Syria: No To Intervention, No To Illusions

By Phyllis Bennis

ZNet
June 28, 2012

http://www.zcommunications.org/syria-no-to-intervention-no-to-illusions-by-phyllis-bennis

Fifteen months on, the short Syrian spring of 2011 has long
since morphed into a harsh winter of discontent. Syria is
close to full-scale civil war. If the conflict escalates
further, it will have ramifications far outside the country
itself. As former UN Secretary-General and current envoy of
both the UN and the Arab League Kofi Annan put it, "'Syria is
not Libya, it will not implode, it will explode beyond its
borders. Syria is not Libya, it will not implode; it will
explode beyond its borders."

Like so many other times before, the human cost of this
conflict is incalculably high. It's not surprising that the
normal human reaction is "we've got to do something!" But
exactly what any army or air force might do that would
actually help the situation isn't very clear. U.S./NATO
military intervention didn't bring stability, democracy or
security to Libya, and it certainly is not going to do so in
Syria.

The one crucial outside approach that could help resolve at
least the immediate conflict - serious negotiations in which
both sides are represented - for the moment remains out of
reach. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the joint UN
and Arab League envoy in Syria, has proposed at a new
diplomatic initiative that would include the Syrian regime's
supporters, Iran and Russia, as well as the U.S.-allied
western countries and those Arab and regional governments
backing the armed opposition. So far the U.S. has rejected the
proposal, at least regarding Iran, with Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton saying that Tehran is part of the problem in
Syria and thus can't be part of the solution. The current UN
secretary-general, Ban ki-moon, who frequently reflects
Washington's interests, further undercut the potential of his
own envoy's proposal, saying that Assad has "lost all
legitimacy" - diplomatic code for "we don't have to talk to
him."

For those eager for analogies or counterparts, this isn't
Egypt or Libya, where opposition to the leader was
overwhelming. Despite his government's history of brutal
repression, Bashar al-Assad still enjoys significant support
from parts of Syria's business elites, especially in Damascus
and Aleppo, and some in minority communities (Christian,
Shi'a, parts of the Druse and even some Kurds) whom the regime
had cultivated for many years. The opposition was divided from
the beginning over whether massive reform or the end of the
Assad regime was their goal. It divided still further when
part of the opposition took up arms, and began to call for
international military intervention. The non- violent
opposition movement, which still rejects calls for military
intervention, survives, but under extraordinary threat.

There is no question that the regime has carried out brutal
acts against civilians, potentially including war crimes. It
also appears the armed opposition is responsible for attacks
leading to the deaths of civilians. It is increasingly
difficult to confirm who may be responsible for any particular
assault. The UN monitors on the ground, whose access was
already severely limited, have now been pulled from the field.
The regime has allowed a few more foreign journalists to enter
the country, but restrictions remain and the fighting is so
severe in many areas they are often unable to get solid
information. The regime is clearly responsible for more
attacks with heavy weapons, including tanks and artillery, but
it is also clear that the anti-government forces are being
armed with increasingly heavy weapons, largely paid for by
Qatar and Saudi Arabia and coordinated by Turkey and the CIA.
Indications are growing of well-armed outside terrorist forces
operating in Syria as well.

Accountability, whether in national or international
jurisdictions, is crucial - but stopping the current
escalation of violence and avoiding all-out war must come
first.

SECTARIANISM ON THE RISE

Syria is erupting in a region still seething in the aftermath
of the U.S. war in Iraq. While most U.S. troops and
mercenaries have left Iraq, the destruction and instability
left behind have created a legacy that will last for
generations. One aspect of that legacy is the sectarian divide
that the U.S. invasion and occupation imposed in Iraq - and as
the expansion of that divide continues across the region, the
threat of increasing sectarianism in Syria looms. Although the
Assad regimes - from father Hafez's rise to power in 1970
through his son Bashar's rule since 2000 - have always been
ruthlessly secular, Syria remains a poster-country for
sectarian strife. The ruling Assad clan are Alawites (a form
of Islam related to Shi'ism), ruling over a country with a
large Sunni majority.

If the increasing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict extends
beyond its borders, it could lead to regional conflagration
involving even greater refugee flows and potentially battles
in or around Syria's neighbors Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey or
elsewhere. Already, alongside the international power
interests colliding in Syria, there is the beginning of a
Sunni- Shi'a proxy war taking shape, with Sunni Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, and Shi'a Iran, backing opposing forces.

