Morsy, the Coup and the Revolution: Reading between the Red
Lines

by Hesham Sallam

Jadaliyya.com
August 15, 2012

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6870/morsy-the-coup-and-the-revolution_reading-between-

President Mohamed Morsy's recent decision to force Egypt's
most prominent military leaders into retirement has been
lauded as a major step toward the demilitarization of the
Egyptian state. For some optimists, his decision represents
the triumph of the revolution over its adversaries inside the
military establishment. There is indeed little doubt that this
event will prove monumental and may be the prelude to a new
era in civil-military relations in Egypt.

At the same time, as compelling as it is to interpret these
recent developments as a civilian coup against Egypt's
military rulers, there are some indications that they are the
product of a movement within the military's own ranks to avert
an impending confrontation with civilian political forces and
to reconfigure the army's role in politics in a way that
leaves its autonomy and long-term interests intact.

The immediate circumstances surrounding Morsy's decisions
remain clouded, and we are certainly learning new details as
the situation unfolds. However, the context in which this
event emerged is quite illuminating. Worthy of notice is that
talk of overturning the Muslim Brotherhood's hold over the
presidency have intensified in recent weeks, particularly in
light of calls for mass demonstrations on 24 August against
what some have characterized "the Brotherhood's rule."

Leading these calls are figures close to the military, most
notably talk show host Tawfiq Okasha and former MP Mostafa
Bakry, who in the past have seized every possible opportunity
to support, justify and promote the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces' position throughout the post-Mubarak era.

Calls for protests circulating in online forums have
reportedly included threats to burn down the Brotherhood's
offices throughout Egypt. Former MP Mohamed Abou Hamed, one of
the vocal supporters of the call for protest, went as far as
saying that 24 August would not simply be a million-person
rally, but rather a real revolution akin to the events of 25
January last year. Interestingly, calls for bringing down the
"Brothers' rule" coincided with (now former) Defense Minister
Hussein Tantawi's public statement on 15 July that the
military would not allow for any "one faction" to rule over
Egypt, in a clear warning against the Brotherhood's dominance
of the political arena.

These trends, coupled with the developments that followed,
signal that some military leaders may have been prodding their
allies among opinion shapers and friendly media outlets to
promote the image of popular support for a coup d'etat against
the Brotherhood. There is even evidence that the some leaders
within the military have actively tried to undermine Morsy's
performance in public eyes, possibly to give pro-coup voices
further ammunition in the run-up to 24 August.

For instance, while Morsy was participating in an African
Union summit in Ethiopia in mid-July, military police forces
withdrew from their security posts at public hospitals under
vague circumstances. Their withdrawal paved the way for
attacks by thugs, and for subsequent strikes by hospital
personnel who were aggrieved by the absence of security, not
to mention public criticism of Morsy for "failing" to deliver
on his promise to bring back security to Egyptian streets.

While it is easy for many analysts to dismiss these patterns
as yet another manifestation of government incompetence,
accompanied by Okasha's usual sensationalist bluffing, it
seems that some leaders within the security sector have took
these developments seriously. Last week, Egyptian authorities
suspended Okasha's television station and began investigating
him for allegations of "inciting his viewers to attempt to
murder President Mohamed Morsy and of supporting a military
coup d'etat."

On Saturday, copies of Al-Dostour were confiscated after the
newspaper ran a series of headlines that warned against the
Islamization of the state by the Brotherhood, and, in so many
words, called for a coup against Morsy. The last of a series
of headlines on the newspaper's front page read:

"Saving Egypt from the coming destruction will not happen
without the unity of the army and the people, the formation of
a national salvation front consisting of political and
military leaders, and the upholding an unequivocally civil
state with military protection, exactly like the Turkish
system...If this does not happen in the next few days, Egypt
will fall and collapse, and we will regret [wasting] the days
that remain before a new constitution is announced...People's
peaceful protest is imperative and a national duty, until the
army responds and announces its support for the people."

These developments suggest the recent upsurge in public calls
for a coup by pro-military figures mirrors an inclination on
the part of some senior SCAF leaders to prepare for a series
of steps to undermine, if not completely sideline, Morsy's
presidency. Such an inclination is not surprising, given that
it was embarrassingly clear to the public that SCAF leaders,
particularly Tantawi, seemed uneasy with the idea of showing
any hint that they were accountable to civilian leadership.

Not only was Tantawi keen on being portrayed in public as the
country's co-president, but it was reported that he had
refused to attend Cabinet meetings chaired by newly appointed
Prime Minister Hesham Qandil to avoid any insinuation that he
answers to a civilian leader. It could also be that Tantawi
and others felt compelled to undermine Morsy's presidency
after sensing the elected president is beginning to gain the
acceptance of other senior military leaders, and that they
were willing to concede more powers to him than the military's
conservative guard would like.

The ensuing response of other military officers was to help
eject their imprudent leaders out of fear that the commitment
of their superiors to prolonging their fight with the
Brotherhood could drag military forces back into a stalemate
with anti-SCAF popular mobilization and greatly weaken the
military's grip over its long-standing political and economic
privileges. It was not surprising, therefore, to learn from
presidential palace insiders that Tantawi and Sami Anan, the
former armed forces chief of staff, were surprised when they
learned they had been sacked.

In other words, what we have observed on 12 August was not a
coup, per se, but a preemptive coup aimed at preventing a
serious political - and potentially physical - confrontation
between the military and the Brotherhood, and a possible new
wave of anti-SCAF popular mobilization.

The way these events have unfolded further suggest it is
highly unlikely that Morsy or the Brotherhood could have led
this initiative single-handedly, without the support, if not
the leadership, of senior military officials. For starters,
SCAF member General Mohamed al-Assar, who was rewarded in the
recent reshuffle, was quick to tell media outlets shortly
after Morsy's decision was announced that the president had in
fact consulted with military leaders before retiring Anan and
Tantawi.

