Tomgram: U.S. Africa Command Debates TomDispatch
Posted by Nick Turse
TomDispatch
July 26, 2012
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175574/
On July 12th, TomDispatch posted the latest piece in
Nick Turse's "changing face of empire" series: "Obama's
Scramble for Africa." It laid out in some detail the way
in which the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has, in
recent years, spread its influence across that
continent, establishing bases and outposts, sending in
special operations forces and drones, funding proxy
forces on the continent, and so on. As last week ended,
TomDispatch received a "letter to the editor" from
Colonel Tom Davis, director of the U.S. Africa Command
Office of Public Affairs, disputing in some detail a
number of Turse's points. (Colonel Davis also sent a
copy of the letter to the Nation Institute, which
supports this website.)
As readers know, it's quite possible to write this
editor. I read everything that arrives at TomDispatch
with appreciation and answer when I can. There is,
however, no "comments" section, nor a place for letters
to the editor at TD. In this case, however, I found the
obvious time and effort AFRICOM took to respond to the
Turse piece of interest and so, today, we're posting
Colonel Davis's full letter, and a response from Turse.
After all, whatever highlights the changing U.S.
military position in Africa, about which Americans know
remarkably little, seems well worth the time and space.
Two things remain to be said: first, beneath the
detailed critique and response that follows lies an
obvious difference of opinion that seems worth
highlighting. Like a number of other TomDispatch
writers, I believe that the U.S. military should not be
responsible for Planet Earth; that it is not in our
interest for the Pentagon to be dividing the globe, like
a giant pie, into six "slices" covering almost every
inch of the planet: U.S. European Command, or EUCOM (for
Europe and Russia), the U.S. Pacific Command, or PACOM
(Asia), CENTCOM (the Greater Middle East and a touch of
North Africa), NORTHCOM (North America), SOUTHCOM (South
America and most of the Caribbean), and AFRICOM (almost
all of Africa). Nor should the U.S. military be
garrisoning the planet in the historically unprecedented
way it does. This imperial role of ours has little or
nothing to do with "defense" and creates many
possibilities for future blowback. Instead, it seems far
more sensible to begin to shut down or cut back
radically on our vast array of global bases and outposts
(rather than, as in Africa, expanding them), and
downsize our global mission in a major way. AFRICOM
would obviously disagree, as would the Pentagon and the
Obama administration, and the results of that basic
disagreement about the role of the U.S. military in the
world can be seen in what follows.
Second, one of Colonel Davis's criticisms below is of a
passage in my introduction to Turse's piece. "[O]nly the
other day," I wrote, "it was revealed that three U.S.
Army commandos in a Toyota Land Cruiser had skidded off
a bridge in Mali in April. They died, all three, along
with three women identified as `Moroccan prostitutes.'"
The Colonel questions the accuracy of that word
"revealed," since his command had issued a brief press
release on April 20th stating: "Three U.S. military
members and three civilians died in a vehicle accident
in Bamako, Mali today."
In the Washington Post piece I linked to, however,
reporter Craig Whitlock identified the three "military
members" as "U.S. Army Commandos" and those three
"civilians" as "Moroccan prostitutes" and raised the
following questions: "What the men were doing in the
impoverished country of Mali, and why they were still
there a month after the United States suspended military
relations with its government, is at the crux of a
mystery that officials have not fully explained even 10
weeks later." It seems to me that, if you compare the
press release to the later article, "revealed" is not
too strong a word. With that, let me turn the
proceedings over to Colonel Davis and Nick Turse.
Tom
The Nature of the U.S. Military Presence in Africa
An Exchange between Colonel Tom Davis and Nick Turse
FROM: Colonel Tom Davis
Director, U.S. Africa Command Office of Public
Affairs
Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
TO: Mr. Tom Engelhardt, Editor
Dear Mr. Engelhardt,
We read the recent article "Secret Wars, Secret
Bases, and the Pentagon's `New Spice Route' in
Africa" with great interest. It is clear the author,
Nick Turse, conducted a great deal of research,
including reaching out to us, and we welcomed the
opportunity to highlight U.S. Africa Command's
mission and activities. However, there were several
inaccuracies and misrepresentations that we would
like to address. My hope is that you, through your
publication, will correct the record. As a thought
provoking, responsible, and professional journalist,
I know that you would want to ensure all reporting
was based on facts, not innuendos or misperceptions.