THREATS OF U.S./WESTERN INTERVENTION

Iran's role is the single most important basis for U.S. and
other western interest in Syria, making that emerging proxy
war even more dangerous. At this moment of continuing U.S.
pressure, increasing U.S. and EU sanctions, and Israeli
threats against Iran, Syria remains a tempting proxy target.
Syria itself isn't a significant oil producer, and Washington
has been far more concerned about keeping Syria's borders
secure for Israel, and reducing Iranian influence than with
getting into Syria itself. Damascus's longstanding economic,
political and military ties with Tehran mean that efforts to
weaken or undermine Syria are widely understood to be at least
partly aimed at undermining Iran, by destroying Tehran's one
reliable Arab ally. This is perhaps the most influential
factor pushing the U.S. towards greater action against Syria.

Certainly the U.S., the EU and the U.S.-backed Arab Gulf
governments would prefer a more reliable, pro- western
(meaning anti-Iranian), less resistance- oriented government
than Assad's in Syria, which borders key countries of U.S.
interest including Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey. They would
also prefer a less repressive government, since brutality
brings protesters out into the streets, threatening
instability.But for the moment, despite the U.S. involvement
in helping its allies arm the opposition, conditions in the
area still make a direct Libya-style U.S./NATO military strike
on Syria somewhat less likely.

The U.S. and its allies are all too aware of the consequences
for their own interests of direct military involvement in
Syria - based on what they see now in post-Qaddafi Libya. That
model in Syria would create greater instability in the core of
the strategic Middle East; expanding regional sectarianism;
chaotic borders adjoining Israel, Iraq and Turkey; extremist
Islamism gaining a foothold in Syria; and the end of any
potential diplomatic arrangement with Iran. In Europe, there
is no "attack Syria" pressure equivalent to the political
demands brought to bear on French and Italian leaders to
intervene in Libya last year, following the PR fiasco of their
overt colonial-style disdain for the earlier uprising in
Tunisia. For Turkey, among the most active supporters of
arming the opposition, Syria's shoot-down of the Turkish plane
could lead to even stronger calls for military intervention;
so far, though, while Ankara's call for a NATO "discussion" of
the matter means risks of escalation continue, the uncertainty
of whether the plane was over international or Syrian waters
has allowed both governments to moderate their responses.

So at the moment it still appears unlikely the Obama
administration would risk an attack on Syria without a UN
Security Council endorsement. And that endorsement is simply
not going to happen in the near future. China and Russia have
both indicated they oppose any use of force against Syria, and
so far they are both opposing additional sanctions as well.

Russian opposition to an attack on Syria goes beyond Moscow's
usual resistance to Security Council endorsement of
intervention anywhere in the world. It goes to the heart of
Russia's strategic national interests, including its military
capacity and its competition with the west for power, markets
and influence in the Middle East. Russia's relationship to
Syria more or less parallels the U.S. relationship to Bahrain:
Damascus is a major Russian trading partner, especially for
military equipment, and most crucial of all, hosts Moscow's
only Mediterranean naval base (and only military base outside
the former Soviet Union), in Tartus on Syria's southern coast.

Certainly there are no guarantees. Politics still trumps
strategic interests. The risk of a U.S./NATO attack on Syria
remains, and the threat could be ratcheted up again in a
moment. This isn't about humanitarian concerns -neither the
U.S. nor any other country has ever used military force for
purely humanitarian purposes. But the "CNN factor" -the
relentless depiction of all-too-real heart-wrenching suffering
- creates a political reality that influences decision-making
in Washington, London, Paris, Ankara and beyond. As the
violence escalates in Syria, as more civilians, especially
children, are killed, calls for intervention, some real and
some cynical, escalate as well.

In the U.S. and Europe, the media and politicians' earlier
embrace of the armed opposition has subsided somewhat as
reports rise of opposition attacks and resulting civilian
casualties. But anti- Assad propaganda remains dominant. And
Washington is in election mode, so the pressure to "do
something" is on the rise. The calls for military intervention
are coming from the media and some in Congress, from neo-cons
who never gave up on their plans for regime change across the
Arab world, and from hawkish liberal interventionists who
again see military force as a solution to every human rights
or humanitarian problem.

There are also prominent opponents of military force inside
the White House and Pentagon, who recognize it would create
worse problems for U.S. interests (even if they don't care
much about the impact on Syrian civilians). Whether they can
stand up to election-year "do something" pressures remains
unclear. The push-back by those in civil society who say no to
military intervention, while refusing to accept the mechanical
"enemy of my enemy is my friend" claims that the Syrian regime
is somehow a fraternal bastion of anti-imperialist legitimacy,
will be crucial.