It is also hard to imagine that state TV officials would have
agreed to air news of such thorny decisions without some
assurance that the relevant wielders of power inside the
military establishment are on board and that they would not be
reprimanded for any wrongdoing. Additionally, the honorable
exit awarded to Tantawi and Anan, who were both granted state
honors and presidential advisory appointments, suggest that a
friendly military hand was involved in ensuring that Morsy's
decision would signal that military leaders are to be
respected and revered in the public eye, notwithstanding
political differences.

More importantly, such an honorable exit may also signify an
attempt by incumbent officers to send the unequivocal (and
self-serving) message that the era of public humiliation of
military leaders and their prosecution for past wrongdoing has
not started, and perhaps never will.

There are other reasons to believe that the recent reshuffles
are not part of a purely civilian coup led by Morsy. Such an
exceptionally daring and high-risk move is not consistent with
the rather cautious tendencies that the Brotherhood and its
leaders have exhibited over the past year and a half, as well
as its seeming pragmatism in accommodating military generals
who have long held the power to overturn the Brotherhood's
political gains.

It is difficult to imagine Morsy deciding to sack military
leaders without some assurance that other officers would
support such a decision and not take the side of their
superiors against the president. In fact, days before the
recent reshuffle, Morsy implicitly recognized military
leaders' autonomy in managing their own affairs as per the
controversial 17 June supplement to the Constitutional
Declaration, by tasking Tantawi to replace Hamdy Badeen,
commander of the military police, instead of doing so himself.

The way the decision was framed reflects a conservative
interpretation of the declaration, specifically one that
obligates the president to defer to the officers on senior
military appointments. This is hardly the behavior of a leader
who is preparing for a full-fledged confrontation with the
SCAF. Rather, this shows that until very recently, Morsy was
still playing by the SCAF-dictated rules of the game, and
there were no signs that he was in fact planning to "go to the
mattresses."

What seemed to have changed on 12 August is that SCAF ceased
to be a unitary actor, and support among senior military
figures, such as new Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and
General Mohamed al-Assar, for a leadership change within their
own ranks became more decisive. These officials, who would
later be rewarded in the ensuing reshuffle, probably feared
Tantawi and Anan were poised to pull the military into further
confrontations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other anti-SCAF
political forces, through the orchestration of a possible coup
d'etat.

Such a prospect would not only prolong the military's highly
taxing and unpopular role in governing Egypt and managing the
country's transition, but could also jeopardize the
institution's long-term political and economic interests.
Revolting against elected officials could lead to
international isolation and possibly strained relations with
Washington, which continues to provide Egypt with an annual
US$1.3 billion in military assistance.

Moreover, entering into an uncertain confrontation with
popular mobilization raises a host of unpleasant questions
about the future of the military's long-standing privileges -
not to mention the institution's coherence and integrity -
should SCAF leaders suffer a defeat a la 11 February 2011.

Heightening these fears is that the image of the military has
suffered greatly after the recent attacks by militant groups
against Egyptian troops in Sinai, where the army is still
engaged in many unresolved battles. Thus the preemptive coup
coalition opted to save the military by cooperating with Morsy
in taking steps to sideline their leaders and preclude any
prospect for deepening the military's role in the political
sphere.

Although it remains unclear what these developments signify
for the future of Egypt's still ongoing struggle for
revolutionary change, a number of preliminary observations are
in order.

Firstly, to repeat one of the major lessons of the last year's
eighteen-day uprising, personnel reshuffles and meaningful
institutional change are not one and the same. Simply that the
military has undergone an internal purge and conceded
presidential and legislative powers to Morsy on paper does not
necessarily mean the institution is ready to give up its long-
standing privileges. These include the undue power the
military enjoys in shaping defense and national security
policy, as well as the political and financial autonomy of its
operations, budget and its vast revenue-generating economic
empire from elected civilian institutions and public
accountability. In fact, the military's recent concessions to
civilian leaders may have been aimed at protecting these very
privileges, not giving them up. In other words, there may be a
long road ahead in the quest for meaningful civilian oversight
of military institutions and leaders.

Secondly, civilian control of the military is but one of many
obstacles that Morsy faces in asserting his authority over
state institutions, in which anti-reform elements will likely
continue to resist democratic oversight and accountability.
For example, contrary to popular belief, the military is not
the only government bureaucracy that engages in revenue-
generating activities that remain beyond the reach of elected
institutions.

Egyptian bureaucracies are padded with a variety of off-budget
private funds, which generate an estimated LE100 billion every
year, or twenty percent of the country's official government
spending in the fiscal year 2011/12. What this means is that
inside every bureaucracy, civilian or military, is a "mini-
SCAF" that is predisposed to protect its financial autonomy
and anti-democratic privileges from elected leaders. Whether
Morsy will choose to confront or accommodate entrenched
bureaucratic powers inside other state institutions remains to
be seen.

Finally, and most importantly, Egypt's still inconclusive
struggle for revolutionary change cannot be reduced to power
politics between the military and the Brotherhood. While
bringing the military under the control of truly accountable
civilian officials may be one important step toward achieving
"bread, freedom and social justice," it is certainly not
enough. For those who believe that the January 25 Revolution
was a call for a more humane contract between Egyptians and
their rulers, and a demand for a responsive and just state
that delivers to its own people, it seems that the real battle
is far from over.

[A version of this piece is due to appear in the print edition
of Egypt Independent.]

[Hesham Sallam is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of
Government at Georgetown University. He is Co-Editor of
Jadaliyya Ezine.]

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