Below are the items U.S. Africa Command would like
to address:
"They call it the New Spice Route": This was a term
used informally by a few of our logistics
specialists to describe the intra-theater
transportation system, primarily land shipments from
Djibouti, which provides logistical support for U.S.
military activities in Africa. The network is
officially called the AFRICOM Surface Distribution
Network. However, to call it a "superpower's
superhighway" is very misleading. The U.S. military
cargo transported along these different
transportation nodes represents only a mere fraction
-- i.e., a handful of trucks per week intermixed
among the thousands of others -- of the total amount
of fuel, food, and equipment transported along these
routes each day.
"Fast-growing U.S. military presence in Africa":
While the size of the U.S. military footprint in
Africa has increased since the creation of U.S.
Africa Command in October 2008, to call it "fast-
growing" is an exaggeration. At the end of October
2008, there were about 2,600 U.S. military personnel
and Department of Defense civilians on the African
continent or on ships within the command's area of
responsibility. The number today is about 5,000,
more than half of which represents the service
members who serve tours at Camp Lemonnier in
Djibouti, with the remainder serving on a temporary
basis ranging from a few days to a few weeks. Much
of this change is attributable to an increase in the
number of exercises and military-to-military
engagement programs in order to better enable
African nations and regional organizations to
strengthen their defense capabilities. On a much
smaller scale, it also reflects a modest increase in
the staff sizes of DOD offices resident in U.S.
embassies, which average just a small number of
staff members. But even 5,000 personnel -- about
the military population of a small Air Force Base in
the U.S. -- spread across an area that covers 54
countries and major portions of two oceans can
hardly be called a "scramble for Africa."
In our view, this is very positive, and testament to
our desire to be a security partner of choice in
Africa. It reflects an increase in military
assistance engagement activities -- all of which are
requested and approved by the host nation. While we
work to advance the security interests of the U.S.,
we are together addressing what are clearly shared
security interests.
"The U.S. maintains a surprising number of bases in
Africa": This is incorrect. In the lexicon of the
U.S. military, the word "base" implies a certain
size, level of infrastructure, and permanence.
Based on this widely accepted definition, other than
our base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, we do not
have military bases in Africa, nor do we have plans
to establish any. We do, however, have temporary
facilities elsewhere in Africa that support much
smaller numbers of personnel, usually for a specific
activity. In all cases, our personnel are guests
within the host-nation and work alongside or
coordinate their activities with host-nation
personnel. Some of these locations are fairly well
developed while others are more austere.
For example, approximately 100 U.S. military
advisors are dispersed among four nations in Central
and East Africa providing advice and assistance to
the national militaries working to end the threat
posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). We
currently have small teams in Obo and Djema in the
Central African Republic, Dungu in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Nzara in South Sudan, and
Entebbe in Uganda. In each location, we are working
alongside the national militaries, helping to
reinforce their efforts and strengthen collaboration
and coordination, not conducting our own operations.
Similarly, there are humanitarian work sites in
Ethiopian towns such as Humble, Hulla, and Dube,
where Seabees and other U.S. military personnel have
assisted in the past or are currently assisting with
drilling wells, providing medical and veterinary
assistance, or constructing schools and health
clinics.
Finally, Thebephatswa Airbase in Molepolole,
Botswana, is staffed and operated by Botswana
Defence Force personnel (BDFP). There is no
permanent U.S. presence on the airbase, nor has
there ever been. The U.S. has partnered with
Botswana for previous exercises at Thebephatswa
Airbase and much of SOUTHERN ACCORD, a major bi-
lateral exercise in August, will be conducted at
Thebephatswa.