SYRIA, RESISTANCE, ANTI-IMPERIALISM?

Syria's position, geographic and political, and the resulting
interest in it from outside actors, makes things very
complicated. The country lies on the fault lines of the Middle
East - from sectarian divides in war-battered Iraq and
precariously- balanced multi-confessional Lebanon and across
the broader region, to great power competition including the
U.S. and NATO vs. Russia, to the Arab- Israeli conflict, to the
roles of non-Arab Turkey and Iran. There is a crucial
divergence between the role the Assad regime has played
domestically and its regional position. As Jadaliyya co-editor
Bassam Haddad has written, "most people in the region are
opposed to the Syrian regime's domestic behavior during the
past decades, but they are not opposed to its regional role.
The problem is the Syrian regime's internal repression, not
its external policies." That opinion could describe the view
of many Syrians as well.

Of course unlike Egypt or Tunisia the target of Syria's
original non-violent protests was not a U.S.- backed dictator
but a brutal though somewhat popular leader at the center of
the anti-western resistance arc of the Middle East. Of course
even if Assad had played a consistent anti-imperialist role in
the region, Syrians would have every right and reason to
challenge his regime's brutality and denial of human rights.
But the claim led some international activists to lionize the
Syrian government as a bastion of anti-imperialism and
therefore to condemn all opposition forces as lackeys of
Washington.

In fact the regime's reality is far different. Certainly the
U.S. views Syria, largely based on its alliance with Iran (and
somewhat for its support of Hezbollah in Lebanon) as an
irritant. But Damascus has never been a consistent opponent of
U.S. interests. In 1976 it backed a massive attack by right-
wing Falangists and other Christian militias against the
Palestinian refugee camp at Tel al-Zataar during Lebanon's
civil war. In 1991 Syria sent warplanes to join the U.S. war
coalition to attack Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. After 9/11
George W. Bush collaborated with the Assad regime to send
innocent detainees such as Maher Arar to be interrogated and
tortured in Syria.

It is also crucial to note which important U.S. ally in the
Middle East has been uncharacteristically silent regarding the
Syrian uprising: Israel. One would have expected Tel Aviv to
be leading the calls for military intervention against Syria,
the demands for regime change, the constant drumbeat of
demonization and the calls for war. But Israel has been
largely silent - because despite the rhetorical and diplomatic
antagonism between the two, Syria has been a generally
reliable and predictable neighbor. The occasional border clash
or small-scale eruption of violence aside, Assad has kept the
border, and thus the economically strategic and water-rich
Golan Heights, illegally occupied by Israel since 1967,
largely quiescent. As late as 2009 Assad was offering Israel
negotiations "without preconditions" over the Golan Heights.
And further, Assad is a known quantity; despite Syria's close
ties to Iran, Israel has little interest in a post-Assad Syria
like today's Libya, with uncontrolled borders, unaccountable
militias, arms flooding in and out, rising Islamist influence,
and a weak, illegitimate and corrupt government ultimately
unable to secure the country. For Israel, the "anti-
imperialist" Assad still looks pretty good.

ORIGINS, IMPACTS & CONSEQUENCES

The Syrian uprising that began in early 2011 was part of the
broader regional rising that became known as the Arab Spring.
Like their counterparts, Syria's non-violent protesters poured
into the streets with political/democratic demands that broke
open a generations-long culture of fear and political
paralysis. Like those who mobilized against U.S.- backed
dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, the Syrian
protesters were both secular and religious, reflecting a wide
diversity of backgrounds and opinions. There were calls for
democratization, demands that long-silenced voices be heard
and empowered, and for immediate and massive political
changes.

For some that meant that the regime must end, some were
willing to negotiate with the government without Assad, still
others called for broad reforms, ending political repression
and opening the political system, within the existing
governing structures. But at first none called for
international military intervention.

Then, like in Libya, some in the Syrian opposition,
particularly military defectors, took up arms in response to
the regime's brutal suppression of the initially non-violent
protests. The defensive use of arms soon morphed into a
network of militias and fighters, largely unaccountable and
uncoordinated - some of whom later began to call for military
assistance.

