workers for the jobs
that do exist. Foreign investment is limited because Morocco
inherited progressive labor legislation from the colonial
period. Workers with contracts have good benefits and decent
salaries, making their labor much more expensive than
workers in China or India.

On March 1 the government increased subsidies on staples
such as bread and olive oil to address inflation. While the
lack of jobs and the rising cost of living need to be
tackled, the youthful protesters, as is the case elsewhere
in the Arab world, see the need for political reforms as
well. Morocco is also burdened by the billions of dollars
spent on the conflict in the resource-rich Western Sahara,
which it entered with the "Green March" in 1975. A war
against the Algerian-backed Polisario Front has largely
become a political conflict since a 1991 cease-fire. Morocco
previously stated that it was increasing its military budget
by 25 percent to counter Algeria's growing military budget,
which is being fed by rising oil and gas revenues. The
United States supplies both countries in a growing arms
race.

PALACE INTRIGUE 

The Moroccan monarchy concentrates most power in the
Makhzen, the palace bureaucracy surrounding King
Mohammed VI. Since succeeding his iron-fisted father,
King Hassan II, in 1999, M6 has liberalized the
political system to the point that the press is
relatively free. Certain subjects are off limits,
however: no criticism of the king, the army, or state
policy toward Western Sahara is allowed. That still
leaves a lot of room to speak about corruption, which
exists at every level of the state apparatus. A
December 2009 U.S. State Department cable released by
WikiLeaks described "the appalling greed of those close
to King Mohammed VI." It singled out the palace's use
of "major institutions and processes of the Moroccan
state ... to coerce and solicit bribes in the country's
real estate sector."

Unemployed college graduates have organized an association
that demonstrates daily in front of the parliament in Rabat.
For the past two years, they have begun to block traffic
through the city center. About six months ago I witnessed
something remarkable. The police were called in to push the
demonstrators out of traffic. A police captain was about to
hit a protestor with a truncheon when the crowd at hand
started hissing loudly. The captain froze, put his arm
around the man and walked him to the sidewalk, while gently
asking him to go home. The crowd represents a popular force,
since most people no longer accept the brutal police tactics
used by King Hassan II.

Many other associations have formed. Women's groups have
proliferated, pressing demands for further liberties. A new
family law was instituted that gave women greater rights.
Human rights organizations, free from state controls,
branches of Transparency International, and other NGOs exist
and criticize shortcomings in the regime. The press freely
reports their findings.

Much more needs to be done to lessen the king's monopoly on
power and the economy. However, Moroccans suffered through
nearly 40 years of heavy-handed dictatorship under Hassan II
and are relieved that repression has abated and they can now
express themselves somewhat. Class tensions are high, with
rich people living in Beverly Hills-like luxury and masses
of people in poverty. M6 is trying to reduce the long-
standing animosity between Arabs and Berbers, the original
inhabitants of North Africa before the Arab conquest and a
substantial part of the population. Most army officers are
Berber, so a military takeover of Morocco would frighten the
Arab majority.

There are also Islamist movements, the largest of which, al-
Adl Waal-Ihssane, is illegal but ever present underground.
In demonstrations March 20, the youth wing of this movement
led the march and protected property to avoid any violence.
The legal Islamist party, the PJD, has a block of deputies
in Parliament, but no members in the coalition government.
The king has initiated a policy of supporting traditional
Sufi (mystical) brotherhoods to try to reduce support for
Islamism. The PJD program offers no solutions to economic
problems, focusing instead on moral issues.

NURTURING DEMOCRACY 

Few Moroccans want to embark on the Tunisian model for
fear of unknown consequences. The question remains
whether a traditional monarchy can meet the demands of
thousands of unemployed graduates and a large mass of
impoverished and illiterate people in a society marked
by wide class divisions.

The political class has no constituency-based offices. Once
elected, parliamentarians are far more loyal to their
respective parties than the people, but opportunism is
rampant. None have community offices to serve the people,
and more than 100 have switched parties since the last
elections. Most of them moved to a new party founded by a
friend of the king, creating major shifts in political
loyalties and discrediting the political system in the minds
of voters. Only 37 percent of eligible voters cast their
ballots in the last parliamentary elections. Democracy
cannot be implanted overnight where authoritarian structures
exist throughout society. Families remain patriarchal with
fathers in charge. Zaims, charismatic leaders, dominate
local and national politics. Revitalized brotherhoods
maintain master-disciple dichotomies with masters demanding
blind obedience from adepts. Local notables expect gifts and
obedience from underlings. Those structures have been in
place for centuries and will not go away because of
constitutional reforms.

No one, including the youth, is addressing these structural
manifestations of authoritarianism in Morocco. The reform
movement is the first stage in a long process to change
social relations. Tradition will not evaporate, and it will
present an ongoing obstacle to the urban-based reform
movement.

Ali Bouabid, the son of one of the founders of the Socialist
Union of Popular Forces, best summed up the political crisis
facing Morocco when he asked if party leaders were ready for
democracy. In other words, can Moroccan dinosaurs become
butterflies under the pressure of a growing mass youth
movement?

[Stuart Schaar is professor emeritus of Middle East and
North African history, Brooklyn College, City University of
New York, and co-author of The Middle East and Islamic World
Reader. He lives and teaches in Rabat, Morocco.]

[Thanks to Stuart Schaar for submitting this -- moderator.]

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