We also currently have warehousing privileges at
Mombasa International Airport in Kenya, which
includes the storage of equipment and rations. U.S.
personnel do not manage the warehouses; the daily
activities and running of the warehouse are handled
by local nationals hired by the Embassy and funded
by AFRICOM.
"100 to 200 U.S. commandos share a base with the
Kenyan military at Manda Bay": This is also
incorrect. U.S. military personnel deployed to
Manda Bay are primarily Civil Affairs, Seabees, and
security personnel involved with military to
military engagements with Kenyan forces and
humanitarian initiatives. Simba was established in
2004 to provide support to U.S. military engagements
with the Kenyan Navy. Its primary mission is to
provide base/life support services to U.S. military
personnel who are in the area for training and
engagement activities with the Kenyan military,
including maritime engagement and civil-military
efforts.
"The U.S. also has had troops deployed in Mali": To
clarify, prior to the coup, the U.S. military had a
longstanding military partnership with Mali. For
several years, we had small teams regularly travel
in and out of Mali for training activities with the
Malian military; this includes conventional forces
and special operations forces (SOF).
At the time of the military seizure on March 22,
U.S. Africa Command had a small number of personnel
in Mali who were supporting our military-to-military
activities. Military assistance to Mali was
suspended immediately following the seizure. U.S.
government personnel from many agencies, including
DoD, remained on stand-by in Bamako as negotiations
continued toward a return to democratic,
constitutional, civilian rule. Because of the
continued uncertainty surrounding the outcome and
consequences of the seizure, and the fact that
military engagement had only been suspended, our
personnel remained in Mali to provide assistance to
the Embassy, maintain situational awareness on the
unfolding events, and assist in coordination between
U.S. Africa Command and the Embassy.
The U.S. State Department terminated foreign
assistance to the government of Mali on April 10.
The Department of Defense's Defense Security
Cooperation Agency received a memorandum from the
State Department dated 19 April notifying the DoD of
the coup designation and the termination of all
military assistance programs. Upon receiving this
notification from State Department, we began
arranging the departure of personnel and equipment
from Mali. All U.S. military personnel who were in
Mali supporting military-to-military engagement
activities have since departed Mali. Only those
Department of Defense personnel regularly assigned
to the Embassy (such as the Defense Attaché or U.S.
Marine Corps guards) remain.
Also, the introduction to the story states it was
recently "revealed" that three U.S. soldiers were
killed in an accident in Mali in April and that
"This is how we know that U.S. special operations
forces were operating in chaotic, previously
democratic Mali." The fact is we issued a press
release a day after the soldiers were killed, and
the Associated Press, Xinhua, and AFP ran stories on
the incident. It must be noted that the activities
of U.S. military forces in Mali have been very
public. We have published stories, fact sheets, and
photos on our website, and Malian, U.S. and
international reporters have covered these
activities for some years.
"Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces are
engaged in missions against the Lord's Resistance
Army": While our forces live and work closely with
African security forces, our focus is on enabling
their ability to better conduct command and control,
planning and coordination. Special Operations
Forces are not directly involved in the African-led
operation to remove the threat of the LRA. The
mission for U.S. forces in Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR),
and South Sudan is to advise and assist local forces
to better enable them to conduct their operations.
As a matter of fact, in April 2012, we organized a
four-day press event in Uganda and CAR, providing 18
local and international journalists' access to cover
the African-led counter-LRA mission. This visit
resulted in extensive worldwide coverage of the
story, which clearly articulated our advise and
assist mission.
"And that's still just a part of the story": Yes,
we've trained Ugandan, Burundian, and Djiboutian
troops supporting the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM). As part of the C-LRA media trip
mentioned above, we also brought the media to visit
the AMISOM train-up efforts -- all taking place at a
Uganda People's Defense Force base outside Kampala,
Uganda. This visit also resulted in extensive
worldwide media coverage. We've also trained
Senegalese and Rwandan troops supporting the UN
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), as well as peacekeepers
from nearly a dozen other African countries. We
apply the resources that we do have to help
countries willing to contribute to multinational
efforts like AMISOM or UNAMID so that they can
continue their operations. Our engagement in this
realm is in support of a State Department-led
peacekeeping training program, which has trained
more than 200,000 African peacekeepers from 25
African nations over the years. Recently we've seen
positive results in Mogadishu, not only as a result
of the U.S. support, but more importantly, because
of the brave men and women of the AMISOM troop-
contributing nations.