Now some U.S. and supporters of western military intervention
in Syria, last year's assault on Libya provides the model of
how to respond to a human rights/humanitarian crisis. They
believe it was a victory for human rights when a couple of
European leaders proposed a no-fly zone, and part of the anti-
Qaddafi opposition eagerly accepted their offer, and part of
the Arab League and part of Europe and part of the Obama
administration and most of NATO agreed. With the fig leaf of
Arab League approval (the African Union was sidelined as soon
as it refused to support the military assault), the U.S./NATO
warplanes quickly became the air force of the armed Libyan
opposition, the "no-fly zone" was immediately transformed into
an all-out air war and bombing campaign, and "protection of
civilians" was instantly redefined as regime change.

But they were wrong to see it as a "human rights victory" then
and they are more visibly wrong now. A year later, following
the overthrow (and killing) of Qaddafi and the deaths of
thousands of Libyans, the now-divided country struggles with
out-of-control militias holding thousands of prisoners,
torture, escalating violence, continuing attacks on sub-
Saharan Africans and other foreigners, a virtually powerless
government with more legitimacy in the West than at home, and
a shattered national, social and physical infrastructure.

The impact of a military strike in Syria could be even worse.
Syria's conflict poses far more complex challenges than any of
the earlier derailments from the non-violent mobilizations of
the Arab Spring in Bahrain, Yemen or even Libya. Inside the
country, the nature of Syria's diverse economy, its strong
middle class, the once relatively small gap between Syrian
wealth and poverty, all mean that the regime maintains some
level of legitimacy despite years of repression against
political critics. Bashar al-Assad appears to maintain
significantly more support than did Muammar Qaddafi in Libya,
for instance. The Assad regime's own minority status
strengthens claims it is protecting other Syrian minorities.
And the tight links between ruling family and the military,
mean that despite significant numbers of increasingly high-
level military defections, the government and top military
command appear largely intact. If the defections, such as the
high- visibility flight to Jordan of Syrian air force officer
in their Russian-made MiG fighter plane, escalate, the
military capacity of the regime will be seriously undermined.
But so far, the military-government unity remains viable.

For ordinary Syrians, struggling to survive amid escalating
fighting, with virtually no access to electricity, water or
medical assistance in more and more cities, the only hope
starts with ending the fighting. The best - probably the only
- useful thing outside powers can do, would be to move
immediately towards serious new diplomacy, in which supporters
of both the regime and the armed opposition participate, with
the goal of imposing an immediate ceasefire. Kofi Annan's call
for just such a diplomatic option could be the start, if
Washington could be pressured to reverse its opposition.

Such a diplomatic channel - bringing together Iran and Russia
on one side, the U.S., EU, Turkey and pro-western Arab
monarchies on the other, under UN auspices - would not solve
all the problems that led to the Syrian crisis. The United
Nations, particularly the veto-bound Security Council, remains
thoroughly undemocratic, with U.S. domination a longstanding
challenge. This kind of diplomacy would likely not reflect all
the diverse interests of the Syrian people - but it would stop
the current escalation towards full-scale civil war, and
perhaps open enough political space to re-empower the original
indigenous non-violent democratic movements in Syria. It will
only work if it is kept out of the UN's currently popular
"responsibility to protect" (R2P) framework, which inevitably
leads to outside military force.

The best the Annan plan could achieve would be to bring enough
pressure to bear on the two sides (assuming the
U.S./western/Arab monarchy side and the Russian/Iranian side
could agree on a goal) to reverse the current military
escalation and perhaps impose a lasting ceasefire, long enough
to force real negotiations inside Syria between a re-
empowered internal opposition and the regime on some kind of
political transition. Finding agreement between the diplomatic
sponsors, let alone between the two sides inside Syria, will
obviously not be easy.

But only with an end to the war, will the original unarmed
opposition forces have a chance to remobilize public support
for the internal, non- violent protest movement for real
change, reclaiming social movements for Syria's own freedom
and democracy, and reasserting Syria's place in the Arab
Spring.

===

THE UPRISING

There are at least five distinct forces at play in the Syrian
uprising:

 * The regime - power largely concentrated in the extended
 Assad family and broader Alawite community; political
 leadership closely interconnected with top military command
 and mukhabarat (secret police). Maintains some popular
 support also from key business and banking powers in Syria,
 especially in Damascus and Aleppo. Has political support and
 some military assistance from Iran; recent expressions of
 political support from ALBA countries of Latin America
 (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela) in context of
 U.S. and other western threats. Key military and commercial
 ties with Russia, especially through providing Russia with
 naval base at Tartus. Higher- level defections from military
 on the increase.