Like every Geographic Combatant Command, we have an
exercise program with nations within our area of
responsibility. We currently have 14 major
bilateral and multilateral exercises that have been
conducted or are planned for 2012 and as many in
2013. As you probably know, many security issues in
Africa are best addressed multilaterally. Exercises
are a critical engagement opportunity that not only
allow for improvements to interoperability, but also
foster greater regional cooperation and integration.
We also conduct some type of military training or
military-to-military engagement or activity with
nearly every country on the African continent. This
is part of our effort to enable African nations to
increase their defense capabilities. These
activities are requested by the host nation and
cleared by the U.S. embassies. Many are well
covered by local press and highlighted on our
website.
"Next year, even more American troops are likely to
be on hand": The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st
Infantry Division will not deploy to Africa.
Instead, the brigade acts as a single source to
provide U.S. Army personnel to support activities
already tasked to our Army service component, U.S.
Army Africa. Previously, the requirements were
distributed across the entire U.S. Army. Under this
new construct, these same requirements will be
filled from a single unit allowing personnel from
this brigade to establish a level of expertise on
the African continent. This change will not
increase the number of Soldiers on the continent,
but simplifies our internal processes for
identifying Soldiers to support existing missions.
We must note that reports that leap to the
conclusion that "3,000 Soldiers will deploy to
Africa" are inaccurate. Small teams -- whose numbers
typically range from 3-12 -- would be drawn from
this unit to conduct deliberately planned
engagements, training events, and exercises. Once or
twice a year, to support a large-scale exercise,
they may send a few hundred. This process is
evolving. But, when their missions are complete,
they return home. This can be compared to the
SPMAGTF-12 cited in the article, whose Marines are
not only doing great work for Uganda and Burundi and
other partner nations, but also America, Americans,
and American interests.
"Mercenary cargo carriers to skirt diplomatic
clearance issues": The choice of words is
interesting and unfortunate. This is only one
example where somewhat inflammatory language is used
to make a point but at the expense of the
credibility of the report. What exactly is a
mercenary cargo carrier? Federal Express, DHL,
Ethiopian Air, and other reputable air cargo
companies we use to transport material? The choice
to use contract carriers is based exclusively on
cost and efficiency. And, to be very clear, we are
always required to obtain diplomatic clearance and
complete all customs formalities. It would be highly
inappropriate and unethical to attempt to "skirt"
country clearances. To do that would be an egregious
violation of our values. In fact, since these
actions appear to constitute criminal activity, we
would be appreciative if Mr. Turse can provide us
specific details, documents, or other evidence, in
order to provide our Criminal Investigative Command
(CID) a basis of information to start an
investigation. To be perfectly clear, AFRICOM does
not condone this type of behavior, anything you can
do to provide us the needed evidence would be
appreciated.
"Emergency Troop Housing": All of the military
construction projects you outline are included in
the Defense Authorization Acts of FY 2010 and 2011
and are a matter of public record. However, the 300
additional Containerized Living Units (CLUs) are
being built for people already living at Camp
Lemonnier, either in tents or in other substandard
housing, not for new arrivals.
We appreciate Mr. Turse contacting us for
information and running our input in the final
article. He followed up with us with a list of
questions that required much more time than the one
business day he gave us to answer. It took several
days to conduct the research necessary to answer his
questions; unfortunately, he chose to publish the
story prior to receiving the answers, which he knew
we were working on. If he had waited, we would have
provided the information requested, which could have
better informed his story. It takes time to gather
information about locations in seven different
countries.
Finally, I would encourage you and those who have
interest in what we do to review our Website,
www.AFRICOM.mil, and a new Defense Department
Special Web Report on U.S. Africa Command at this
link
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2012/0712_AFRICOM/
Please do not hesitate to contact us in the future
if you have any questions or need any additional
information.
Sincerely,
Tom Davis,
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director of Public Affairs
United States Africa Command
Nick Turse's Response:
From: Nick Turse
To: Tom Davis
Dear Colonel Davis,
Thank you very much for your note. It's flattering
that you and your colleagues read my article,
"Obama's Scramble for Africa: Secret Wars, Secret
Bases, and the Pentagon's `New Spice Route' in
Africa ," with such interest. It's always
gratifying to know that a piece has had an impact on
readers.
I appreciate your regard for the "great deal of
research" that I conducted and am grateful for the
information that your command released to me. I do,
however, object to your assertion that the article
contained "several inaccuracies and
misrepresentations." Most of your "refutations"
actually seem to corroborate my assertions and I
believe that, by and large, your objections have
largely to do with semantics and differences of
interpretation. But let me respond, point by point:
"They call it the New Spice Route": I'm glad to have
you confirm this fact. I do, however, find it odd
that you refer to this as an informal term, since
this is how the supply network was referred to in an
official military publication (Army Sustainment).
In fact, the article by Lieutenant Colonel David
Corrick was even titled "The New Spice Route for
Africa." To describe it as consisting of "primarily
land shipments from Djibouti" also seems to run
counter to the information in Lieutenant Colonel
Corrick's article. A map of "The New Spice Route"
that appeared with his article indicates that the
supply network consists of land and sea routes
linking Mombasa, Kenya, and Manda Bay, Kenya;
Mombasa and Garissa, Kenya; Mombasa and Nairobi,
Kenya; Nairobi and Entebbe, Uganda; Mombasa and a
Djiboutian port; and a Djiboutian port with Dire
Dawa, Ethiopia. To complain about my calling it a
"superpower's superhighway," on the basis of the
total percentage of cargo that travels along the
route, strikes me as nitpicking over a difference of
interpretation.
Quite obviously, this is not how you would
characterize it and I respect that. I see the
matter differently, however. The United States is
still a superpower -- on this, I suspect, we would
both agree -- and this is the network by which it
speeds food, fuel, and equipment to keep its
operations in Africa running. I would also hasten
to add that military personnel associated with the
program characterize it not as some second-rate
Djiboutian trucking effort, but as "innovative,"
"high-tech," and "transformational." This is their
language, not mine. Moreover, Lieutenant Colonel
Corrick writes that the network is growing and that
it "will eventually span all of Africa."
"Fast-growing U.S. military presence in Africa": You
question this phrasing in my piece. Once again,
your complaint about inaccuracy seems to me to be
based on what is, at best, a matter of opinion --
although I obviously believe that the facts
demonstrate otherwise. To base the bulk of your
contentions strictly on troop-level increases
strikes me as a very limited way of assessing
growth. The U.S. military "presence" anywhere is
much more that simply a question of troop levels.
(Nevertheless, given that the U.S. is technically
not "at war" in Africa, the more than 200% increase
in U.S. personnel there since 2005 seems striking to
me.)
Back in 2003, the U.S. military hardly had a
foothold in Africa. Today, there is a major base in
Djibouti (now slated for many improvements and
expansion), contingents of U.S. personnel have been
deployed to the Central African Republic, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, South
Sudan, and the Seychelles Islands; troops have
conducted operations in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia,
and Uganda. Then there's that expanding supply
network I wrote about. There's also the growing
Tusker Sand program of aerial surveillance missions
that the Washington Post exposed. You even state
that AFRICOM conducts "some type of military
training or military-to-military engagement or
activity with nearly every country on the African
continent." The list goes on and on. I stand by
this assessment and consider it well-documented.
"The U.S. maintains a surprising number of bases in
Africa": You deny that the places I identified are
"bases." I understand that you don't label them as
such, but that doesn't mean others don't. Let me
start by noting this: I was more than fair in
making certain that readers knew AFRICOM and I
differed in our interpretations. At the beginning
of my article, I explicitly noted: "According to
Pat Barnes, a spokesman for U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM), Camp Lemonnier serves as the only
official U.S. base on the continent."