 * The original non-violent opposition - broad and diverse,
 secular and faith-based. Many activists came together in new
 informal coalitions and groupings that bypassed some older,
 more staid organizations. Maintains opposition to arming of
 opposition and especially to any outside military
 intervention. These activists were the primary force of the
 early uprising, but achieved less visibility as regime's
 repression targeting non-violent actions succeeded in
 suppressing protests, international media was largely
 excluded, and internal independent media focused primarily on
 attacks on civilians. Renewed attention in recent months,
 including documenting street protests that are continuing
 despite civil war-like conditions in the country. It appears
 that more public mobilizations, including but not limited to
 street protests, are on the rise again with broadly
 democratic participation, especially in and around the major
 cities of Damascus and Aleppo, once known as relative
 strongholds of regime support. In April a young woman stood
 alone outside the parliament in Damascus with a banner that
 read "Stop the Killing, we want to build a homeland for all
 Syrians." Islamist forces are among those involved in the
 non- violent opposition; longtime Syrian non-violent leader
 Sheikh Jawad Said.

The non-violent opposition also includes the National
Coordination Committee, made up of 13 political parties
including some leftist forces, and independent mainly secular
activists. They are against any military intervention,
including a so- called "no-fly zone" (that opened the assault
on Libya); their leader, Hussein Abdul Azim, said "we reject
foreign intervention - we think it is as dangerous as tyranny.
We reject both."They do, however, support economic sanctions
and diplomatic pressure against Assad. The NCC does not call
for overthrowing the regime, but instead for a national
dialogue - though it does not support Assad's proposed
dialogue initiative, but rather a process conditioned on the
pullback of military forces from the streets, ending attacks
on peaceful protests, and release of all political prisoners.
Some in the NCC have called for trying to replace the SNC as
the "official" or recognized representative of the Syrian
opposition.

 * The internal Syrian armed opposition - originally based on
 military defectors who created Free Syrian Army, morphed into
 assorted militias using FSA name, but with little central
 coordination; includes both defectors and armed civilians.
 FSA leaders have admitted they are not in control of the
 proliferation of groups of armed civilians operating under
 the FSA name. In recent weeks numbers of soldiers reported
 killed have escalated, as have reports of direct fights
 between regime soldiers and armed opposition groups. Appear
 to be receiving heavier weapons from Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
 Turkey is providing logistical support to transfer weapons,
 and U.S. providing "non-lethal" military equipment including
 night-vision goggles, GPS gear, etc.

 * The internal/external supporters of the armed opposition -
 grouped primarily in the Syrian National Council (SNC), and
 call explicitly for overthrow of the regime. Includes Muslim
 Brotherhood, Local Coordination Committees (grassroots
 activist groups inside Syria), Kurdish factions, and others,
 including exile factions. Muslim Brotherhood probably most
 organized single organization within it; consistent
 disagreements over Islamist influence. Have political base
 outside Syria, in Italy and Turkey. Originally claimed to
 defend non-violent nature of uprising but later called for
 coordinating role over armed factions inside and control of
 all weapons going in (FSA says will not cooperate with that,
 want weapons directly). At least some of SNC leadership
 calling for outside military assistance. The SNC recently
 asked individual countries to provide the Syrian opposition
 with "military advisers, training and provision of arms to
 defend themselves."Very diverse politically, secular and
 Islamist, have had continuing problems with achieving enough
 unity to engage with international forces. Despite divisions,
 uncertain leadership and questionable levels support from
 inside Syria, SNC has been adopted by western (U.S., parts of
 EU) and Arab Gulf (Saudi, Qatar) governments and to some
 degree Turkey. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said
 "they will have a seat at the table as a representative of
 the Syrian people."The SNC has appeared weaker in recent
 months.

Largely through the SNC, the U.S. is providing the Syrian
opposition with "non-lethal" military supplies, including
communications gear, GPS equipment more. Washington is also
apparently supporting some kind of military training and
backing efforts to unify the disparate opposition elements
into a more coherent whole.

 * Non-Syrian armed forces - unknown forces, apparently mostly
 non-Syrian, including volunteers or others from international
 Islamist fighting groups appear to be arriving to fight in
 Syria. Goals unclear, could include opposition to
 Alawite/Shi'a government (Alawites considered an off- shoot
 of Shi'a Islam, and thus heretical to some extremist Sunni
 fundamentalists), and/or efforts to create chaos through
 military attacks resulting in power vacuums they might hope
 to fill.

===

[Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of the Transnational Institute in
Amsterdam and of the Institute for Policy Studies in
Washington. Her books include Calling the Shots: How
Washington Dominates Today's UN.]

==========

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