Shortly thereafter, I again drew attention to this
distinction, and our differing interpretations of
what constitutes a base, when I wrote: "Today --
official designations aside -- the U.S. maintains a
surprising number of bases in Africa." Neither you
personally nor the U.S. military are the ultimate
arbiters of what constitutes a base. You have your
own definition, nothing more. Webster's begins its
relevant entry on "base" as "the place from which a
military force draws supplies." That seems to
encompass a good many facilities along that "New
Spice Route" in Africa. But resorting to
dictionaries, either yours or Webster's, seems
beside the point. When the Washington Post first
wrote about U.S. operations in Obo in the Central
African Republic, it began its article this way:
"Behind razor wire and bamboo walls topped with
security cameras sits one of the newest U.S.
military outposts in Africa. U.S. Special Forces
soldiers with tattooed forearms and sunglasses
emerge daily in pickup trucks that carry weapons,
supplies and interpreters." Whether you call that
an "outpost," a "base," or a "camp" matters little.
It is clearly a protected compound that houses
military personnel, supplies, and equipment. If it
looks like a duck and it quacks like a duck.
Additionally, your letter could be read to imply
that I claim the U.S. had outposts at Thebephatswa
Airbase in Molepolole, Botswana, or Mombasa
International Airport in Kenya. To be clear, I
never wrote any such thing. I asked your command
for comment for my article about these and other
sites, but none was offered until your note, which
arrived more than a week after the article was
published. As such, I did not publish anything
about these facilities. It seems that, just as I
suspected, they have been or are currently integral
to the U.S. military project in Africa, so I
appreciate the information.
You will note that, in regard to Camp Gilbert in
Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, and a Navy port facility in
Djibouti, I specifically mentioned in my article
that "AFRICOM did not respond to requests for
further information on these posts before this
article went to press." To this day, no one has
responded to my requests for information about these
possible bases. What should I make of this pregnant
silence?
"100 to 200 U.S. commandos share a base with the
Kenyan military at Manda Bay": You will need to take
this up with the Washington Post. The sentence, in
full, reads: "A recent investigation by the
Washington Post revealed that contractor-operated
surveillance aircraft based out of Entebbe, Uganda,
are scouring the territory used by Kony's LRA at the
Pentagon's behest, and that 100 to 200 U.S.
commandos share a base with the Kenyan military at
Manda Bay." Specifically, the Washington Post
states: "Manda Bay, Kenya: More than 100 U.S.
commandos are based at a Kenyan military
installation."
To be clear, I did not want to rely on the
Washington Post's reporting, but was left with no
choice. Ten days before my article was published, I
specifically asked your spokesman about the troops
stationed at Manda Bay as well as the nature of the
operations there, but my questions were never
answered. I asked in a slightly different manner
six days before publication, but again received no
answer. Your letter to my editor, more than a week
after publication, was the first response I received
on the subject from AFRICOM.
"The U.S. also has had troops deployed in Mali": It
seems that we are in total agreement that this
statement is true.
"Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces are
engaged in missions against the Lord's Resistance
Army": We seem to be in agreement on this as well.
I wrote nothing about tactical operations, gun
battles, or anything of the sort. In fact, I even
quote an AFRICOM spokesman who said, "U.S. military
personnel working with regional militaries in the
hunt for Joseph Kony are guests of the African
security forces comprising the regional counter-LRA
effort." I don't know how much clearer I could have
been about that. What is very clear is that U.S.
troops are thoroughly engaged in missions against
the LRA. As an article by the Pentagon's American
Forces Press Service explicitly noted: "U.S. troops
are providing information- and intelligence-sharing,
logistics, communications and other enabling
capabilities for host-nation troops pursuing Kony in
Uganda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan
and the Republic of the Congo."
"And that's still just a part of the story": Given
that, in your letter, you chronicle missions above
and beyond those that I exposed, I'd say we agree on
this point as well.
"Next year, even more American troops are likely to
be on hand": You begin by stating, "The 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division will not deploy
to Africa." I never said otherwise, only -- and
very specifically -- that elements of this BCT would
deploy. I never spoke of the full contingent, only
units from it. As far as the numbers go, I
apologize if these are incorrect. They are,
however, publicly reported figures to which I
explicitly provided a link as a form of citation.
That article, in Army Times, is titled: "3,000
soldiers to serve in Africa next year."
Once again, I did not want to have to use figures
from a third party in assessing the size of the
American contingent in Africa. In fact, I asked the
AFRICOM spokesman at the Pentagon, in an email dated
July 6th, whether the U.S. military presence (which
he had already told me was approximately 5,000 at
this moment) would grow, shrink, or stay about the
same next year, but he never offered an answer. Nor
did AFRICOM personnel at your headquarters, to whom
he assured me that he passed along my questions,
respond. In fact, weeks later, they still have not
responded.
"Mercenary cargo carriers to skirt diplomatic
clearance issues": You object to my language once
again, but don't actually refute the facts. You
ask: "What exactly is a mercenary cargo carrier?" I
submit that it's a person or company which supports
military cargo operations for financial gain. The
air carriers you mention are, indeed, military
contractors which are supporting military operations
for profit, largely unbeknownst to the American
public. I firmly stand by this characterization.
You go on to write: "[W]e are always required to
obtain diplomatic clearance and complete all customs
formalities. It would be highly inappropriate and
unethical to attempt to `skirt' country clearances.
To do that would be an egregious violation of our
values. In fact, since these actions appear to
constitute criminal activity, we would be
appreciative if Mr. Turse can provide us specific
details, documents, or other evidence, in order to
provide our Criminal Investigative Command (CID) a
basis of information to start an investigation." To
begin, I would refer CID to Major Joseph D. Gaddis
of the U.S. Air Force for further information. In a
section of an Army Sustainment article on air
logistics in Africa, titled "The Diplomatic
Clearance Hurdle," Major Gaddis writes:
"A major question facing logisticians in Africa is
whether the legwork of contracting airlift outweighs
the challenges often associated with traditional
methods of using U.S. military aircraft in Africa,
which include lengthy processes to obtain diplomatic
clearance. Carrying out a mission into most
countries often requires 14 to 21 days of leadtime.
For the Hungary based C-17 unit, this process can be
as long as 30 to 45 days. When working with
operations in landlocked countries, diplomatic over-
flight clearance leadtimes reduce the flexibility of
the DOD airlift system. Domestically registered
contract aircraft do not have these clearance
issues. Their simple country clearance process
enables them to plan a flight in less than a day.
Foreign civilian carriers operating in Africa
(including U.S.-registered carriers) also face less
diplomatic red tape and do not require the same
lengthy clearance process as the U.S. military."
Maj. Gaddis very clearly states: "Domestically
registered contract aircraft do not have th[e]
clearance issues" that affect U.S. military
aircraft. He states explicitly that the U.S. can
skirt lengthy authorization issues by using "Foreign
civilian carriers operating in Africa. [which] face
less diplomatic red tape and do not require the same
lengthy clearance process as the U.S. military."
This suggests that the U.S. is making a conscious
decision to shift from traditional and more overt
methods of shipping equipment and supplies to more
covert methods in order to subvert regulations put
in place by African countries -- or at the very
least subvert the spirit of those regulations.
While cutting "red tape" appears to be the primary
reason for hiding behind contractors, I can't help
but see similarities between this effort and the use
of generic-looking spy planes as part of Tusker Sand
surveillance missions in Africa.
In any case, I would appreciate it if you would keep
me apprised of any investigations or other actions
that result from this information.
"Emergency Troop Housing": Again, we seem to be in
total agreement that the U.S. is constructing
"Emergency Troop Housing" in Djibouti. You note
that "the 300 additional Containerized Living Units
(CLUs) are being built for people already living at
Camp Lemonnier, either in tents or in other
substandard housing, not for new arrivals." I just
want to make clear that I never said these CLUs were
for "new arrivals." It does, however, make me
wonder about why that word "emergency" is being used
for this new housing. I also question why -- since
you dispute that the U.S. presence in Africa is
fast-growing -- troops have been living in
substandard housing? If there was no rush and you
have plenty of time to plan for arrivals, why wasn't
adequate troop housing constructed in advance?
Finally, I respectfully take issue with your
comments about my requests to AFRICOM for
information for my article, which was published on
July 12, 2012. As your records will attest, on May
29, 2012, I first asked for detailed information on
the U.S. military presence in Africa, specifically
bases -- including those at which U.S. troops are
guests of other nations. On June 6th, I received a
rather superficial reply to which I followed up with
questions, by phone or email -- sometimes both -- on
July 2nd, 6th, and 9th. I even followed up after
the story was published and was told I would be
contacted with answers by Wednesday, July 16th, by a
specific individual at AFRICOM. At this writing, on
July 24th, I am still waiting to hear from him.
I also object to your claim that I "followed up.
with a list of questions that required much more
time than the one business day he gave us to
answer." To be frank, in my "business" there are no
"business days." And let's be franker still: there
aren't any in yours, either. Other than holiday
ceasefires and the like, I've never heard about the
U.S. military taking a week off from a war or
shutting down for the weekend. My work adheres to
the same schedule.
Still, the list of questions to which you refer was
first called in to your Pentagon spokesman on July
6th. He asked me to put them in writing, which I
dutifully did. I sent those in and he assured me
that he forwarded them on to your headquarters that
same day. I followed up on the 9th and mentioned my
looming deadline. I was told that AFRICOM
headquarters might have some answers for me on the
10th. That day, however, came and went without a
word. So did the 11th. We published the piece on
the 12th.
Given that I've been requesting detailed information
since May, I'm sorry to say that your letter rings a
bit hollow when you write: "If he had waited, we
would have provided the information requested, which
could have better informed his story." Two weeks
later, I'm still waiting for a complete reply to my
questions of July 6th (not to mention those of May
29th). I respectfully submit that a vigorous free
press cannot be held hostage, waiting for
information that might never arrive.
Quite obviously, we have different worldviews and
differing opinions, but to say that my reporting
contained several "inaccuracies and
misrepresentations" is, I believe, a
misrepresentation and I hope you will reconsider
your words in light of my response above.
I believe that I was fair in my reporting. I gave
ample space to AFRICOM's views and contentions when
they differed from mine, provided reasonable-sized
quotes so that your spokesman was able to express
AFRICOM's opinions, and drew on respected mainstream
publications for information when your command did
not answer my questions. I would also submit that
my reporting gives much greater voice to dissenting
views than do the news articles/releases on the
AFRICOM website. I gave your spokesman's view on
what constitutes a "base." I would challenge your
staff to do the same and grant, in news releases and
responses to queries, that while the U.S. military
might not consider a facility to be a "base," others
could have a different opinion.
Moreover, let me suggest that if AFRICOM were
entirely transparent -- and posting reams of
information to your website is not the same as
transparency -- with America's taxpayers about U.S.
military operations in Africa, all of this could be
avoided.
With this and future articles on U.S. operations in
Africa, in mind, let me ask (with plenty of time to
spare) for a full listing of all -- as you term them
-- "temporary facilities" and any other sites where
the United States has or has had "warehousing
privileges," construction projects, work sites,
outposts, camps, facilities, laboratories,
warehouses, supply depots, fuel storage, and the
like in Africa since 2003, as well as supporting
documents on the nature of the operations at these
locations so that I can evaluate them for myself.
If I had a clearer picture, I would certainly be in
a better position to ask even more informed
questions. Once that picture becomes clearer, I
would hope that you would facilitate visits by me to
these facilities for a first-hand look, so I could
draw my own conclusions about their nature.
In addition to providing me with this information, I
also hope you'll allow me to call on you directly
the next time I have questions about U.S. operations
in Africa.
Thank you again for your interest in my work and for
the information your command provided to me.
Regards,
Nick Turse
Associate Editor, TomDispatch.com
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